State ex rel. Brentwood School Dist. v. State Tax Commission

• Citation: 589 S.W.2d 613
• Decision Date: 14 November 1979
• Docket Number: No. 61253,61253
• Parties: STATE of Missouri ex rel. BRENTWOOD SCHOOL DISTRICT et al., Relators-Appellants, v. STATE TAX COMMISSION of Missouri et al., Respondents, and Cheshire Motor Hotel, Inc., et al., Intervenors-Respondents.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Missouri

Page 613

589 S.W.2d 613

STATE of Missouri ex rel. BRENTWOOD SCHOOL DISTRICT et al., Relators-Appellants, v. STATE TAX COMMISSION of Missouri et al., Respondents, and Cheshire Motor Hotel, Inc., et al., Intervenors-Respondents.

No. 61253.

Supreme Court of Missouri, En Banc.

Nov. 14, 1979.

George J. Bude, Ziercher, Hocker, Tzinberg, Human & Michenfelder, Clayton, for relators-appellants.

John Ashcroft, Atty. Gen., Richard L. Wieler, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for respondents.

Jerome Wallach, Fenton, for intervenors-respondents.

SEILER, Judge.

Relator school districts contend they are entitled to intervene as parties respondent in tax assessment cases before the State Tax Commission and sought mandamus in the circuit court accordingly. Their petition was dismissed and they have appealed. Jurisdiction over this appeal is doubtful; appellants assert that the Court's jurisdiction is based upon the need in this case for a construction of the revenue laws, under Mo.Const. art. V, § 3. Respondents contend that the issue presented is a procedural question and that appellants' assertion of jurisdiction is misplaced, but nonetheless urge the Court to take jurisdiction because of the general interest and importance of the question, as well as the urgency interposed by a delay in tax assessment and distribution of revenue to the appellant school districts. This case was advanced on the Court's docket on motion and the tax appeal proceedings below were stayed pending the outcome of this appeal. We therefore will retain and decide the case rather than go through the time-consuming procedure of sending the case to the court of appeals and then transferring it back prior to opinion. Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. Davis, 488 S.W.2d 193 (Mo. banc 1972).

Various property owners instituted proceedings before the State Tax Commission to appeal tax assessments for 1977 and 1978 made by the assessor of St. Louis County. These appeals were filed on August 16, 1978 and August 24, 1978. On October 25, 1978, the Brentwood, Clayton, Mehlville R-9, and Ritenour School Districts ("school districts") filed motions to intervene in the tax appeals. On December 11, 1978, the State Tax Commission ruled that the school districts' motions to intervene were untimely, citing its rule 12 C.S.R. 30-2.050, which requires that motions to intervene be filed within thirty days of the institution of proceedings to review assessments. On December 19, 1978, appellant school districts filed a petition for alternate and absolute writ of mandamus and the circuit court issued the alternative writ of mandamus against the State Tax Commission. After respondents filed their return and motions to quash, relators filed their reply, and following oral arguments, the court quashed its alternative writ of mandamus on February 15, 1979, based upon a finding that the writ was improvidently issued and dismissed the petition.

The writ of mandamus "will not lie to establish a legal right, but its office is to enforce one which has already been established." State ex rel. Crites v. Short, 351 Mo. 1013, 174 S.W.2d 821, 823 (1943). Unless the school districts have an established legal right to intervene, the circuit court properly quashed its alternate writ of mandamus as improvidently issued.

The school districts allege that they have an unconditional right to intervene in tax assessment appeals before the State Tax Commission because they are "persons affected" under the language in § 138.470.1, RSMo 1978, which states in part:

"The commission, or any member thereof; or any duly authorized agent thereof, as the case may be, shall then and there hear and determine as to the proper assessment of all property and persons mentioned in said notice, and All persons affected, or liable to be affected by review of said assessments thus provided for, may appear and be heard at said hearing. . . . " (emphasis added).

The school districts concede that there is no case law authority to support this reading of the above provision.

In State ex rel. St. Francois County School District R-III v. Lalumondier, 518 S.W.2d 638 (Mo.1975), and again in City of Richmond Heights v. Board of Equalization, 586 S.W.2d 338 (Mo. banc 1979), we held that a school district did not have standing to appeal decisions of the county board of equalization. The Court reasoned in St. Francois County School District R-III :

"We have the view that if the General Assembly had intended to provide a review of alleged underassessments at the request of a governmental subdivision it would have so provided . . . No doubt such was originally omitted on a theory that public officials would adequately protect the interests of the state and its subdivisions . . . "

518 S.W.2d at 643. The same reasoning applies in this case. If the General Assembly had intended to grant the school districts the right to intervene in tax assessment appeals, it would have so provided. No doubt the General Assembly did not so provide because the school boards' interests are adequately represented by the county assessor, who is the party respondent under § 138.470.1, RSMo 1978. Moreover, it follows that because a school district does not have sufficient standing to appeal a tax assessment, under St. Francois County School District R-III, it does not have sufficient interests, not otherwise adequately represented, to intervene...