State ex rel. and to Use of Public Service Com'n v. Padberg

• Decision Date: 03 December 1940
• Docket Number: 37311
• Parties: State of Missouri at the relation and to the use of Public Service Commission of the State, Albert Bond Lambert, Samuel H. Liberman, Thomas L. Farrington and Otto F. Harting, Police Commissioners of the City of St. Louis; John H. Glassco, Chief of Police of the City of St. Louis; John F. Carroll, Chief of Detectives of the City of St. Louis; A. D. Sheppard, Acting Superintendent of the State Highway Patrol; Roy McKittrick, Attorney General of the State, Relators, v. Eugene L. Padberg, as Judge of the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis, and of Division No. 3 thereof
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

145 S.W.2d 150

346 Mo. 1133

State of Missouri at the relation and to the use of Public Service Commission of the State, Albert Bond Lambert, Samuel H. Liberman, Thomas L. Farrington and Otto F. Harting, Police Commissioners of the City of St. Louis; John H. Glassco, Chief of Police of the City of St. Louis; John F. Carroll, Chief of Detectives of the City of St. Louis; A. D. Sheppard, Acting Superintendent of the State Highway Patrol; Roy McKittrick, Attorney General of the State, Relators, v. Eugene L. Padberg, as Judge of the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis, and of Division No. 3 thereof

No. 37311

Supreme Court of Missouri

December 3, 1940

Provisional rule made absolute.

James H. Linton, Daniel C. Rogers, Edgar H. Wayman, Harold C Hanke and Covell R. Hewitt for relators.

(1) Circuit courts are without original jurisdiction of the subject matters included in the Public Service Commission Law, Chapter 33, Revised Statutes 1929, as amended by Laws 1931, pp. 304-316, inclusive, because, (a) The General Assembly has vested the Public Service Commission with exclusive power and authority, and it is its duty, in the first instance, within the scope of the statutes governing said Commission, administratively to make findings of fact interpret the pertinent law and make application thereof to the pertinent fact. State ex rel. Cirese v. Ridge, 138 S.W.2d 1012; State ex inf. v. Kansas City Gas Co., 254 Mo. 541, 163 S.W. 860; State ex rel. Kansas City Pub Serv. Co. v. Latshaw, 325 Mo. 909, 30 S.W.2d 111; Southwest Mo. Railroad Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 281 Mo. 52, 219 S.W. 380; Public Serv. Comm. v. Kansas City P. & L. Co., 325 Mo. 1217, 31 S.W.2d 67. (2) The circuit courts do not have jurisdiction . . . "to enjoin, restrain or interfere with the Commission in the performance of its official duties." State ex rel. Pub. Serv. Comm. v. Mulloy, 333 Mo. 282, 62 S.W.2d 730; State ex rel. Anderson v. Witthaus, 340 Mo. 1004, 102 S.W.2d 99; State ex rel. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co. v. Latshaw, 325 Mo. 909, 30 S.W.2d 111. (3) Circuit courts do not have any authority to declare rights and legal status under the Declaratory Judgment Act of 1935, because, (a) Said act is not applicable as a matter of law. Mo. Const., Sec. 5, Art. 12; 50 A. L. R. 48; 16 C. J. 295.

Godfrey, Anderson, Schurr & Taylor for respondent.

(1) The only issues before this court are the facts well pleaded in the petition of plaintiffs below for a "Declaratory Judgment and Other Relief" and the "Motion to Dismiss" of defendants below. 1 Houts, Mo. Pleading & Practice, secs. 100, 126, pp. 143, 255; Williams v. C., B. & Q. Ry. Co., 320 Mo. 46, 6 S.W.2d 929; State ex rel. McEntee v. Bright, 123 S.W. 1057, 224 Mo. 524; Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Eaves, 2 S.W.2d 194; Henley v. Henley, 5 S.W. 702. (2) The overruling by respondent judge of the "Motion to Dismiss" filed by defendants below (relators herein) was proper because: (a) Prosecutions for alleged violations of a criminal statute may be enjoined where the remedy is not adequate and such prosecution would work irreparable injury. Park Transportation Co. v. Highway Comm., 60 S.W.2d 389; State ex rel. Chase v. Hall, 297 Mo. 594, 250 S.W. 64; Merchants Exchange v. Knott, 212 Mo. 646, 111 S.W. 565, 14 R. C. L. 347; 4 Pomeroy, Equity Juris. (3 Ed.), p. 2678; Donovan v. Pa. Co., 199 U.S. 279, 26 S.Ct. 91; Commonwealth v. Ry. Co., 24 Pa. St. 159, 62 Am. Dec. 372; State ex rel. Anderson v. Witthaus, 340 Mo. 1004, 102 S.W.2d 99. (b) Under the pleadings below, the Public Service Commission is without authority over plaintiffs below. R. S. 1929, sec. 5234; Laws 1931, p. 316, sec. 5280; Campbell v. Cornish, 22 P.2d 69. (3) Respondent judge, in retaining jurisdiction over the issues presented in the petition for a "Declaratory Judgment and Other Relief," filed by plaintiffs below, did not exceed his authority. State ex rel. Laundry v. Pub. Serv. Co., 34 S.W.2d 37, 327 Mo. 93; State ex rel. United Rys. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 192 S.W. 958; State ex rel. M., K. & T. Ry. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 210 S.W. 386; State ex rel. K. C. Term. v. B. P. S. Co., 272 S.W. 957; Laws 1935, p. 218; Borchard, Declaratory Judgments, pp. 560-564, 592, 611.

OPINION

Douglas, J.

This is an original action in prohibition to stop a proceeding in the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis. That proceeding was instituted by some motor carriers to prevent the enforcement of the Bus and Truck Law against them on their claim of exemption under the terms of the law. Relators contend the circuit court is deprived of jurisdiction under the Public Service Commission Act.

In 1931 the Legislature adopted a new Article VIII of Chapter 33, R. S. 1929, of that Act which invested the Public Service Commission with the supervision, regulation and licensing of commercial hauling by motor vehicles over the public highways. [Mo. Stat. Ann., secs. 5264-5280.] Section 5280 provided that the act should not apply to trucks of one and one-half ton capacity and less. Certain other exemptions which are not pertinent to this case were also provided for. The act declares it unlawful for any common carrier by motor or for any contract hauler to operate without first obtaining from the commission the proper permit and paying the required license fee. The license fees are graduated according to the load capacity of the truck and commence with trucks having more than one and one-half ton capacity. In this connection the law vested in the commission the right to rate the capacity of the truck in computing the license fee "on the manufacturer's rated load capacity or the actual weight carrying capacity of the vehicle, which capacity shall be determined by the public service commission" at the time of issuing the permit. [Sec. 5272.] It seems that the commission has made it a practice not to rate according to the "manufacturer's rated load capacity" but has made its ratings on the actual weight carrying capacity and has determined also that actual weight carrying capacity is the basis of the exemption of trucks of one and one-half ton capacity and less. This latter determination has given rise to the present controversy.

The plaintiffs in the circuit court proceeding are several trucking companies and they are seeking a declaratory judgment for the construction of such exemption clause. They claim its correct construction would exempt trucks of "one and one-half ton capacity and less as rated by the manufacturer." They admit that they operate as common carriers or contract haulers in the State and that they use trucks of one and one-half ton capacity and less as rated by the manufacturers of said trucks and that they operate without a permit from the commission. They further admit that the commission asserts that their trucks are capable of carrying more than one and one-half tons and are therefore not exempt.

The commission tried unsuccessfully to have the suit in the circuit court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and thereupon applied here for prohibition.

The Public Service Commission Act provides by Section 5234, R. S 1929, for a judicial review of the decisions of the commission. In addition that section prohibits the courts from otherwise interfering with the commission in the performance of its official duties. Our courts have pointed out the wisdom of such orderly procedure. In an opinion by Judge Clark in the case of State ex rel. Public Service Commission v. Blair, No. 37,339, 347 Mo. --, 146 S.W.2d 865, considered contemporaneously herewith, we held "that no court can enjoin the Commission in the performance of its...