State ex rel. Boedigheimer v. Welter
| Decision Date | 27 September 1940 |
| Docket Number | 32516. |
| Parties | STATE ex rel. BOEDIGHEIMER v. WELTER. |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Appeal from District Court, Otter Tail County; Anton Thompson Judge.
Quo warranto proceeding by the State, on the relation of Hugo Boedigheimer, against William L. Welter. From a judgment dismissing the proceeding, the relator appeals.
Affirmed.
The Supreme Court is without power to increase the qualifications of judges prescribed by the Constitution, notwithstanding that it is important that judges of all courts of record be persons " learned in the law." Const. art. 6, § 6; art. 7, § 7.
Syllabus by the Court .
To be eligible to the office of municipal judge of the village of Perham a person need not be an attorney at law. That part of Ex.Sess.Laws, 1933-1934, c. 35, § 3, requiring the municipal judge to be ‘ a person learned in the law and duly admitted to practice as an attorney in this State’, is violative of Article, 7, § 7, of the State Constitution, and therefore unconstitutional.
Jesse A. Schunk, of New York Mills, for appellant.
M. J Daly, Jr., of Perham, and Frankberg & Berghuis, or Fergus Falls, for respondent.
On the petition of Hugo Boedigheimer, a writ of quo warranto issued out of the district court of Otter Tail county requiring respondent, William L. Welter, to show by what authority he assumed to exercise jurisdiction as municipal judge of the village of Perham. On the pleadings the trial court ordered the writ vacated and the proceedings dismissed. This appeal is from a judgment entered pursuant to that order.
The municipal court in question was established by Ex.Sess.Laws 1933-1934, c. 35. Section 2 thereof reads: ‘ Said Court shall possess all the powers and, except as to the manner of its establishment and as herein otherwise provided, shall be subject to all of the provisions set forth in that portion of General Statutes 1923, Chapter 5, relating to Municipal Courts and acts amendatory thereof and supplementary thereto.’
Section 3 reads:
The only question in the case now before us has to do with the constitutionality of that part of § 3 of the act which provides that the judge of the court shall be ‘ a person learned in the law and duly admitted to practice as an attorney in this State.’ The words ‘ men learned in the law’ have been construed by this court to mean ‘ attorneys at law’ . State ex rel. Jack v. Schmahl, 125 Minn. 533, 147 N.W. 425, 426.
As bearing upon the constitutionality of the section of the law under attack, it is necessary to consider two applicable provisions of our State Constitution. They are Article 6 Section 6, which reads: ‘ Judges of supreme and district courts-Qualifications-Compensation-The judges of the supreme and district courts shall be men learned in the law and shall receive such compensation at stated times as may be prescribed by the legislature; which compensation shall not be diminished during their continuance in office, but they shall receive no other fee or reward for their services,’ and Article 7, Section 7, which reads: ‘ Eligibility to office-Every person who by the provisions of this article shall be entitled to vote at any election shall be eligible to any office which now is, or hereafter shall be, elective by the people in the district wherein he shall have resided thirty days previous to such election, except as otherwise...
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