State ex rel. and To Use of Jamison v. St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Company
| Citation | 300 S.W. 274,318 Mo. 285 |
| Decision Date | 02 December 1927 |
| Docket Number | 25954 |
| Parties | The State ex rel. and to use of Adlai J. Jamison, Collector of Revenue for Shannon County, v. St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Company, Appellant |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Missouri |
Appeal from Carter Circuit Court; Hon. E. P. Dorris, Judge.
Affirmed.
E T. Miller, Ward & Reeves and W. J. Orr for appellant.
(1) "For county purposes the annual rate on property in counties having six million dollars or less shall not, in the aggregate, exceed fifty cents on the one-hundred-dollar valuation; in counties having six million dollars and under ten million dollars, said rate shall not exceed forty cents on the hundred-dollar valuation." Constitution, Art. 10 sec. 2. "The rate herein allowed each county shall be ascertained by the amount of taxable property therein according to the last assessment for state and county purposes" Constitution, Art. 10, sec. 2. It is stipulated that the last assessment showed a total valuation of $ 6,006,083.58 when the county court made the levy of fifty cents for county purposes. (3) "The last assessment for state and county purposes," as used in the Constitution, means the last completed assessment as corrected and approved by the State Board of Equalization. State ex rel. v. Wabash Ry. Co., 251 Mo. 134. (4) Any statutory provisions which are in conflict with the plain letter of the above constitutional requirements must give way. State ex rel. v. Wabash Ry. Co., 251 Mo. 134. (5) The Constitution does not fix a definite time for the levying of county taxes, but Sec. 12863, R. S. 1919, provides that this may be done at the May term of the county court. State ex rel. v. Wabash, supra. (6) Sec. 12817, R. S. 1919, relied on by the plaintiff as authority to sustain the fifty-cent levy, has no application. If given the effect contended for, its operation might unsettle one of the things the Constitution contemplates must be fixed and settled for each year; that is, the rate which shall be imposed for that year.
Action by the Collector of Revenue of Shannon County to collect taxes claimed to be due said county from appellant, together with interest, penalty and attorney's fees. The venue was changed to Carter County. There the trial court entered judgment for plaintiff and defendant was granted an appeal to this court. The disposition of the appeal involves a construction of the revenue laws of this State; hence our appellate jurisdiction.
Respondent contends that Shannon County was entitled in 1923 to levy for county purposes a rate of fifty cents on each one hundred dollars of assessed valuation. Appellant contends that said county could not levy at a rate in excess of forty cents. It seems that the amount sued for represents the difference between the amount of taxes for county purposes paid by appellant on the forty-cent basis and the amount claimed by respondent to be due on the fifty-cent basis.
The case was submitted below on the following stipulated facts:
The County Board of Equalization finally ad-
journed April 23, 1923.
"4th.
The County Court made the tax levy at the
May term, 1923.
which re-
duced the total valuation of the county below
$ 6,000,000.
The Merchants' Tax Book is received in the
month of September, 1923.
Article X, Section 11, of our Constitution, limits the rate which counties may levy for taxes for county purposes to fifty cents on the one hundred-dollar valuation, where the assessed valuation of all property in the county is $ 6,000,000 or less. Where such assessed valuation exceeds $ 6,000,000 and is under $ 10,000,000, the maximum rate is forty cents for each one hundred dollars of valuation. Hence, if the total assessed valuation of Shannon County, by which the lawful rate was ascertainable, did not exceed $ 6,000,000, the rate of fifty cents was legally assessed and the judgment should be affirmed. If such valuation exceeded $ 6,000,000, the maximum rate was forty cents and the judgment below should be reversed.
Article X, Section 11, of the Constitution, also provides that "the rate herein allowed to each county shall be ascertained by the amount of taxable property therein, according to the last assessment for state and county purposes."
The first question to be determined is what is meant by the "last assessment," as those words are used in Article X, Section 11, of the Constitution. If they mean the completed assessment for 1923 and if the County Court of Shannon County had no power to reduce the assessment below $ 6,000,000 by making certain "corrections," as appellant contends, then the levy made by the county court was excessive and invalid.
The case of State ex rel. Blades v. Wabash Railroad Co., 251 Mo. 134, 158 S.W. 26, cited and relied on by appellant, if soundly ruled, is authority strongly supporting appellant's contention that the last assessment, by which the legality of the levy must be ascertained, is the completed assessment for 1923, even though such assessment was not completed until after October 15, 1923.
There is nothing in Article X, Section 11, of the Constitution which requires the assessment, made in the year the levy is made and in the year in which the taxes are payable, to be taken as and for the "last assessment." The term "last assessment" means the last completed assessment. The Wabash case so holds. [See also State ex rel. Carthage v. Hackmann, 287 Mo. l. c. 188, 229 S.W. 1078; Steinbrenner v. St. Joseph, 285 Mo. l. c. 325, 226 S.W. 890; State ex rel. Dexter v. Gordon, 251 Mo. l. c. 309, 158 S.W. 683.] It must therefore be regarded as finally settled in this State that the words "last assessment," as used in Article X, Section 11, and in Article X, Section 12, of the Constitution, means the last completed assessment.
The term "last assessment" is merely an arbitrary measuring rod which is not necessarily accurate at the time it is applied. In fixing the limit of indebtedness under Article X, Section 12, the "assessment next before the last assessment" is used as the measuring rod, notwithstanding the actual assessed value in the taxing district may have markedly increased or decreased between the date of such "assessment next before the last assessment" and the time when the particular bonds are voted.
Although the statute does not specifically provide that the county court shall make the levy of taxes for county purposes at any particular time, such time is quite limited perforce of other provisions. Section 12863, Revised Statutes 1919, requires the county court to determine the sum necessary to be raised for county purposes and to fix the rate necessary to raise that amount as soon as may be after the assessor's books shall be corrected and adjusted according to law. This must be at or before the May term of each year because, at that term, the county court is authorized and empowered to appropriate, apportion and subdivide all of the revenues collected and to be collected, etc. [Sec. 12866, R. S. 1919.] The legislative intent that the levy should be made at or before the May term is thus quite manifest. [State ex rel. v. Wabash Railroad Co., supra, l. c. 141.]
Thus the county court is at least authorized and empowered to make the levy for county purposes at its May term and, in fixing the rate of such levy, the court is governed by the last assessment, which means the last assessment completed at the time such levy is made. It can mean nothing else. If the assessment for the current year is completed at the time the levy is made, well and good. That assessment can be used as the measuring rod to ascertain the rate which can legally be levied. If the assessment for the current year is not complete at that time, then the completed assessment for the previous year must be used.
As a matter of fact, the valuation of merchants' stocks for the current year can never be definitely known at the May term of the county court, for the simple reason that merchants are not required to make their returns until the first Monday in June and such valuations cannot be equalized until the first Monday in September. [Sec. 13071, R. S 1919.] When the valuation fixed by the State Board of Equalization for railroad and telegraph property is not certified until after the May term of the county court, such valuation cannot be used at that time as any part of the "last assessment." As appears by the stipulation, the State Board of Equalization did not certify the valuation of the railroad and telegraph property for 1923 until October 15th. Neither the railroad and telegraph valuation nor the merchants valuation for the year 1923 was before the County Court of Shannon County at its May term, when it came time to and it did fix the tax rate for 1923. There was no statute nor constitutional provision which required the county court to wait until the State Board of...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State on Inf. Huffman v. Sho-Me Power Co-op.
... ... Corporation, Empire District Electric Company and Missouri Utilities Company, Intervenors No ... 275, 167 S.W. 965; State ex rel ... School District v. Hackman, 292 Mo. 27, ... Co., 198 S.W. 494; ... State ex rel. Jamison v. St. Louis-S. F. Ry., 318 ... Mo. 285, 300 ... ...
-
State ex rel. Long-Hall Laundry & Dry Cleaning Co. v. Bland
... ... at the Relation of Long-Hall Laundry & Dry Cleaning Company, and Employers Mutual Liability Insurance Company, ... ...
-
State ex rel. and to Use of Hughes v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co.
... ... Southwestern Bell Telephone Company, Appellant Nos. 38800, 38801 Supreme Court of Missouri ... 976; State ex rel. and ... to the use of Jamison v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry ... Co., 300 S.W. 274, 318 ... 1939; St ... Louis and S.F. Railway Co. v. Epperson, Tax Collector, ... 97 Mo. 300, 10 S.W ... ...
-
State ex rel. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lucas
... ... of Missouri at the relation of Aetna Life Insurance Company, Relator, v. Ray B. Lucas, Superintendent of Insurance ... ...