State ex rel. C. A. H. v. Strickler
| Decision Date | 23 January 1979 |
| Docket Number | No. 14210,14210 |
| Citation | 251 S.E.2d 222,162 W.Va. 535 |
| Court | West Virginia Supreme Court |
| Parties | STATE ex rel. C. A. H. v. Hon. Elmer D. STRICKLER, Judge. |
Syllabus by the Court
1. "Under no circumstances can a child adjudged delinquent because of a status offense, i. e., an act which if committed by an adult would not be a crime, be incarcerated in a secure, prison-like facility with children adjudged delinquent because of criminal activity." Syl. pt. 4, State ex rel. Harris v. Calendine, Va.App., 233 S.E.2d 318 (1977).
2. By virtue of the terms of W.Va.Code § 49-5-13(b) (1978), a juvenile court is required to "give precedence to the least restrictive" of the enumerated dispositional alternatives consistent with the best interests and welfare of the public and the child.
3. In preparation for the dispositional hearing, the court and all counsel should explore and become knowledgeable of all possible resources available to the juvenile court in an effort to find the least restrictive dispositional alternative having reasonable prospects for successful rehabilitation.
J. M. Tully, Summersville, for relator.
Chauncey H. Browning, Atty. Gen., Richard E. Hardison, Deputy Atty. Gen., Charleston, for respondent.
In this prohibition proceeding this Court issued a show cause order on June 12, 1978 1 for the purpose of considering whether the Circuit Court of Nicholas County exceeded its lawful jurisdiction under State ex rel. Harris v. Calendine, W.Va.App., 233 S.E.2d 318 (1977), by committing the relator, a juvenile status offender, to the West Virginia Industrial Home for Girls at Salem, a secure prison-like facility housing exclusively juveniles adjudicated delinquent for committing criminal offenses. We hold the trial court exceeded its lawful jurisdiction and award the writ.
The salient facts are not in dispute, and the procedural history of the case can be briefly summarized. Following adversary proceedings on a juvenile delinquency petition, the relator was adjudicated a delinquent child under W.Va.Code § 49-1-4 (1977). The juvenile court found the relator guilty of the charge of habitual truancy, of the charge of being a habitual runaway, and of the charge of being unmanageable, ungovernable, and incorrigible. On April 7, 1978, after receiving a social report prepared by the juvenile probation officer and a psychological evaluation prepared by a psychologist employed at a county mental health facility, the court below ordered relator committed to the West Virginia Industrial Home for Girls at Salem.
The probation officer's report explored the disposition alternatives contained in W.Va.Code § 49-5-13 (1977), and recommended the relator be committed to the most restrictive alternative, an industrial home, based on (1) the relator's prior history; 2 (2) statements from child welfare authorities that there were no foster homes or other welfare agency programs capable of rehabilitating a juvenile who refuses all help, who will not admit to having problems, and who habitually runs away; and (3) a conclusion that confinement and continuous planning and counseling were necessary. The psychological report indicated that removal from the home and a more structured environment were mandatory to an effective treatment program.
On April 7, 1978, based on the entire record, including the court's experience with relator, the court found that no less restrictive dispositional alternative contained in W.Va. § 49-5-13 (1977) would help relator and that relator was so totally unmanageable that no treatment facility or alternative was available in this state to take care of her problem to which she would be amenable. Upon that finding, and upon the finding that the West Virginia Industrial Home for Girls at Salem was the only alternative available, the relator was ordered committed there until she could be "transferred to any other secure institution that the state may make available for children like her in the future."
Upon motion of relator's counsel that order was stayed to enable counsel to obtain a ruling on a Writ of Prohibition by this Court, and relator was remanded to a juvenile detention facility for a reasonable time pending further development in this case.
After this Court issued the show cause order, the respondent was granted a continuance, depositions were taken, and on August 31, 1978, respondent filed an answer and return denying that the West Virginia Industrial Home for Girls at Salem is a secure prison-like facility under this Court's pronouncement in Calendine, supra, and denying that the circuit court exceeded its legitimate juvenile jurisdiction.
Preliminarily, we hold that the West Virginia Industrial Home for Girls at Salem is a secure prison-like facility. In Calendine, supra, 233 S.E.2d at 325, this Court established the criteria for determining whether an institution is a secure prison-like facility:
(W)e are not impressed with euphemistic titles used to disguise what are in fact secure, prison-like facilities. (footnote omitted). We define a secure, prison-like facility, regardless of whether it be called a "home for girls," "industrial school," "forestry camp," "children's shelter," "orphanage," or other imaginative name, as a place which relies for control of children upon locked rooms, locked buildings, guards, physical restraint, regimentation and corporal punishment.
The depositions of state authorities having responsibilities relating to juvenile delinquents compel the conclusion that the institution is a secure prison-like facility by revealing that all the factors enumerated in Calendine are features of confinement at Salem with the exception of corporal punishment. The principal security measures consist of a locked front door and some sixteen correctional officers for the approximately twenty-two residents. A more detailed description of the physical facilities, security measures, and treatment program is not warranted. This point was not addressed in the respondent's brief and apparently was abandoned. In any event, the argument is without merit.
The question presented in this proceeding is resolved and controlled by our decision in Calendine. There we upheld the constitutional validity of West Virginia's juvenile delinquency statutes and established definitive guidelines to guarantee that such statutes would not be unconstitutionally applied to deny juvenile status offenders equal protection, substantive due process or to inflict cruel and unusual punishment.
The fourth syllabus point of Calendine mandates that we award the writ of prohibition and thereby preclude the relator's commitment to Salem. Our holding was that, "Under no circumstances can a child adjudged delinquent because of a status offense, i. e., an act which if committed by an adult would not be a crime, be incarcerated in a secure, prison-like facility with children adjudged delinquent because of criminal activity."
Salem is the only correctional facility currently available in this state for the commitment of female non-status offenders. Consistent with our holding in Calendine and recent legislative action, there are no status offenders confined at Salem at this time. Most of its residents have been adjudicated delinquent for the commission of criminal acts such as assault and battery, grand larceny, and car theft with an average stay of eight to ten months.
The practical problem confronting all institutions and groups working with habitual runaways is that there is no secure detention facility or rehabilitation facility in West Virginia devoted exclusively to the rehabilitation of status offenders. The absence of such facility, however, does not justify the violation of constitutional rights.
We placed particular importance on this point in Calendine, supra, 233 S.E.2d at 331:
No status offender . . . may be incarcerated in a secure, prison-like facility which is not devoted exclusively to the custody and rehabilitation of status offenders. We emphasize here that State parismony is no defense to an allegation of...
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