State ex rel. Ames v. Geauga Cnty. Republican Cent. & Exec. Comms.
| Decision Date | 23 August 2021 |
| Docket Number | 2021-G-0004 |
| Parties | STATE OF OHIO ex rel. BRIAN M. AMES, Relator-Appellant, v. GEAUGA COUNTY REPUBLICAN CENTRAL AND EXECUTIVE COMMITTEES, et al., Respondents-Appellees. |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
Civil Appeal from the Court of Common Pleas Trial Court No. 2021 M 000093
Brian M. Ames, pro se, (Relator-Appellant).
Nancy C. Schuster, Schuster & Simmons Co., LPA, (For Respondents-Appellees).
{¶1} Appellant, Brian Ames ("Mr. Ames"), appeals the judgment of the Geauga County Court of Common Pleas dismissing his complaint against appellees, Geauga County Republican Central and Executive Committees and Nancy B McArthur in her official capacity as chairman (collectively the "appellees"), for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
{¶2} Mr. Ames's complaint alleged that the appellees violated R.C. 121.22, i.e., the Open Meetings Act (the "OMA"), when he was denied access to a meeting at which the committees selected a qualified elector to fill the vacancy of a Republican member of the Geauga County Board of Elections.
{¶3} Mr. Ames asserts one assignment of error, contending that the trial court erred by granting the appellees' motion to dismiss for the following reasons: (1) pursuant to precedent from the Supreme Court of the United States, county central and executive committees of a political party are "external intermediaries" created to serve public policy and are subject to the OMA at all times; (2) R.C 3501.07 confers upon a county executive committee more than the power to make and file a recommendation for an appointment to the county board of elections; and (3) the appointment to fill a vacancy in a county board of elections is not an internal affair of a county political party.
{¶4} After a careful review of the record and pertinent law, we find that Mr. Ames can prove no set of facts entitling him to relief for the following reasons:
{¶5} (1) The Supreme Court decision that Mr. Ames cites does not establish that county central and executive committees are "public bodies" that are subject to the OMA at all times.
{¶6} (2) Since R.C. 3501.07 only applies to a county executive committee, not a county central committee, the statute does not provide a legal basis for determining that a county central committee is a "public body" that is subject to the OMA.
{¶7} (3) While R.C. 3501.07 authorizes a county executive committee to recommend an elector for appointment, the statute does not delegate to the county executive committee "one of the sovereign functions of government, to be exercised for the public benefit." The "sovereign function" at issue is the power of appointment, which the General Assembly expressly granted to the secretary of state.
{¶8} Thus, the Geauga County Court of Common Pleas properly dismissed Mr. Ames's complaint, and we affirm its judgment.
{¶9} In February 2021, Mr. Ames, as "relator," filed a "verified complaint in mandamus, declaratory judgment and injunction for enforcement of R.C. 121.22," naming as "respondents" the "Geauga County Republican Central and Executive Committees"[1] and "Nancy B. McArthur in her official capacity as chairman."
{¶10} Mr. Ames alleged that the General Assembly, by enacting R.C. 3501.07, has empowered the executive committee to make and file a recommendation with the Ohio Secretary of State for the appointment of a qualified elector to fill the vacancy of a Republican member of the Geauga County Board of Elections. On February 6, 2021, the committees held a meeting for that purpose in anticipation of the expiration of a Republican member's term on March 1. Chairman McArthur denied Mr. Ames and others entrance to the meeting, despite Mr. Ames informing her that the meeting was required by law to be an open meeting.
{¶11} Mr. Ames alleged that the committees are "statutorily created public bodies for the purpose of performing a statutory function"; the OMA applies to the meeting; and the conduct of the meeting was in violation of the OMA. He sought a finding that the appellees committed a violation of the OMA; a mandatory injunction pursuant to R.C. 121.22(I)(1); a civil forfeiture of $500 pursuant to R.C. 121.22(I)(2)(a); and costs and reasonable attorney fees pursuant to R.C. 121.22(I)(2)(a).
{¶12} The appellees appeared through counsel and filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6), contending that the committees were not "public bodies" pursuant to the OMA when the county executive committee met pursuant to R.C. 3501.07 to make a recommendation for an appointment to the county board of elections. Mr. Ames filed a memorandum in opposition.
{¶13} In March 2021, the trial court filed an order finding "beyond doubt" that Mr. Ames can prove no set of facts that would warrant the requested relief and dismissed Mr. Ames's complaint with prejudice.
{¶14} Mr. Ames appealed and presents the following assignment of error:
{¶15} "The trial court erred by granting Respondents' Motion to Dismiss."
{¶16} Mr. Ames also presents the following five issues for review and argument:
{¶17} "[1.] Are the county central and executive committees created by R.C. 3517.03 external intermediaries between the state and a county political party or internal structures imposed upon the party?
{¶18} "[2.] Did the General Assembly by the enactment of R.C. 3501.07 confer upon a county executive committee more than the making and filing of a recommendation with the secretary of state for the appointment of a qualified elector to fill a vacancy in the respective county board of elections?
{¶19} "[3.] Is the appointment of a qualified elector to fill a vacancy in a county board of elections an internal affair of a county political party?
{¶20} "[4.] Is this Court's ruling in Jones v. Geauga Cty Republican Party Cent. Commt, 2017-Ohio-2930 applicable to this case?
{¶21}
{¶22} An order granting a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss is subject to de novo review. Perrysburg Twp. v. Rossford, 103 Ohio St.3d 79, 2004-Ohio-4362, 814 N.E.2d 44, ¶ 5.
{¶23} A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is procedural and tests the sufficiency of the complaint. State ex rel. Hanson v. Guernsey Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 65 Ohio St.3d 545, 548, 605 N.E.2d 378 (1992). In resolving a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion, courts are confined to the allegations in the complaint and cannot consider outside materials. State ex rel. Baran v. Fuerst, 55 Ohio St.3d 94, 97, 563 N.E.2d 713 (1990). In construing the complaint, a court must presume that all factual allegations are true and make all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Mitchell v. Lawson Milk Co., 40 Ohio St.3d 190, 192, 532 N.E.2d 753 (1988). However, a court should not accept as true any unsupported legal conclusions in the complaint. See id. at 193.
{¶24} A complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt from the face of the complaint that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts entitling him to recover. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. v. PUCO, 76 Ohio St.3d 521, 524, 668 N.E.2d 889 (1996). If, after considering the complaint accordingly, there is no set of facts consistent with the appellant's allegations that would permit recovery, the judgment of dismissal will be affirmed. Grybosky v. Ohio Civ. Rights Comm., 11th Dist. Ashtabula No. 2010-A-0047, 2011-Ohio-6843, ¶ 15.
{¶25} The determinative issue in this case is a legal one: whether a major political party's county central and executive committees are "public bodies" that are subject to the OMA.
{¶26} The OMA begins with a pronouncement: "This section shall be liberally construed to require public officials to take official action and to conduct all deliberations upon official business only in open meetings unless the subject matter is specifically excepted by law.'" State ex rel. More Bratenahl v. Bratenahl, 157 Ohio St.3d 309 2019-Ohio-3233, 136 N.E.3d 447, ¶ 8, quoting R.C. 121.22(A). "It directs that '[a]ll meetings of any public body are declared to be public meetings open to the public at all times.'" (Emphasis added.) Id., quoting R.C. 121.22(C). It also provides that "'[a] resolution, rule, or formal action of any kind is invalid unless adopted in an open meeting of the public body.'" Id., quoting R.C. 121.22(H). It authorizes "[a]ny person" to "bring an action to enforce" the OMA. R.C. 121.22(I)(1).
{¶27} The term "public body" is defined, in relevant part, as any of the following:
{¶28} "(a) Any board, commission, committee, council, or similar decision-making body of a state agency, institution, or authority, and any legislative authority or board, commission, committee, council, agency, authority, or similar decision-making body of any county, township, municipal corporation, school district, or other political subdivision or local public institution;
{¶29} "(b) Any committee or subcommittee of a body described in division (B)(1)(a) of this section * * *" (Emphasis added.) R.C. 121.22(B)(1)(a) and (b).
{¶30} The term "meeting" is defined as "any prearranged discussion of the public business of the public body by a majority of its members." (Emphasis added.) R.C. 121.22(B)(2).
{¶31} The term "public business" is not defined in the OMA. The Supreme Court of Ohio has defined it as "the business of the government," "matters within the purview of a public body's duties, functions and jurisdiction," and "those matters over which the public governmental body has supervision,...
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