State ex rel. Adult and Family Services Div. v. Bradley

• Decision Date: 29 June 1983
• Docket Number: Nos. TC,s. TC
• Citation: 295 Or. 216,666 P.2d 249
• Parties: STATE of Oregon ex rel. ADULT AND FAMILY SERVICES DIVISION, Respondent on Review, v. Richard Paul BRADLEY, Petitioner on Review. D 8008 66894, CA A22419, SC 28949.
• Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Page 249

666 P.2d 249

295 Or. 216

STATE of Oregon ex rel. ADULT AND FAMILY SERVICES DIVISION Respondent on Review, v. Richard Paul BRADLEY, Petitioner on Review.

Nos. TC D 8008 66894, CA A22419, SC 28949.

Supreme Court of Oregon.

Argued and Submitted Feb. 8, 1983.

Decided June 29, 1983.

Gerald D. Wygant, Portland, argued the cause and filed the briefs for petitioner on review.

Paul J. Lipscomb, Salem, argued the cause for respondent on review. With him on the brief was Blair, MacDonald, Jensen & Lipscomb, Salem.

Before LENT, C.J., and PETERSON, CAMPBELL, ROBERTS, CARSON and JONES, JJ. ^*

ROBERTS, Justice.

The state brought a filiation proceeding under ORS 109.125(1)(b) to establish defendant's support obligation for a child to whom it was furnishing support. ¹ The child was born on October 7, 1972. Plaintiff brought this action in August, 1980, when the child was seven years and 10 months old. The statute of limitation in effect when the child was born limited the time for bringing filiation proceedings to six years from birth. ORS 109.135(3). ² Defendant raised the statute of limitation as a defense. Plaintiff responded with an equal protection challenge to the limitation period. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals held that the six year statute of limitation violated the illegitimate child's right to equal protection of the laws because it denied her the right to paternal support to which legitimate children are entitled throughout their minority. ³ The trial court held that "the 'illegitimate' child's right to support from the natural parent is a substantial right and is a right equal to that of the 'legitimate' child's. Hence, any statute limiting this right during a child's minority works an illogical injustice on a child born out of wedlock and is constitutionally impermissible." The Court of Appeals, 58 Or.App. 663, 650 P.2d 91, ruled that "[w]eighing the state's interest in enacting the statutory limitation of six years against the constitutional rights of an illegitimate child to the protection of the laws equal to that afforded legitimate children, we hold that the six-year statute of limitations is unconstitutional." 58 Or.App. at 671, 650 P.2d 91. Under article I, section 20 of the Oregon Constitution we affirm.

In reaching its decision, the Court of Appeals relied on Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 102 S.Ct. 1549, 71 L.Ed.2d 770 (1982), decided after the trial court's decision in this case. Mills held unconstitutional a Texas one year statute of limitation for paternity actions. Prior to Mills, Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 93 S.Ct. 872, 35 L.Ed.2d 56 (1973), had compelled Texas to grant its illegitimate children paternal support rights. Texas chose not to bestow entitlements equal to those enjoyed by legitimate children. ⁴ Instead, an illegitimate child's substantive right to support existed only where the child was able to establish paternity within one year of its birth. See Mills, 456 U.S. at 94-95, 102 S.Ct. at 1552-1553. In Mills, the Supreme Court was faced with a twofold inquiry: 1) whether the state had provided illegitimate children an adequate opportunity to obtain support as required by Gomez and, 2) if it had, whether the time limitation was substantially related to the state's interest in avoiding the litigation of stale or fraudulent claims. The court found the statute inadequate on both points. (

FN5)

Our analysis of illegitimate children's rights to support begins from a different premise. We need not consider the first prong of the Mills test, the adequacy of the illegitimate child's substantive right to support, because under Oregon law all children are entitled to the same rights whether or not their parents have married. ORS 109.060. ⁶ This includes the right to support from both parents throughout minority. ORS 109.010, ⁷ 109.100. ⁸ We have no occasion to consider whether some lesser support right may be constitutionally "adequate." By statutory mandate the only adequate right is an equal right. These statutes reflect the principle set forth in article I, section 20 that classes of citizens cannot be denied privileges by virtue of personal characteristics, in this instance the circumstances of birth. Rather, we proceed to the second consideration in Mills and examine what reasons support the six year statute of limitation on filiation proceedings. That limitation period, by foreclosing initiation of filiation proceedings beyond a child's sixth birthday, erects a procedural barrier to the exercise of support rights to which a child is entitled until the age of 18, and it does so on the basis of illegitimacy, a status which defines a class to whom equal privileges have been otherwise extended by law.

Oregon regulates the methods by which paternity may be established in ORS 109.070. ⁹ That statute grants presumptions of paternity for children born of married parents and provides that paternity may be otherwise resolved by marriage of the parents after the birth of the child, by filiation proceedings, by parental acknowledgment, and by other provisions of law. These other provisions have been held to include a determination of paternity under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, ORS 110.005 et seq., Clarkston v. Bridge, 273 Or. 68, 539 P.2d 1094 (1975); a declaratory judgment proceeding, where the plaintiff mother is not the proper plaintiff to bring a filiation proceeding under ORS 109.124 and 109.125(1)(a), ¹⁰ Fox v. Hohenshelt, 275 Or. 91, 549 P.2d 1117 (1976); and a declaratory judgment after the death of the putative father to determine heirship pursuant to ORS 111.095(2) and 28.040, Thom v. Bailey, 257 Or. 572, 481 P.2d 355 (1971). This court has never considered whether the limitation period of ORS 109.135(3) applies when paternity is established or declared "by other provision of law." It is apparent, however, that, at least in the context of an heirship proceeding, paternity may be established at any time during the life of the child without regard to the amount of time since the child's birth. ORS 112.105. ¹¹

We must consider whether, in light of this inconsistent application, there is something unique to the determination of paternity in the context of a filiation proceeding which justifies the imposition of this limitation period.

Defendant asserts that the time limit provides putative fathers necessary protection from stale and fraudulent claims, and from defense of claims at a time when rebuttal evidence may have disappeared.

Difficulties of proof are a valid and important consideration in the regulation of paternity proceedings. However, the federal equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires at a minimum that states refrain from totally foreclosing the rights of illegitimate children for reasons of proof problems alone. Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628, 94 S.Ct. 2496, 41 L.Ed.2d 363 (1974); Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 96 S.Ct. 2755, 49 L.Ed.2d 651 (1976). ¹² These cases are founded on the premise that if the state seeks to address difficulties of proof of paternity it must do so by alternatives which deal directly with that issue and in some way short of a total preclusion of the rights of illegitimate children. Article I, section 20 of the Oregon Constitution requires no less.

We have held that the appropriate beginning point in the analysis of a constitutional claim is with our own constitution. Hewitt v. SAIF, 294 Or. 33, 41-42, 653 P.2d 970 (1982); State v. Caraher, 293 Or. 741, 750-52, 653 P.2d 942 (1982); Sterling v. Cupp, 290 Or. 611, 614, 625 P.2d 123 (1981).

Article I, section 20 of the Oregon Constitution provides:

"No law shall be passed granting to any citizen or class of citizens privileges, or immunities, which, upon the same terms, shall not equally belong to all citizens."

The clause protects against a law's disparate treatment of groups or persons by virtue of characteristics by which it would be otherwise impermissible to classify people. Illegitimacy is one such characteristic. Our laws have made steady progress toward eliminating the legal disabilities under which illegitimate children have labored. See Thom v. Bailey, supra, 257 Or. at 579-84, 481 P.2d 355; see also ORS 656.005(6) which eliminates any distinction between legitimate and illegitimate children for purposes of the Workers' Compensation laws.

The statutory scheme reflected in the filiation statute, ORS 109.125, imposes a limitation period only on children "born out of wedlock," see supra, note 10, and only on children seeking to establish paternity for purposes of support. We have shown that all children regardless of the circumstances of their birth may prove paternity for purposes of inheritance so long as they do so within ten years of the death of the putative father. Further, a legitimate child seeking to prove paternity who does not meet the statutory definition of "child born out of wedlock" may not employ the filiation statute and would not be subject to its limitation period. The statute classifies illegitimate children seeking to prove paternity for purposes of support less favorably than legitimate children who prove paternity for any purpose and illegitimate children who prove paternity for the resolution of heirship. This classification is drawn upon a characteristic, the circumstances of birth, which our laws in other areas have eliminated as an impediment to the exercise of a person's rights.

We recognize that the consequence of illegitimacy is that the child has no legally recognized father. By necessity the illegitimate child must prove paternity while its legitimate counterpart need not. We also recognize that the requirements for such proof are established by the state. Because equality in support rights means nothing if the father remains unknown, any limitations placed on the child's ability to prove paternity must be narrowly drawn, for a state may as easily discriminate...