State ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. Martin

Citation125 Okla. 51,256 P. 667,1927 OK 148
Decision Date21 May 1927
Docket NumberCase Number: 18080
PartiesSTATE ex rel. ATTORNEY GENERAL v. MARTIN.
CourtSupreme Court of Oklahoma
Syllabus

¶0 1. Contempt--Nature of Proceeding--Sufficiency of Facts Charged.

Proceedings to punish for contempt as herein initiated is not a criminal prosecution. Such are regarded as sui generis. Information states facts sufficient to charge contempt.

2. Same--Direct Contempt of Court--Filing Contemptuous Motion Addressed to Supreme Court.

The preparation, signing, and filing of a motion with the clerk of the Supreme Court, addressed to the attention of the court, containing contemptuous language, is a direct contempt of this court under the statute and the common law in force in this state.

3. Same--Evidence Establishing Falsity of Charges of Misconduct of Judges Contained in Motion.

Evidence examined. It conclusively establishes the untruth of the charges of official misconduct of judges of this court as charged in the motion filed by respondent.

4. Same--Duty of Attorney to Ascertain Facts Before Filing Motion Charging Misconduct of Judge.

Where an attorney prepares, signs, and files a motion for leave to file petition for rehearing in a cause, charging dishonesty and other official misconduct on the part of a judge in the writing or filing of an opinion or judgment held, good faith on his part requires the most careful and thorough investigation as to the truthfulness of the averments therein.

5. Same--Bad Faith of Attorney in Failing to Verify Defamatory Statements of Client.

Evidence examined. Client had litigation where referee took testimony and filed recommendation awarding judgment in a fraud case against client; the report of referee was confirmed by the district court and the judgment was affirmed by the Supreme Court. Evidence shows client had every opportunity to be heard, and he had caused to be printed and circulated scurrilous articles attacking the integrity of the judges concurring in the opinion and judgment against him. Held, that respondent, employed to secure a rehearing, is not protected in adopting as averments of the truth upon information or otherwise statements of the client attacking the official conduct as herein done. He had opportunity to verify the statements of his client, and his failure to do so, together with his conduct herein, shows his bad faith.

6. Same--Bad Faith Shown by Reiteration of Charges After Failure of Proof of Charges on Hearing.

Where an attorney, who prepared and filed a motion charging judges of the court with official misconduct, is cited for contempt, and upon the trial fails to establish or attempt in good faith to prove such charges, and the testimony overwhelmingly shows the lack of justification for such averments, held, that the reiteration of the truth of said charges and the continuation of the attack in printed brief and oral argument on hearing after the taking of evidence is concluded, is the strongest kind of evidence of bad faith on the part of respondent.

7. Same--Evidence of Contempt of Court-- Sufficiency.

Evidence shows respondent did not act in good faith in preparing, signing, and filing the motion. Held, he is guilty of contempt of court as charged.

Original proceedings by George F. Short, Attorney General, against H. B. Martin for contempt of court. Respondent found guilty. (All Justices of the Supreme Court having certified their disqualifications in the proceeding, the following were duly appointed and qualified as Special Justices: W. E. Utterback, H. D. Henry, Kelly Brown, George Twice, Dan Huett, W. N. Lewis, A. R. Swank, J. A. Diffendaffer, and A. Scott Thompson.)

C. B. Cochran and D. H. Linebaugh, amici curiae.

H. A. Ledbetter, A. F. Moss, Christy Russell, and C. A. Warren, for respondent.

THOMPSON

¶1 This proceeding is one for contempt of this court. We believe that a statement of facts preceding the filing of the motion before this court, out of which grew the charges herein being tried, will be helpful in obtaining a clear understanding of the discussion hereinafter indulged.

¶2 In 1921 a large number of minority stockholders of the Riverside Oil & Refining Company commenced an action in the district court of Oklahoma county, Okla., against the said company, O. O. Owens, and others having control and management of said company and its affairs, charging mismanagement and the wrongful appropriation of its property, and for the appointment of a receiver of said company, cancellation of a contract between it and O. O. Owens, and for an accounting against said Owens and other relief. The issues were referred to John H. Halley, and he later took testimony therein, and filed his report with the court substantially finding all the issues in favor of the plaintiffs, and recommended a personal judgment in favor of the company and against O. O. Owens for a sum in excess of $ 90,000. Upon presentation to the court the referee's report was approved and judgment was entered in accordance with the recommendations therein made. An appeal was taken to this court and the cause was docketed as No. 13646. The case was advanced, briefed, orally argued and submitted. On February 12, 1924, an opinion of this court written by Justice Harrison was filed, modifying the judgment of the district court in such a manner as to constitute a practical reversal in favor of O. O. Owens. Both parties filed petitions for rehearing. Oral argument was had, and on December 16, 1924, an order was entered in open court granting a rehearing. In January, 1925, the court was reorganized after newly elected members qualified, and the cause regularly set down for oral argument on February 10, 1925. It was argued orally and again submitted. On July 7, 1925, an opinion of the court written by Justice Clark was rendered and filed, affirming the judgment of the district court. This opinion was concurred in by Justices Nicholson, Mason, Riley, and Lester, and is reported in Riverside Oil & Refining Co. v. Lynch, 114 Okla. 198, 243 P. 967. There was no dissenting opinion filed.

¶3 The plaintiffs in error, O. O. Owens et al., filed a petition for rehearing, which was denied on the 15th day of December, 1925, and thereafter filed an application for permission to file a second petition for rehearing, which application was denied on March 2, 1926. The mandate of this court was issued and was duly recorded in said district court.

¶4 On March 4, 1926, the receiver qualified under the judgment and a motion was made by the defendants therein to vacate the order appointing a receiver. The district court entered an order restraining the receiver from taking possession of the property of the company. Thereupon the receiver commenced an original action in this court, numbered 17409, asking for a writ of mandamus directing the district judge to vacate the order restraining the receiver and to place the receiver in charge of the property of the company and to further execute the judgment of the court as affirmed by this court.

¶5 The cause was heard before a conference of the court and submitted on written briefs. On June 5, 1926, O. O. Owens personally filed a motion to disqualify in said cause the following members of this court, to wit: Justices Clark, Nicholson, Mason, Lester, and Riley, who were the Justices who had concurred in the opinion rendered in cause No. 13646. Attached to this motion was an affidavit 16 pages in length, signed by O. O. Owens, supporting his motion. The affidavit contains statements which we would say were at least intemperate, charging these named Justices with bias and prejudice against him in rendering the opinion in cause No. 13646.

¶6 This court in No. 17409 denied the motion to disqualify the Justices, and on June 22, 1926, an opinion of this court written by Justice Mason was filed, directing the district court of Oklahoma county to vacate the restraining order, place the receiver in possession of company property, and otherwise execute the judgment which had been affirmed by this court. This opinion is reported in Harris v. Chambers, 121 Okla. 75, 247 P. 695.

¶7 After O. O. Owens filed his motion in 17409 to disqualify the Justices named, Judge J. F. Sharp and Mr. A. F. Moss, who had been his attorneys, withdrew from the case.

¶8 Beginning on April 2, 1926, and thereafter contemnor therein, H. B. Martin, attorney at law, hereinafter referred to as respondent, filed in behalf of O. O. Owens or the Riverside Oil & Refining Company, or both, suits or proceedings in various courts attacking the validity of the judgment affirmed in cause No. 13646, charging it was unconscionable, inequitable, and supported by no evidence. One of these cases was filed in the United States Court for the Western District of the state of Oklahoma, and a proceeding to like effect was instituted in the United States Court for the Eastern District of the state of Oklahoma.

¶9 On June 23, 1926 (the day following the filing of the opinion of this court in cause No. 17409), O. O. Owens filed a suit in the district court of Tulsa county, Okla., against J. D. Lydick, J. B. Dudley, attorneys opposing him in Nos. 13646 and 17409, Hal Johnson, and John H. Halley, district judge and referee, respectively, who heard his case in the district court of Oklahoma county, which afterwards reached this court as No. 13646. He also joined as defendants former Justice McNeill and Justices Nicholson, Riley, and Clark of this court, and others. The plaintiff in this suit prayed that the judgment affirmed in cause No. 13646 in this court be set aside and that he recover from the defendants, including the members of this court joined as defendants, judgment in the sum of $ 100,000. The petition in this case charged a conspiracy on part of the defendants, including members of this court named, to injure and defraud him, O. O. Owens. It also contained other charges against said Justices which, if sustained, would be sufficient grounds for impeachment and...

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT