State ex rel. Bryson v. Carr

• Decision Date: 30 June 2022
• Docket Number: Appeal No. 2020AP1949
• Citation: 404 Wis.2d 307,978 N.W.2d 595,2022 WI App 34
• Parties: STATE of Wisconsin EX REL. DeLorean BRYSON, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Kevin CARR, Respondent-Respondent.
• Court: Wisconsin Court of Appeals

404 Wis.2d 307

978 N.W.2d 595

2022 WI App 34

STATE of Wisconsin EX REL. DeLorean BRYSON, Petitioner-Appellant,

v.Kevin CARR, Respondent-Respondent.

Appeal No. 2020AP1949

Court of Appeals of Wisconsin.

Submitted on Briefs: May 12, 2022

Opinion Filed: June 30, 2022

On behalf of the petitioner-appellant, the cause was submitted on the briefs of DeLorean Bryson, pro se.

On behalf of the respondent-respondent, the cause was submitted on the briefs of Steven C. Kilpatrick, assistant attorney general, and Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general.

Before Blanchard, P.J., Graham, and Nashold, JJ.

GRAHAM, J.

¶1 DeLorean Bryson is a Wisconsin inmate who challenges the authority of the Department of Corrections to deduct 50 percent of his prison wages and gifted funds to pay certain mandatory surcharges and court fees. Bryson's argument is based on language in his judgment of conviction, which purports to limit the Department's deductions to "25% of prison funds," and his interpretation of the sentencing court's statutory authority to set the percentage at which inmate funds are deducted to pay surcharges and court fees.

¶2 For the reasons set forth below, and consistent with this court's recent decision in State ex rel. Ortiz v. Carr , 2022 WI App 16, ¶18, 401 Wis. 2d 450, 973 N.W.2d 786, we conclude that Bryson's judgment of conviction unambiguously purports to limit the Department's authority to deduct funds for surcharges and court fees to 25 percent. We further conclude that the Department has the exclusive authority to set the deduction percentage for the surcharges, but we accept the Department's concession that it does not have that same authority as to court fees. Although we conclude that the sentencing court exceeded its authority by entering a judgment that purports to cap the deduction rate for the surcharges, we accept the Department's concession that it is required to follow the language in Bryson's judgment of conviction unless and until it is amended by the sentencing court. Therefore, we reverse in part and remand to the circuit court with directions.

BACKGROUND

¶3 Bryson was convicted in Milwaukee County Case No. 2013CF5740 and is serving his sentence in a Wisconsin prison. Following his conviction, and consistent with various statutes discussed below, Bryson was ordered to pay the following surcharges and costs: a crime victim and witness assistance surcharge (hereinafter "victim-witness surcharge") in the amount of $184; a DNA analysis surcharge ("DNA surcharge") in the amount of $500; a crime laboratories and drug law enforcement surcharge ("crime labs surcharge") in the amount of $26; and court fees in the amount of $326.¹ Bryson was not ordered to pay restitution. Bryson's September 30, 2014 judgment of conviction (JOC) states:

"Pay DNA surcharge, all other applicable costs and any other surcharges and assessments. To be collected by DOC from 25% of prison funds[.]"

¶4 The Department maintains inmate trust accounts for the benefit of inmates in its custody.² As we understand from the parties' submissions, inmate trust accounts typically contain prison wages and gifted funds. For some time following his conviction, consistent with the above-quoted language in Bryson's JOC, the Department deducted 25 percent from Bryson's prison wages and gifted funds to pay the surcharges and fees. Then, in July 2016, the Department announced a new policy. Going forward, the Department would deduct 50 percent of Bryson's prison wages and gifted funds to pay his surcharges and fees.³

¶5 Bryson filed an inmate complaint challenging this new deduction percentage rate. Among other things, he argued that deductions are capped at 25 percent by WIS. STAT. § 973.04 and the language of his JOC, and that neither the new Department policy nor any recent legislative amendments could override that cap.

¶6 An inmate complaint investigator dismissed Bryson's complaint.⁴ Bryson appealed the dismissal to the corrections complaint examiner, who recommended that the appeal be denied. The examiner cited WIS. STAT. §§ 301.001, 301.03, 301.31, 301.32, 302.04, 973.045(4), 973.046(4), and the Department's new policy as authority for the Department to determine the deduction percentage for surcharges and court fees. The Secretary of the Department agreed with this recommendation and denied Bryson's appeal.⁵

¶7 Bryson then petitioned the circuit court for a writ of certiorari, requesting review of the Department's decision.⁶ Following briefing by the parties, the circuit court issued a decision granting Bryson's petition in part and denying it in part. As noted below, we review the agency decision and not the decision of the circuit court. However, a brief summary of the court's analysis may assist the reader in framing the various issues implicated in this case.

¶8 The circuit court granted Bryson's petition as to the victim-witness surcharge. Although the court determined that the Department has exclusive statutory authority to set the deduction percentage for that surcharge pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 973.045(4), it also determined that the Department had previously exercised that authority by adopting WIS. ADMIN. CODE § DOC 309.465, which sets the percentage at 25 percent. The court determined that the Department's new policy could not override that provision in the administrative code, and therefore, that the Department exceeded its legal authority by deducting funds for the victim-witness surcharge at a rate of 50 percent.

¶9 As for the remaining items, the circuit court observed that there are not any comparable administrative code provisions specifically setting the deduction percentage for the DNA surcharge, the crime labs surcharge, or court fees. Based on its examination of the statutes, the court determined that a sentencing court does not have statutory authority to set the deduction percentage for those items, and that the authority to set those percentages belongs exclusively to the Department.⁷ The court interpreted the language in Bryson's JOC and determined that it does not purport to limit the Department from exercising "its statutory authority to collect an additional percentage above what the JOC requires." The court left "for another day the question of whether the [Department] must seek corrective relief from a JOC that purports to limit [the Department's] rate-setting ability to no more than 25 percent or to otherwise exercise authority that a sentencing court does not have."

¶10 Bryson appeals the circuit court order, challenging the court's determinations about the DNA surcharge, the crime labs surcharge, and the court fees. The Department has not cross-appealed the portion of the order addressing the victim-witness surcharge, and we address the victim-witness surcharge no further.

DISCUSSION

¶11 In an appeal of a circuit court decision on a petition for certiorari review, this court reviews the challenged decision by the agency (here, the Department), not the decision made by the circuit court. Ortiz , 401 Wis. 2d 450, ¶18, 973 N.W.2d 786. Our review is limited to: " ‘(1) whether the Department acted within the bounds of its jurisdiction; (2) whether it acted according to law; (3) whether its action was arbitrary, oppressive, or unreasonable,’ " representing its will rather than its judgment; " ‘and (4) whether the evidence was sufficient that the Department might reasonably make the decision that it made.’ " Id. (quoted source omitted).

¶12 In this case, the issue can be framed as whether the Department acted according to law when it increased the percentage at which it deducted funds from Bryson's inmate trust account to pay the DNA surcharge, the crime labs surcharge, and court fees. In addressing the parties' arguments on this issue, we are required to interpret various statutes and the language of Bryson's JOC. Statutory interpretation and the interpretation of court orders present issues of law, which we review de novo and without deference to the interpretations given by the Department or the circuit court. Id. , ¶¶19, 22.

¶13 The issues raised by Bryson's petition are related but not identical to issues raised in a number of cases that have recently been before this court. The most notable such case is Ortiz , 401 Wis. 2d 450, 973 N.W.2d 786, which was decided by this court earlier this year. Because the Ortiz decision is instrumental to our analysis, we begin by summarizing its conclusions at some length. Following that summary, we turn to the particular issues raised in Bryson's case.

I

¶14 Ortiz was an inmate who had been ordered to pay restitution by the sentencing court. Id. , ¶5. Ortiz's JOC stated: "Court ordered restitution to be paid from 25% of prison wages." Id. , ¶1. Shortly after Ortiz started serving his sentence, the Department started deducting 50 percent of his prison wages and gifted funds for restitution payments. Id. , ¶8. Ortiz challenged the Department's action, arguing that the Department did not have authority to deduct these funds at a higher percentage than the percentage ordered by the sentencing court. Id.

¶15 We first rejected the Department's interpretation of the JOC. Id. , ¶¶25-28. The Department argued that its 50 percent deductions did not conflict with the JOC, and that the JOC must be interpreted as merely setting a minimum percentage rate for the Department's deductions. Id. , ¶25. We disagreed, explaining that the language of the JOC unambiguously ordered the Department to deduct "exactly 25%," "not more or less," from Ortiz's prison wage "to pay his restitution obligation." Id. , ¶25 (emphasis omitted).

¶16 We then determined that the sentencing court had statutory authority to determine the percentage or amount that was to be deducted from funds in Ortiz's prison accounts for the payment of restitution. Our analysis was based on our interpretation of WIS. STAT. § 973.20, a statute that specifically governs restitution.⁸ That statute generally provides a sentencing court with authority...