State ex rel. Berwind Fuel Co. v. Dist. Court
| Decision Date | 26 October 1917 |
| Docket Number | No. 20679.,20679. |
| Citation | 138 Minn. 213,164 N.W. 812 |
| Parties | STATE ex rel. BERWIND FUEL CO. v. DISTRICT COURT, ST. LOUIS COUNTY, et al. |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Writ of certiorari in Supreme Court by the State, on relation of the Berwind Fuel Company, to review the action of the District Court, St. Louis County, and another, in allowing compensation to Aaron Lindstrom, relator's employé, under the Workmen's Compensation Act (Laws 1913, c. 467 [Gen. St. 1913, §§ 8195-8230]). Order affirmed.
Syllabus by the Court
Section 8, chapter 209, Laws 1915, which limits the time to recover under the Compensation Act to one year after the occurrence of the injury, does not apply to claims that accrued before the passage of the 1915 statute. K. A. Campbell and B. Burness, both of Minneapolis, for relator.
James A. Wharton, of Duluth, for respondents.
Aaron Lindstrom was injured while in the employ of the Berwind Fuel Company, on June 9, 1914. This action or proceeding for compensation was commenced July 9, 1917. The trial court allowed compensation under the Compensation Act. Relator makes but one contention; that is, that the claim for compensation was outlawed when asserted.
At the time the injury was sustained the original act of 1913 (chapter 467, Laws 1913 [Gen. St. 1913, §§ 8195-8230]) was in force. This act fixes no limitation upon the time within which an action or proceeding shall be commenced. By chapter 209, Laws of 1915, section 8, a new section, 20a, was added to the act of 1913, and this provides that action or proceeding by an injured person to recover compensation must be commenced within one year after the occurrence of the injury. This act was approved April 21, 1915, and became effective July 1, 1915, after plaintiff's claim accured. If section 8 of the act of 1915 applies to plaintiff's claim, then by its terms, his claim became barred when the act went into effect. If the act of 1913 applies, his claim was not barred.
We need not discuss this question at length. This court has recently held that section 8 of the 1915 law is not retrospective and that the limitation prescribed by that section does not apply to claims arising before the passage of the act. State ex rel. Anderson v. General A. F. & L. A. Corp., 134 Minn. 21, 158 N. W. 715. That decision is determinative of this case, for the facts in the two cases are substantially the same and the principle involved is identical.
Relator asks us to adopt the rule that the holders of claims accruing prior to the 1915 statute are granted the period fixed by that statute after the statute went into effect in which to present their claims. In other words, that the time which elapsed before the statute became operative is disregarded and the cause of action is to be deemed to have accrued at the time the limitation statute became effective. This rule has been adopted by creditable authority. The fact is, a new statute of limitation enacted in general terms, applied literally, would often bar existing rights of action without a fair chance to present them. Such a result would often by harsh and would sometimes render the statute unconstitutional. To avoid such a result and to give the statute a construction that will enable it to stand, courts have adopted rules of...
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