State ex rel. Blair v. Gettinger

Decision Date15 April 1952
Docket NumberNo. 28829,28829
Citation105 N.E.2d 161,230 Ind. 588
PartiesSTATE ex rel. BLAIR v. GETTINGER et al.
CourtIndiana Supreme Court

Ellis H. Bell, Harold J. Bell and Bell & Bell, all of Indianapolis, for appellant.

Russell E. Wise, Union City, Robert L. Smith, Keith Fraser, Portland (John A. Resler, Portland, of counsel), for appellees.

DRAPER, Judge.

The parties signed a contract whereby the appellees employed the appellant to teach grades one and two in a school of appellee Jackson School Township in Randolph County, Indiana, during the school year 1948-1949. She completed that year and upon being refused employment for the succeeding year, she brought this action to mandate the appellees to reinstate her to her former position on the same terms and for the same wages she received in the school year 1948-1949, and for payment of her salary for the succeeding year.

From an adverse decision she appeals, asserting that the decision of the court is contrary to law.

The evidence most favorable to the appellees discloses that the appellee trustee entered into negotiations with the appellant to engage her services as a teacher for grades one and two in said school. The trustee told appellant the regular teacher a year, and he had only one year's employment a year, and he had only one year's employment to offer her, and he asked her if she were licensed to teach grades one and two. She informed him that she was so licensed. The trustee told appellant the position paid $2400 per year, but he would pay her $2500 since the position was to be for one year only. Thereupon a printed contract in the usual form was signed by the parties.

About two weeks after the opening of school the appellant brought to the trustee the teacher's license which she held and same was approved by the superintendent. The appellant taught the school year of 1948-1949. On the last day of that school year the appellant inquired whether the teacher whose place she had taken was returning for the following school year, and the trustee answered in the affirmative. The trustee informed appellant that the township paid its regular teachers in ten monthly installments, but since she was not returning he would pay the entire balance due her at that time, which he did. The evidence would further indicate that the appellant understood she was not returning for the following year and attempted to make other arrangements for a different school and that she never turned in her teacher's reports as required by law for the 1948-1949 school term. The appellees offered testimony designed to establish appellant's incompetence to teach the first and second grades, but such evidence was rejected.

As above stated, the contract was in usual form, without special provisions of any kind. The appellant alleged, and on the record before us it must be taken as true, that she neither resigned in writing, received another contract, nor was timely notified in writing that her contract would not be renewed for the succeeding year, in the absence of either of which a valid contract of the kind under consideration must be deemed to continue in force for the succeeding year under the provisions of Burns' 1933, § 28-4321.

The appellees assert, however, that the appellant had no license to teach the first and second grades in the 1948-1949 school year, although she represented to the appellees that she was so licensed and so induced the signing of the contract. That assertion raises the first and perhaps the most important question in the case.

The appellant could not lawfully be employed to teach the first and second grades if she did not hold a license of the kind and grade required for that position. Burns' 1948 Repl., § 28-4208; Opinions Atty.Gen'l. of Indiana, 1933, p. 199. The township could not be bound by a contract not authorized by law. Honey Creek School Township v. Barnes, 1889, 119 Ind. 213, 21 N.E. 747. Such an attempted contract would be void, Putnam v. School Town of Irvington, 1879, 69 Ind. 80, City of Indianapolis v. Wann, Receiver, 1896, 144 Ind. 175, 42 N.E. 901, 31 L.R.A. 743, and could not support a recovery. Jackson School Township v. Farlow, 1881, 75 Ind. 118. Whether or not the appellant was licensed to teach the first and second grades in the school year 1948-1949 must be determined by the application of the law to all of the evidence in the case, regardless of which party adduced it.

On September 9, 1925, there was issued to the appellant:

'Elementary License, First Grade Intermediate and Grammer (sic) Grades valid for employment in the public schools of Indiana for the corresponding kind of school work described on the reverse side of this license.'

On the reverse side appeared, among other material, the following:

'Intermediate and Grammer (sic) Grades

* * *

* * *

                                                    Valid
                                          Date      Until
                "1st Grade Inter-Grammer
                (sic) license renewed     4/17/34  7/24/35
                1st gr. Elementary
                license renewed           9/30/35  7/24/40
                1st gr. Elementary
                license renewed           9/17/41  7/24/45
                1st gr. Elementary
                license renewed           1/16/46  7/24/50"
                

The reverse side also bears the notation of various renewals of the license, the last of which indicates that the license was renewed and valid from 7/25/45 until 7/24/50. It bears the further notation:

'Elementary License.

'Kindergarten License, 'good in the kindergarten and first grade of any elementary school.'

'Primary License, 'good for teaching in the first, second, third and fourth grades of any elementary school.'

'Intermediate License, 'good for teaching in the fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh and eighth grades of any elementary school.'

'Grammer (sic) Grade License, 'good for teaching in the fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth grades of any elementary school and first grade in the seventh and eighth grades of any junior high school.''

The license held by the appellant was originally issued pursuant to and in accordance with Acts 1923, ch. 11, § 9, being Burns' 1948 Repl., § 28-4209. Subd. 8, par. a, thereof provides for kindergarten and first grade licenses. Subd. 8, par. b, under the heading 'Primary teachers license' provides for licenses to teach the first to fourth grades, both inclusive, of any elementary school. Other portions of Subd. 8 follow:

'c. Intermediate grade teacher's license:

'(1) Intermediate grade teacher's license, first grade, valid for five (5) years, renewable thereafter for life on presentation of evidence of successful experience and professional spirit, and good for teaching in the fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth grades of any elementary school. An intermediate grade teacher's license, first grade, may be issued to persons who have completed a two-year standard or approved normal school course, and who have specialized in fourth, fifth and sixth grade teaching.

* * *

* * *

'd. Grammar grade teacher's license:

'(1) Grammar grade teacher's license, first grade, valid for five (5) years, renewable thereafter for life on presentation of evidence of successful experience and professional spirit, and good for teaching in the fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth grades of any elementary school, and in seventh and eighth grades of any junior high school. A grammar grade teacher's license, first grade, may be issued to persons who have completed a two-year standard or approved normal school course, and who have specialized in seventh and eighth grade teaching.'

From the foregoing it would appear that the appellant's license to teach, when issued, was an Intermediate and Grammar grades license which entitled her to teach the 4th to 8th grades, both inclusive, in any elementary school, and the 7th and 8th grades of any junior high school. Her license to teach, when issued, did not entitle her to teach the first and second grades, and if she were so entitled when she contracted with the appellees, it must be because of something which intervened after the issuance of the license in 1925.

By § 1 of Ch. 11 of the Acts of 1923, being Burns' 1948 Repl., § 28-4201, the authority to grant licenses to teachers was vested in the state board of education, and by § 4, being 28-4204, it was provided that:

'All details not provided for in this act connected with the licensing of regular public school employees (the requirements as to academic and professional preparation for each kind and grade of license issued, the conversion of one kind of license into another kind, * * * the issuing of licenses on credentials, the exchange and renewal of licenses, * * * the kind and grade of license * * * for given positions, * * *) shall be determined, on the recommendation of the state superintendent, by the state board of education.'

By Ch. 330 of the Acts of 1945, Burns' 1948 Repl., § 28-405, et seq., the Indiana state board of education was created, and the state board of education theretofore in general charge of the schools of the state was thereby terminated. It was provided that the board should be divided into three commissions, one of which is the commission on teacher training and licensing. All powers and duties of the predecessor state board of education were transferred, distributed and assigned to the board and commissions created by the Act.

Sec. 4 of the Act, Burns' 1948 Repl., § 28-408, reads as follows:

'The commission on teacher training and licensing shall exercise all the powers and duties heretofore exercised by the state board of education with reference to examination, training, and licensing of persons desiring to teach in the elementary and secondary schools of the state, and the supervision and inspection of teacher training institutions, and the appointive members shall include a minimum of four (4) persons actively employed in the schools in Indiana.

* * *

* * *

'The commission * * * shall cooperate with the accrediting agencies in the improvement of teacher training and the...

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