State ex rel. Beecher v. Wakeley
Decision Date | 07 January 1890 |
Citation | 44 N.W. 488,28 Neb. 431 |
Parties | STATE EX REL. BEECHER v. WAKELEY, JUDGE. |
Court | Nebraska Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Syllabus by the Court.
Chapter 27 of the Session Laws of 1889, providing for the execution of a supersedeas bond upon the dissolution of a temporary injunction, does not authorize the execution of such bond where, pending an application for the granting of a temporary order of injunction, a restraining order has been issued to the defendant for the purpose of restraining him from a commission of the act complained of until the application for the temporary injunction can be heard; and a writ of mandamus will not lie to a judge of the district court, requiring him to fix the amount of such bond to be filed by a plaintiff, where a temporary order of injunction is refused, notwithstanding a restraining order may have been formerly granted.
Original proceeding in mandamus.
Wm. E. Healey and Thos. D. Crane, for relator.
John L. Webster, for respondent.
This is an application to this court, in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, for a peremptory writ of mandamus to the defendant, one of the judges of the district court of Douglas county, requiring him to fix the amount in which a supersedeas bond may be executed by the relator, for the purpose of securing a review of the decision of said judge upon a motion to discharge a restraining order previously made by him in an action then pending in said court in which the relator was plaintiff, and by which she sought an injunction to restrain the officers and agents of the city of Omaha, the Omaha Street-Railway Company, the Omaha Motor Railway Company, and Hugh Murphy from changing the grade of a street upon which relator's property abutted. It is shown by the record that the petition filed in that case was presented to the defendant with a request for an order granting a temporary injunction, when the following indorsement was made thereon by defendant: The undertaking was executed and filed as required by the order above quoted. On the 4th day of November, 1889, the city of Omaha filed its answer, and on the 25th day of the same month the plaintiff filed her reply thereto. On the 11th day of November the cause came on for hearing, when the following order was made:
It is contended by plaintiff that the duty of fixing the amount of the supersedeas bond is imposed by chapter 27 of the Session Laws of 1889, the first section of which is as follows: Section 3 of the same chapter is as follows: Sections 253 and 254 of the Civil Code, in the chapter providing for injunctions, are as follows: ...
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Trester v. Pike
...and consideration of the object and purpose of a restraining order than in the case last mentioned will be found in State v. Wakeley, reported in 28 Neb. 431, 44 N. W. 488, wherein a restraining order was clearly distinguished in its office from a temporary order of injunction. In that case......
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Meyers v. City of Minneapolis
...Michael, 15 Cal. 107, is: "The Supreme Court has no power to grant an injunction pending an appeal." To the same effect is State v. Wakely, 28 Neb. 431, 44 N. W. 488, and Roberts v. Kartzke, 18 Idaho, 552, 111 Pac. Grant that under the power given this court by sections 121 and 122, G. S. 1......
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Trester v. Pike
...and consideration of the object and purpose of a restraining order, than in the case last mentioned, will be found in State v. Wakeley, reported in 28 Neb. 431, wherein restraining order was clearly distinguished in its office from a temporary order of injunction. In that case it is said: "......
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Meyers v. City of Minneapolis
...15 Cal. 107, is: ‘The Supreme Court has no power to grant an injunction pending an appeal.' To the same effect is State ex rel. Beecher v. Wakeley, 28 Neb. 431, 44 N. W. 488, and Roberts v. Kartzke, 18 Idaho, 552, 111 Pac. 1. Grant that under the power given this court by sections 121, 122,......