State ex rel. Aull v. Field
| Decision Date | 12 December 1892 |
| Parties | The State ex rel. Aull, Prosecuting Attorney, v. Field, Judge, et al |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Writ denied.
William Aull, Prosecuting Attorney, for the State.
The judge of said circuit court has under the statute no jurisdiction in the first instance to admit to bail a person in custody on a charge of crime when the judge of the criminal court having jurisdiction over the offense is present in the county. Revised Statutes, 1889, secs. 4049, 4123, 5414. It was clearly the intention of the legislature to give such jurisdiction in the first instance to the judge of the court in which the charge was pending. If the circuit judge in the first instance has the jurisdiction, then the judge of the criminal court having cognizance of the offense though present in the county, has no such jurisdiction in the first instance. See State v. Ramsey, 23 Mo. 327.
Prohibition.
The plaintiff, as prosecuting attorney of LaFayette county obtained in this court a preliminary rule against Hon. Richard Field, judge of the circuit court for that county, to prohibit the latter from exercising jurisdiction in a certain cause, entitled "In re Plattenburg," a proceeding upon a writ of habeas corpus, issued by that judge at the instance of Plattenburg. Judge Field made a return to the order. Plaintiff demurred to the return.
Both parties have submitted the case for a final decision, the questions involved being issues of law only, arising upon admitted facts.
The formal parts of the record need not be further mentioned.
That the writ of prohibition may be used, on proper occasion, to prevent a single judge (no less than a court as such) from illegally assuming the exercise of judicial power, is a proposition which defendant does not gainsay. But the latter insists that his course in the premises is sanctioned, and, indeed, plainly marked out by positive law.
In LaFayette county a special criminal court is held, organized under an act which went into effect, March 18, 1875. Laws 1875, p. 42.
Plattenburg was duly indicted in October, 1892, for murder in the first degree, and was accordingly lodged in jail upon due process of the criminal court of that county. The regularity of his imprisonment is not disputed; his application to the defendant as circuit judge seeks merely for a release upon bail, pending the proceedings on the indictments.
Section 3 of the statute governing the criminal court in that county declares that "said court shall have the same jurisdiction as the circuit court now has in criminal cases, * * * and shall have power to issue, hear and determine writs of habeas corpus."
Plaintiff's contention here is that where criminal jurisdiction in any county is vested in a separate court, distinct from the circuit court, the latter has no power to admit a prisoner to bail until an application has been made to the criminal court or judge thereof, if in the county.
It is conceded that such an application to the circuit judge as is now in question comes within the terms of section 5414, Revised Statutes, 1889; but it is urged that that language should be narrowed by construction, so as to require the question of bail to be submitted first to the judge of the criminal court in counties where there are such courts. That is said to be the true intent of the section as indicated by its reference to St. Louis, where the only separate criminal court of general powers in the state existed at the time of the first enactment of that section in 1855. Revised Statutes, 1855, sec. 21, p. 849.
We fully recognize the proposition that doubtful words of a statute may be enlarged at times, or restricted in meaning, to conform to the intent of the lawmaker, developed by the aid of principles of interpretation. The supreme court has acted upon that rule in some cases. But we believe that a brief examination will show that the meaning, imputed to section 5414 by plaintiff, is not that intended by its present terms.
The section as originally framed (Revised Statutes, 1855, ch. 73, sec. 21) was identical with the re-enactment in 1865, except that, in the latter, the word "chapter" instead of "act" appeared in the first line. Revised Statutes, 1865, sec. 71, p. 361. But in 1879 several changes in its language were made. They can be seen at a glance upon the following copy of the section as it now reads (no revision of it having occurred in 1889). The additions are indicated by italics, and the words of the prior law, which were dropped, we place in brackets, thus:
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