State ex rel. Booth v. Montana Twenty-First Judicial Dist.
| Decision Date | 31 December 1998 |
| Docket Number | No. 97-689,TWENTY-FIRST,97-689 |
| Citation | 1998 MT 344,972 P.2d 325,292 Mont. 371 |
| Parties | , 1998 MT 344 STATE of Montana, ex rel. Donald Franklin BOOTH, Jr., Relator, v. MONTANAJUDICIAL DISTRICT, Ravalli County, The Hon. Jeffrey H. Langton, Presiding, Respondent. |
| Court | Montana Supreme Court |
J.G. Shockley (argued), Attorney at Law, Victor, Montana, for Relator
George H. Corn (argued), Ravalli County Attorney, Hamilton, Montana, for Respondent
¶1 Donald Franklin Booth, Jr. (Booth) was involved in an automobile accident on July 23, 1996, which resulted in the death of two persons and the serious injury of a third. Montana Highway Patrol (MHP) Sergeant Warren Schiffer (Sergeant Schiffer) investigated the accident and, in a report dated August 27, 1996, concluded that Booth was the principal cause of the accident based on his alcohol consumption prior thereto.
¶2 On September 24, 1996, MHP Officer Rick Schmauch (Officer Schmauch)cited Booth in the Ravalli County Justice Court for driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) at the time of the July accident. Booth pleaded guilty to the DUI charge in Justice Court on December 11, 1996. Two days later, the State of Montana (State) sought leave of the Twenty-First Judicial District Court, Ravalli County, to file an information charging Booth with two counts of felony negligent homicide, one count of misdemeanor negligent vehicular assault and one count of misdemeanor DUI, all arising out of the July accident. Leave was granted and the information was filed. Booth appeared in the District Court thereafter and advised that he had pleaded guilty to the DUI offense in the Justice Court.
¶3 Booth subsequently moved the District Court to dismiss all of the charges contained in the information. He contended that the entire prosecution was barred based on his guilty plea to the DUI charge in the Justice Court. The State agreed that the DUI charge should be dismissed based on the Justice Court proceeding, but maintained that it was not barred from prosecuting the negligent homicide and negligent vehicular assault charges. The District Court ultimately concluded that prosecution of the misdemeanor DUI and negligent vehicular assault charges was barred and granted Booth's motion to dismiss those charges. It also concluded, however, that prosecution of the felony negligent homicide charges was not barred and denied Booth's motion to dismiss those charges.
¶4 Booth filed an application for a writ of supervisory control requesting this Court to assume original jurisdiction of this matter to correct what he contended was the District Court's error in denying his motion to dismiss the negligent homicide charges. In an order dated December 8, 1997, we ordered the State to respond to Booth's application and, on June 16, 1998, we heard oral argument.
¶5 Article VII, Section 2 of the Montana Constitution gives this Court "original jurisdiction to issue, hear, and determine writs...." Supervisory control is appropriate when a district court is proceeding under a mistake of law and in so doing is causing a gross injustice for which an appeal is not an adequate remedy. State v. Mont. Judicial Dist. Court (1997), 281 Mont. 285, 290-91, 933 P.2d 829, 832-33 (citations omitted). It remains an extraordinary remedy, however, to be exercised only in extraordinary circumstances. State v. Dist. Court of Fourth Jud Dist. (1996), 277 Mont. 349, 352, 922 P.2d 474, 476 (citations omitted).
¶6 Here, the issue of whether Booth can be prosecuted for two counts of negligent homicide implicates double jeopardy considerations. If the District Court's conclusion that the prosecution is not barred proved--on appeal--to be incorrect, Booth would have been subjected to prosecution notwithstanding his entitlement to avoid the prosecution altogether. Under such a circumstance, it is clear that appeal would not be an adequate remedy. See Keating v. Sherlock (1996), 278 Mont. 218, 224-25, 924 P.2d 1297, 1300-01. As a result, we determine that Booth's application presents legal issues which are appropriate for this Court to resolve through a writ of supervisory control.
¶7 1. Did the District Court err in concluding that Booth's prosecution for negligent homicide is not barred by § 46-11-503, MCA?
¶8 2. Did the District Court err in concluding that Booth's prosecution for negligent homicide is not barred by § 46-11-504, MCA (1995)?
¶9 3. Does the State's prosecution of Booth for negligent homicide violate the double jeopardy provision contained in Article II, Section 25 of the Montana Constitution?
¶10 A district court's denial of a motion to dismiss criminal charges is a matter of law which we review de novo, determining only whether the court correctly interpreted the law. State v. Bowles (1997), 284 Mont. 490, 492, 947 P.2d 52, 53 (citation omitted).
¶11 1. Did the District Court err in concluding that Booth's prosecution for negligent homicide is not barred by § 46-11-503, MCA?
¶12 Section 46-11-503, MCA, provides, in pertinent part:
(1) When two or more offenses are known to the prosecutor, are supported by probable cause, and are consummated prior to the original charge and jurisdiction and venue of the offenses lie in a single court, a prosecution is barred if:
....
(b) the former prosecution resulted in a conviction that has not been set aside, reversed, or vacated[.]
Booth contended that the prosecutor knew of all the offenses, the offenses were supported by probable cause, the offenses had been consummated prior to the DUI charge in the Justice Court, and jurisdiction and venue of all the offenses were in the District Court under § 3-5-302(2)(a), MCA. Since his "former prosecution" on the DUI charge in the Justice Court resulted in a conviction neither set aside, reversed or vacated, Booth argued that the express language of § 46-11-503(1)(b), MCA, bars his prosecution on the negligent homicide charges in the District Court.
¶13 Relying on State v. Tadewaldt (1996), 277 Mont. 261, 922 P.2d 463, the District Court interpreted § 46-11-503(1), MCA, to apply only when jurisdiction and venue lie in a single court and "the former prosecution of an offense 'in that same court' arises out of the same transaction as the subsequent offense charged in that court." In other words, the District Court interpreted the single court criterion in § 46-11-503(1), MCA, as requiring that both the former prosecution and the subsequent prosecution occur in the same court and, since the "former prosecution" was in the Justice Court and the negligent homicide charges were filed in the District Court, the statutory "single court" criterion was not met. On that basis, the District Court concluded that prosecution of the negligent homicide charges was not barred by § 46-11-503(1)(b), MCA. The District Court's reliance on Tadewaldt was misplaced.
¶14 In Tadewaldt, we addressed whether the district court erred in concluding that § 46-11-504(1), MCA, did not bar prosecution of a drug charge. Tadewaldt, 277 Mont. at 263, 922 P.2d at 464. The case did not involve § 46-11-503, MCA, and, indeed, we resolved the § 46-11-504, MCA, issue by addressing the "same transaction" component contained therein. Tadewaldt, 277 Mont. at 265-67, 922 P.2d at 465-66. We did not address the "jurisdiction" component contained in § 46-11-504, MCA (Tadewaldt, 277 Mont. at 267, 922 P.2d at 467) which, in any event, differs significantly from the "jurisdiction and venue in a single court" portion of § 46-11-503(1), MCA, the statute presently before us.
¶15 Section 46-11-503(1), MCA, by its terms, requires that jurisdiction and venue of all offenses at issue lie in a single court. It does not require that both the former and the subsequent prosecution occur in the same court. On that basis, it is clear that the District Court incorrectly interpreted § 46-11-503(1), MCA.
¶16 Although the court's interpretation of the "single court" criterion was wrong, its ultimate conclusion that § 46-11-503(1)(b), MCA, does not bar prosecution of Booth for negligent homicide is correct for the reasons discussed below. "We affirm district court decisions which are correct regardless of the court's reasoning in reaching the decision." State v. Huether (1997), 284 Mont. 259, 264, 943 P.2d 1291, 1294 (citation omitted).
¶17 We turn, then, to § 46-11-503(1)(b), MCA, to determine whether the statutory criteria necessary to bar the negligent homicide prosecutions in this case are met. The record is clear that the prosecutor knew of all the offenses, and that they were supported by probable cause, on or shortly after August 27, 1996, the date of Sergeant Schiffer's report concluding that Booth had caused the accident which resulted in two deaths and serious injury to a third person by his alcohol consumption. It also is clear that all the offenses were consummated on July 23, 1996, the date of the accident, approximately two months prior to the original DUI charge by Officer Schmauch in the Justice Court. Finally, Booth indisputably was convicted of the DUI in the Justice Court and that conviction has not been set aside, reversed or vacated. Thus, four of the statutory criteria necessary to bar the prosecution of Booth for negligent homicide are satisfied here.
¶18 The only remaining criterion expressly set forth in § 46-11-503(1)(b), MCA, is that jurisdiction and venue of all the offenses must lie in a single court. Moreover, while we have interpreted § 46-11-503(1), MCA, as applying "only to prosecutions arising from the same transaction" (see State v. Berger (1993), 259 Mont. 364, 368, 856 P.2d 552, 554; State v. Waldrup (1994), 264 Mont. 456, 458-59, 872 P.2d 772, 774), the "jurisdiction and venue in a single court" criterion encompasses and resolves the "same transaction" question in ...
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