State ex rel. Atty. Gen. v. Beacom

• Decision Date: 26 June 1902
• Citation: 66 Ohio St. 491,64 N.E. 427
• Parties: STATE ex rel. ATTORNEY GENERAL v. BEACOM et al.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

64 N.E. 427

66 Ohio St. 491

STATE ex rel. ATTORNEY GENERAL v. BEACOM et al.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

June 26, 1902

Quo warranto by the state, on the relation of the attorney general, against M. W. Beacom and others. Judgment of ouster.

The defendants are acting as, and claim to be, respectively director of law, director of public works, director of police, director of fire service, director of accounts, and director of charities and corrections of the city of Cleveland. Together, they claim to be the board of control of that city, with authority to control all the property of the city, including the money raised by taxation. The petition alleges that said claimed authority is not vested in them by any valid law. A judgment of ouster is prayed for. The defendants, answering, admit that they claim and are exercising authority as charged in the petition, and they alleged that such authority is lawfully conferred upon them by an act of March 16, 1891, entitled ‘ An act to provide a more efficient government for cities of the second grade of the first class' (88 Ohio Laws, p. 105, and the several acts amendatory thereof). The case is submitted on demurrer to the answer. The questions presented arise out of the operation of the act, which, by its terms, is limited to ‘ cities of the second grade of the first class' it being admitted that the act confers corporate powers, and that Cleveland, being the only city of the second grade of the first class in the state, is the only city in which the act presently operates.

Syllabus by the Court

The act of March 16, 1891, entitled, ‘ An act to provide a more efficient government for cities of the second grade of the first class' (88 Ohio Laws, p. 105), and the acts amendatory thereof, being special acts conferring corporate powers, are repugnant to Const. art. 13, § 1. State v. Jones 64 N.E. 424.

J. M. Sheets, Atty., Gen., C. D. Gibbons, and Goulder, Holding & Masten, for plaintiff.

Beacom, Baker & Payer and Gage & Carey, for defendants.

SHAUCK, J. (after stating the facts).

The admission that the act confers corporate powers, and that it in fact, confers them on the city of Cleveland alone, would be equivalent to an admission that it is repugnant to section 1 of article 13 of the constitution, but for the contention based upon the classification which is employed in defining the operation of the act. Our reasons for the conclusion that the classification is ineffectual for the purpose for which it is invoked are sufficiently stated in the preceding case of State v. Jones, 64 N.E. 424. Perhaps a careful consideration of the 86 sections of the present act would afford additional reasons for that conclusion, but those stated in the case cited are deemed sufficient; and, except as they are passed on in that case, objections urged against the validity of the present act are not considered. Although the two acts are adjudged to be void for the same reasons some attention seems to be due to the effect of...