State ex rel. Bell v. Frazier

• Decision Date: 20 November 1899
• Parties: STATE ex rel. BELL v. FRAZIER, Sheriff.
• Court: Oregon Supreme Court

59 P. 5

36 Or. 178

STATE ex rel. BELL v. FRAZIER, Sheriff.

Supreme Court of Oregon

November 20, 1899

Appeal from circuit court, Multnomah county; A.L. Frazer, Judge.

Proceeding by the state, on relation of R.F. Bell, against William Frazier, as sheriff of Multnomah county, for mandamus to compel defendant to serve a certain summons. There was a judgment for defendant, and relator appeals. Affirmed.

This is a mandamus proceeding to compel the sheriff of Multnomah county to serve a summons in an action brought by the relator against one Grimes in the circuit court of that county without the fees required by the act of February 18, 1899 being first paid (Laws 1899, p. 140), and the only question for consideration is the constitutionality of such act. Section 1 thereof provides that it shall be the duty of the sheriff, in all counties of the state containing more than 50,000 inhabitants, to exact, for the use of the county, in all civil suits, actions, or proceedings, certain fees and charges as set forth. Section 2 makes it the duty of the several clerks of the circuit and county courts of the state at the time of the commencement of any suit, action, or proceeding for the enforcement of private rights, to exact from the plaintiff or moving party the sum of $10 in all cases where the amount in controversy exceeds $500, and $5 in all cases where the amount in controversy is less than that sum, except in probate proceedings, when $10 shall be required to be paid before the filing of any petition therein; and no complaint, transcript on appeal, petition for writ of review, or any of the instances in probate proceedings mentioned, shall be filed until such payment has been made. The clerks are also required, at the time of filing any answer, demurrer, or motion in any action, suit or proceeding upon the part of a defendant, to exact from him the sum of $5 in all cases where the amount in controversy exceeds the sum of $500, and $3 in all cases where the amount in controversy is $500 or less, except in probate proceedings, where he shall be required to pay the sum of $5. And they are further required to exact from the plaintiff or moving party, at the time the suit, action, contest, or proceeding comes on for final trial or hearing on questions of fact and law, when tried by the court, the sum of $2 which must be paid before any trial shall be had; and, in case of a jury trial, the sum of $12 a day for each and every day the jury shall be engaged in the trial, to be paid in advance each day before proceeding therewith. Section 3 provides a fee of 10 cents a folio for furnishing private parties a copy of the records and files in any of the county offices, which shall be paid into the county treasury as other fees are required to be paid. Section 4 provides that the sums required to be paid by the parties litigant to the clerks of the circuit and county courts and sheriff, as provided in the preceding sections, shall be in lieu of all the fees which the parties have heretofore been required to pay, and no other fees than those recited shall hereafter be exacted from the parties to any action, suit, or proceeding. Section 5 makes it the duty of the clerks of the circuit and county courts, sheriff, recorder of conveyances, and justices of the peace in counties of more than 50,000 inhabitants to keep a fee book, in which shall be entered all items of service performed, and fees, percentages, commissions, charges, etc., which shall be a public record; and each of such officers is required on or before the 1st day of each month to deposit with the county treasurer all sums collected during the previous month, taking his receipt therefor. Section 6 makes it the duty of the county auditor to check up the sums collected by the several county officers and deposited with the treasurer, and make a report of his findings to the board of county commissioners on the 1st day of each month, and before the salaries of such officers are paid. Section 7 provides that the salaries of all county officers shall be paid by warrant drawn on the county fund in pursuance of an order of the board of county commissioners, the same as other claims are paid, and that they shall receive no other compensation for their services; and provides further that none of the provisions of the act shall apply to counties containing less than 50,000 inhabitants. Section 8 repeals all laws and parts of laws in conflict therewith, and contains an emergency clause. The circuit court sustained a demurrer to the alternative writ, holding the act to be constitutional, and hence this appeal.

Sanderson Reed, for appellant.

O.F. Paxton, for respondent.

BEAN J. (after stating the facts).

The contention for the plaintiff is that the act is void, because (1) the title does not express the subject thereof, and therefore contravenes section 20, art. 4, of the constitution; (2) it is a local law, regulating the practice in courts of justice, and providing for the assessment and collection of taxes for state and county purposes, and is void under section 23, art. 4, of the constitution; and (3) it is a law granting to certain citizens privileges and immunities not belonging to all citizens, and is, therefore violative of section 20, art. 1, of the constitution. Of these objections in the order named. It is entitled "An act providing for the payment of certain fees to the recorders of conveyances, clerks of the circuit courts and county courts in the state and to sheriffs in certain counties, and for the payment of trial fees, and providing for the payment to the state and several counties of sums of money and fees paid to said officers by parties litigant and others; and providing for the manner of payment of salaries of county officers," which, in our opinion, sufficiently express the purpose and subject-matter of the law within the doctrine of the previous decisions of this court. O'Keefe v. Weber, 14 Or. 55, 12 P. 74; David v. Water Committee, 14 Or. 98, 12 P. 174; State v. Shaw, 22 Or. 287, 29 P. 1028; State v. Koshland, 25 Or. 178, 35 P. 32; State v. Linn Co., 25 Or. 503, 36 P. 297; Northern Counties Trust v. Sears, 30 Or. 388, 41 P. 931, 35 L.R.A. 188. It has been repeatedly held that the section of the constitution here invoked is not directed against the generality or comprehensiveness of the title of legislative enactments, nor does it require that such title shall index the details thereof. If all the provisions of the law relate, directly or indirectly, to the same subject, and are not foreign to the subject expressed in the title, it will not be held unconstitutional. The object of the constitutional provision is to prevent the blending of incongruous subjects in the same act, using the title as a deception, and to prevent combining subjects representing divers interests in one act in order to unite the members of the legislature who favor either in support of all. There has been a general disposition manifested in the cases cited to construe the constitution liberally, rather than to embarrass legislation by a strict construction. The contention in this particular case seems to be that the title of the act is general, and indicates that it was intended to apply to the whole state, while in the body it is limited to the class of counties containing more than 50,000 inhabitants, and therefore the subject is not properly expressed in the title, because it does not indicate the limit of the operation of the act. A question quite similar to this was considered and decided adversely to plaintiff's contention in Neuendorff v. Duryea, 69 N.Y. 557. The constitution of New York at that time provided that "no *** local bill which may be passed by the legislature shall embrace more than one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title." Article 3, § 16. The legislative assembly passed an act prohibiting public dramatic entertainments on Sunday in the city of New York alone, the title of which was "An act to preserve the public peace and order on the first day of the week, commonly called Sunday." It was contended that it was void, because local, while the title indicated that it was a general act. But the court held that, although it was a local law, the objection was not well taken, and in deciding the case said: "The title of the act is, 'An act to preserve the public peace and order on the first day of the week, commonly called Sunday.' It will be seen that it is broad enough in its language to apply to the whole state. This, however, is not enough, alone, to determine that it is improper. If it meets the conceded purpose of the constitution, it is correct. People v. Briggs, 50 N.Y. 553. That purpose has been repeatedly declared to be: First, to prevent the union in one title of several local projects, or the attaching of some local project to a general subject, or vice versa; and, second, by the title to give information to all concerned in the subject of the act that that subject is likely to be affected by pending legislation. It is plain that the first part of this...