State ex rel. Broatch v. Moores
Decision Date | 23 September 1898 |
Docket Number | 9249 |
Citation | 76 N.W. 530,56 Neb. 1 |
Parties | STATE OF NEBRASKA, EX REL. WILLIAM J. BROATCH, v. FRANK E. MOORES |
Court | Nebraska Supreme Court |
ORIGINAL application in the nature of quo warranto to oust respondent from the office of mayor of the city of Omaha on the ground that he is ineligible within the meaning of section 2, article 14, of the constitution, providing that any person who is in default as collector and custodian of public money or property shall not be eligible to any office of trust or profit under the constitution or laws of the state. Heard on demand of respondent for a trial by jury, on exceptions to referee's findings against respondent, and on motion of relator to confirm said findings. Judgment of ouster.
JUDGMENT OF OUSTER.
C. C Wright, J. B. Sheean, and Frank T. Ransom, for relator.
John C Wharton, Wharton & Baird, J. J. Boucher, and Greene & Breckenridge, contra.
OPINION
See opinions for references to authorities.
In this case there has already been a description and discussion of the issues, which thereby were greatly simplified. ( State v. Moores, 52 Neb. 770, 73 N.W. 299.) There has now been a trial of these issues to a referee, who has reported his findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with the requirements of the order under which he was appointed.
Before discussing the exceptions and objections to these findings, we shall consider a question argued very strenuously and one which, not having then arisen, could not be discussed in the former opinion, and that is the right of respondent, upon demand, to a trial of the issues by a jury. The writ of quo warranto seems first to have been used in the year 1198 against the incumbent of a church to require him to show quo warranto he held the church. It was used for the purposes of extortion by the sovereigns of England until its scope was limited and its abuse checked by statute. The first of these statutes was known as the "Statute of Gloucester," from the place where parliament then sat. By its provisions there was an opportunity given the party affected to be heard at the coming of the king, or his justices in eyre. The defendant was still liable, however, to be summoned by a general proclamation at the hands of the sheriff, without any complaint or charge being tendered, and there were frequent delays in pronouncing judgment. To remedy these grievances there was passed the statute of 18 Edward I., in the year 1290, whereby pleas of quo warranto were required to be determined in the circuits of the justices. Probably writs of quo warranto fell into disuse about the sixteenth year of Richard II. The substitution therefor of the information in the nature of a quo warranto was attributed by Blackstone to the length of the process upon the proceeding in quo warranto, as well as to the fact that the judgment rendered was final and conclusive, even against the crown. The original writ of quo warranto was strictly a civil remedy, prosecuted at the suit of the king by his attorney general, and, in case of judgment for the king, the franchise was either seized into his hands, if of such a nature as to subsist in the crown, or a mere judgment of ouster was entered for the ejection of the usurper. There was no fine or other like punishment. The information was originally regarded as a criminal proceeding in which the usurpation of the office or franchise was charged as a criminal offense, and the offender was liable, upon conviction, to a fine and imprisonment in addition to the loss of the usurped franchise. In speaking of an information in the nature of quo warranto in Ames v. Kansas, 111 U.S. 449, 28 L.Ed. 482, 4 S.Ct. 437, Waite, C. J., said: (" A review of some of the cases in which the information in the nature of quo warranto is treated as in its nature a criminal proceeding is not without a certain value, for thereby it will be seen that, while the remedy is deemed a civil remedy, yet that, with the idea of an information there is associated such a leaning toward the analogies of criminal procedure that the holdings of these courts with reference to the right of trial by jury should be accepted with caution.
In Donnelly v. People, 11 Ill. 552, Caton, J., in the delivery of the opinion of the court with reference to the degree of precision requisite in indictments and informations, said: In line with the above quoted language the supreme court of Illinois held that the omission of the words, "In the name and by the authority of the people of the state of Illinois," and "Against the peace and dignity of the same," was fatal to the information. The same ruling was made in Wight v. People, 15 Ill. 417; and in Hay v. People, 59 Ill. 94. As these three cases were cited in Attorney General v. Sullivan, 163 Mass. 446, 40 N.E. 843, hereafter to be considered, it will be well to remember the technical nicety which governs them.
In State v. Davis, 57 N.J.L. 203, 31 A. 218, Beasley, C. J., in the delivery of the opinion of the supreme court commenting upon the unjustifiable defense urged by the defendants, said: "It is not proper for this court to pass such a wrong as this without rebuke, and it is therefore ordered that judgment be entered that due process of law issue to remove these defendants from the offices into which they have intruded, and also that a fine of $ 200 be laid on each of said defendants for their malfeasance."
In People v. Havird, 2 Idaho 531, there was under consideration the constitutionality of an act passed by the legislature of that territory in which was embodied a provision with reference to quo warranto, that: "Such action shall be heard and determined by the judge of the district court at chambers, and without the intervention of a jury, after due service of the summons and the expiration of time allowed by law for answering the complaint in a civil action; but no judgment shall be rendered in such action by default." In the discussion of this law there was the following language; The principal matter discussed under these conditions of the statute was the denial of the right of trial by jury and the act was declared unconstitutional, probably for the most part, because of that denial.
The above references sufficiently illustrate the decided leaning of certain courts towards the practice ordinarily followed in the prosecution of criminals, and the danger that this bias may have influenced judgment as to the right of trial by jury. While some courts which incline towards the analogies afforded by the Code of...
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