State ex rel. Board of Co. Commrs. v. Dunn
| Decision Date | 29 May 1902 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 12,911-(29).,s. 12,911-(29). |
| Citation | 86 Minn. 301 |
| Parties | STATE ex rel. BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF ST. LOUIS COUNTY and Others v. R. C. DUNN.<SMALL><SUP>1</SUP></SMALL> |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
M. H. Stanford and Wilson G. Crosby, for relators.
W. B. Douglas, Attorney General, C. W. Somerby, Assistant Attorney General, and J. E. Green, County Attorney, for respondent.
Certiorari to the state auditor to review a decision made by him to the effect that certain personal property owned by relators Mitchell & McClure was properly listed for taxation and taxable in the county of Carlton.
There is no controversy about the facts, which are as follows: The copartnership of Mitchell & McClure is composed of persons who are nonresidents of the state, but engaged in the business of manufacturing lumber therein. Their principal place of business in this state is at Duluth, in St. Louis county, though in the year 1901 they owned a large amount of personal property located in Carlton county. The property so located in Carlton county consisted of horses, office furniture, camp equipment, and other property, tools and implements used in cutting and hauling logs, together with a logging railroad equipped with engines and cars, all of which was used and employed in procuring logs from land owned by them, and transporting the same to Duluth, where they owned and operated a sawmill, to be there sawed and manufactured into lumber. The property was not permanently located in that county, and was used exclusively in connection with, and in furtherance of, their business of manufacturing and selling lumber, which was carried on at Duluth. One Floyd, an employee and agent of the firm, in charge of their logging operations in Carlton county, in May, 1901, listed the property for taxation in the town of Twin Lakes, in that county. During the same year the assessor of the city of Duluth assessed the same property in St. Louis county.
Because of this threatened double taxation, the relators Mitchell & McClure applied to the state auditor, under and pursuant to the provisions of G. S. 1894, § 1522, to determine the question as to the county in which the property was properly taxable. Due proceedings were had on the application, notice given to all interested parties, and, after hearing, the state auditor held that the assessment in Carlton county was in accordance with the law, and the same was sustained, whereupon the relators sued out this writ of certiorari to review his decision.
Section 1522, supra, under which the auditor acted, provides that, where a controversy arises between different places in the same county as to where personal property shall be listed and taxed, the question shall be determined and the proper place fixed by the county board of equalization, and where such controversy exists between different counties, or different places in different counties, the same shall be determined by the state auditor.
1. The first question for consideration is whether the decision of the state auditor, made pursuant to the provisions of the statute above cited, may be reviewed by certiorari; and this question narrows itself down to the further inquiry whether the proceedings before that official involved an exercise of judicial or quasi judicial functions, or the performance of merely ministerial or administrative duties. The determination of this question is decisive of the other.
The writ of certiorari formerly issued, at common law, from a superior to an inferior court, board, or tribunal, or officer exercising judicial power, whose proceedings were summary and in a cause different from the common law, and generally to inquire into the jurisdiction of the inferior tribunal. Harris, Certiorari, p. 2. But the scope and purpose of the writ have been materially enlarged, and many of the old restrictions removed, either by judicial decisions or legislative enactments, so that, by the great weight of modern authority, all questions of law in judicial or quasi judicial proceedings of inferior tribunals, involving the merits of a controversy, and affecting the substantial legal rights of the parties, may be thus reviewed; no appeal or other legal remedy being provided.
Our statutes (G. S. 1894, § 4823) provide that the supreme court may issue the writ in "the furtherance of justice and the execution of the laws." To render the proceedings of such tribunals judicial in their nature, they must affect the legal or property rights of the citizen in a manner analogous to the procedure of courts acting judicially. State v. Clough, 64 Minn. 378, 67 N. W. 202. The precise line of demarkation between what are judicial and what are administrative or ministerial functions is often difficult to determine. The exercise of judicial functions may involve the performance of legislative or administrative duties, and the performance of administrative or ministerial duties may, in a measure, involve the exercise of judicial functions. It may be said generally that the exercise of judicial functions is to determine what the law is, and what the legal rights of parties are, with respect to a matter in controversy; and whenever an officer is clothed with that authority, and undertakes to determine those questions, he acts judicially. State v. District Court of Hennepin Co., 83 Minn. 464, 86 N. W. 455; People v. Board, 54 Cal. 375; Tiedt v. Carstensen, 61 Iowa, 334, 16 N. W. 214; State v. Clough, supra.
To determine whether the state auditor was exercising such functions in determining the controversy here in question, we must inquire whether any substantial legal right of the relators Mitchell & McClure was involved. We shall not stop to inquire what rights a county might have in a case of this kind. The individual taxpayers being joined with the county of St. Louis as relators, our consideration of the questions involved will be confined exclusively to their rights in the premises.
The general rule that personal property must be taxed in the county in which the owner resides has its exceptions. A person may have property in different counties of the state, and, when he has a fixed residence in one of them, he has the undoubted right to insist that the property so owned by him be taxed at his place of residence. The exceptions to this rule are statutory, and, so far as here involved, apply to merchants or manufacturers. G. S. 1894, § 1516, provides, among other things, that the personal property of a merchant or manufacturer shall be listed in the town or district where his business is carried on. Under this statute a merchant or manufacturer having distinct places of business in different counties of the state, with property pertaining thereto located in each, may be taxed in each county in which such business is so conducted. This provision applies equally to one who resides outside, as well as to one residing within, this state. These provisions are intended to secure definiteness and certainty with respect to the place of personal property taxation, and are for the benefit of state and property owner alike.
There can be no serious doubt as to the right of the latter to require that his property be assessed in the manner and at the place prescribed thereby. The right to insist that it be taxed in the county or the town so designated might, in instances, be a very valuable one. It is well known that the rate of taxation varies in different localities, the rate in one being higher and more burdensome than in others. Cases are numerous where actions have been brought and recoveries had for taxes paid under protest, where the same were assessed in the wrong taxing district. Recoveries of the kind have been had in this state where the taxpayer had exhausted his legal remedies, and was without proper and adequate redress. Minneapolis & N. Ele. Co. v. Board of Co. Commrs. of Clay Co., 60 Minn. 522, 63 N. W. 101. It must therefore be held that, under the terms and provisions of our statutes, property owners have the legal right to demand that their property be taxed in the county or taxing district designated thereby.
It logically follows from this that in determining the proper county in which to assess such property, under section 1522, supra, the state auditor acts in a judicial capacity. His decision affects not...
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