State ex rel. Barlow v. Kaminsky

• Decision Date: 26 November 1957
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE ex rel. Boce W. BARLOW, Jr. v. Harry KAMINSKY. Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut

Page 792

136 A.2d 792

144 Conn. 612

STATE ex rel. Boce W. BARLOW, Jr. v. Harry KAMINSKY.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

Nov. 26, 1957.

Jay E. Rubinow, Manchester, with whom were Paul B. Groobert, Manchester, Arthur M. Lewis, Hartford, William T. Shea and, on the brief, John D. LaBelle, Manchester, for plaintiff.

Ernest W. McCormick, Hartford, with whom were Denis T. O'Brien, Jr., Meriden, and Lee C. Fielden, Hartford, for defendant.

Before WYNNE, C. J., and DALY, KING, MURPHY, JJ., and LOUIS SHAPIRO, Superior Court Judge.

DALY, Associate Justice.

This action is brought to determine the title to the office of a judge of the City and Police Court of Hartford. The case has been reserved for our advice.

The City and Police Court of Hartford, having both civil and criminal jurisdiction, was constituted by a special law enacted by the General Assembly in 1947. 25 Spec.Laws p. 88, § 1. The provisions establishing it became effective on July 1, 1949, Id., p. 92, § 6. The special act creating the court provided that '[t]here shall be a city and police court composed of three judges, appointed by the general assembly or as may hereafter be provided by law.' In 1953, the special act establishing the court was amended to read as follows: 'There shall be a city and police court composed of four judges appointed by the general assembly, upon nomination by the governor * * *.' 26 Spec.Laws p. 776, No. 150. The governor proclaimed on December 16, 1948, that the forty-seventh amendment ¹ to the state constitution had been adopted. The amendment was not entirely self-executing but could become fully effective only when the General Assembly had fixed the term of the judges and manner in which the appointments were to be made. Compare State ex rel. Rundbaken v. Watrous, 135 Conn. 638, 657, 68 A.2d 289, with State ex rel. Cotter v. Leipner, 138 Conn. 153, 161, 83 A.2d 169. It became operative as to the manner in which appointments should be made and the term of office on May 8, 1953. General Statutes, Cum.Sup.1953, §§ 12c-16c (Cum.Sup.1955, §§ 22d-26d).

The General Assembly having failed to appoint judges of the City and Police Court of Hartford during the 1949 session, the then governor, after the General Assembly had adjourned, appointed judges 'to fill vacancies from July 1, 1949, until the sixth Wednesday of the next session of the General Assembly and until their successors shall be appointed and shall have qualified.' 25 Spec.Laws pp. 1431, 1435. The General Assembly in 1951 also failed to appoint judges of the court, and after the General Assembly adjourned the then governor appointed judges of the court 'to fill vacancies from July 1, 1951, until the sixth Wednesday of the next session of the General Assembly and until their successors shall be appointed and shall have qualified.' 26 Spec.Laws pp. 679, 683. Legislation fully implementing the forty-seventh amendment having been enacted at the 1953 session of the General Assembly, judges of the court were appointed at that session for a term of two years from July 1, 1953, by the General Assembly upon nomination by the governor. Cum.Sup.1955, § 25d; 26 Spec.Laws pp. 1356, 1361.

On April 28, 1955, during the 1955 session of the General Assembly, the governor nominated the defendant to be one of the four judges of the court, 'each for the term of four years from July 1, 1955. ' Cum.Sup.1955, § 25d. The General Assembly adjourned on June 8, 1955, without having taken any action on any of the nominations. Thereafter, on June 21, 1955, the governor appointed the defendant to be one of the four judges of the court 'to fill vacancies from July 1, 1955, until the sixth Wednesday of the next session of the General Assembly and until their successors shall be appointed and shall have qualified.' 27 Spec.Laws pp. 719, 724. On July 1, 1955, the defendant accepted his appointment and thereafter served as a judge. On February 20, 1957, during the 1957 session of the General Assembly, the governor nominated Michael Radin, Martin Mostyn, Joseph Fauliso and the plaintiff to be the four judges of the court, 'each for the unexpired portion of the term ending June 30, 1959.' The General Assembly adjourned on June 10, 1957, without having taken any action on any of the nominations. Thereafter, on June 21, 1957, the governor purported to appoint the plaintiff to be one of the four judges of the court 'to fill vacancy until the sixth Wednesday of the next session of the General Assembly and until a successor shall be appointed and shall have qualified.'

Each party claims that he was on July 1, 1957, and now is, a de jure judge. In this action of quo warranto, the plaintiff seeks to test the legal right of the defendant to the office. Quo warranto calls upon the defendant to show that he is a de jure officer. The burden in such a proceeding is on the defendant to establish his legal right to the office in dispute. State ex rel. Jewett v. Satti, 133 Conn. 687, 688, 54 A.2d 272; State ex rel. Eberle v. Clark, 87 Conn. 537, 540, 89 A. 172, 52 L.R.A.,N.S., 912. As each party bases his title upon his claim that his appointment was legally made by the governor to fill a 'vacancy in an office originally filled by the general assembly' in accordance with provisions contained in § 92 of the General Statutes, we first inquire whether, under that statute, the governor had the power to fill a vacancy in the office of a judge of the City and Police Court of Hartford. Section 92 provides: 'When the general assembly shall not be in session and when no other provision shall have been made for filling any vacancy in an office originally filled by the general assembly or either branch thereof, or by the governor with the advice and consent of the general assembly or either branch thereof, the governor may fill the same until the sixth Wednesday of the next session of the general assembly, and until a successor shall be elected or appointed and shall have qualified. * * *'

Did § 92 empower the governor to fill a vacancy in the office of a judge of the City and Police Court of Hartford after the adjournment of the 1955 session of the General Assembly? Was that an office 'originally filled by the general assembly'? To find the legislative intent, in using that phrase, we look at the wording of the statute, its legislative history and its policy. Sullivan v. Town Council, 143 Conn. 280, 284, 121 A.2d 630. The original statute providing for the filling of vacancies was enacted in 1887. Public Acts 1887, c. 115. It provided: 'Any vacancy that shall occur in any office originally filled by the general assembly or either branch thereof, or by the governor with the advice and consent of the senate, may in the absence of other provision be filled by the governor until the first Wednesday of February, 1889.' It was approved May 18, 1887. The words 'originally filled by the general assembly or either branch thereof' have remained in the statute ever since.

Article fifth of the Connecticut constitution of 1818 vested the judicial power of the state in a Supreme Court of Errors, a Superior Court and such inferior courts as the General Assembly might establish. It then provided, in § 3, that the judges of these courts should be appointed by the General Assembly. By the twenty-sixth amendment, adopted in 1880, it was provided that the judges of the Supreme Court of Errors and the Superior Court 'shall, upon nomination of the governor, be appointed by the general assembly in such manner as shall by law be prescribed.' Enabling legislation, entitled 'An Act to carry into effect the Provisions of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment to the Constitution,' was approved February 8, 1882. Public Acts 1882, c. 1. Thereafter, at the 1882, 1883, 1884, 1885 and 1887 sessions of the General Assembly, judges of the Supreme Court of Errors and the Superior Court were appointed by the General Assembly upon nomination by the governor.

In this context, we first consider what the legislature must have meant by the word 'filled' in the act of 1887. After the twenty-sixth amendment...