State ex rel. Cary v. Langum

• Decision Date: 05 August 1910
• Citation: 127 N.W. 465,112 Minn. 121
• Parties: STATE ex rel. CARY v. LANGUM, Sheriff.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

112 Minn. 121

127 N.W. 465

STATE ex rel. CARY

v.LANGUM, Sheriff.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Aug. 5, 1910.

Appeal from District Court, Hennepin County; William E. Hale, Judge.

Habeas corpus by the State, on the relation of Ernest S. Cary, against Otto S. Langum, Sheriff of Hennepin County. From a judgment discharging the writ, relator appeals. Order affirmed.

Syllabus by the Court

Errors and irregularities in a judgment or sentence for contempt of court, not going to the jurisdiction of the court, are not open to review on habeas corpus.

The trial courts of this state have, independent of statute, the power and authority to grant and order a stay of proceedings for a definite period after conviction in a criminal case, for the purpose of enabling the defendant to perfect an appeal, or to take such other proceedings as he may be advised necessary in the protection of his rights.

The distinction between such a stay and an indefinitely suspended sentence pointed out. James Cormican and P. A. Cosgrove, for appellant.

Al. J. Smith, for respondent.

BROWN, J.

The relator was sentenced by the district court of Hennepin county to 30 days' imprisonment for contempt of court, and upon the issuance of a warrant of commitment sued out a writ of habeas corpus for his release and discharge on the ground that the judgment upon which the commitment was issued had expired, and was in any event void, and relator's detention thereunder unlawful. After a hearing in the court below, the writ was discharged, and relator appealed.

Relator contends: (1) That the judgment convicting him of contempt of court is void, for the reason that it does not comply with section 4641, Rev. Laws 1905, in that the jurisdictional facts are not sufficiently recited therein. (2) That the term of imprisonment prescribed by the sentence commenced to run the day the judgment was entered, and that, since the period of imprisonment has long since expired, the relator cannot now lawfully be imprisoned thereunder; hence he contends that his restraint is in contravention of both state and federal Constitutions.

1. The first contention is without merit. If it be conceded that the judgment is not as full and complete as the statute referred to requires, yet the court below had jurisdiction of the subject-matter and of the relator, and the error of incompleteness in the judgment is not open to review on habeas corpus. If error or defect at all, it is available only by a direct proceeding. State v. Riley, 109 Minn. 434, 124 N. W. 11; 21 Cyc. 298. And, moreover, the judgment was, on certiorari sued out by relator, reviewed by this court and affirmed. State ex rel. Cary v. District Court, 125 N. W. 1020. The judgment is therefore conclusive, and not subject to further attack.

2. The second question deserves special mention, though it must be answered adversely to relator's contention. The contempt of which relator was adjudged guilty was committed in open court and during the trial of an action then pending before the court in which relator was engaged as counsel. The judgment of conviction, entered at the time, October 22, 1907, was in the following language: ‘This court finds you guilty of contempt, and you are sentenced to the county jail for 30 days. I will give you a stay of 30 days to take an appeal, or such proceedings as you wish.’ The stay of proceedings was subsequently extended from time to time, pending which relator brought the sentence to this court for review, where it was affirmed. Thereafter, and upon filing the remittitur in the court below, which was long after the expiration of 30 days from the date of the sentence, the commitment complained of was issued.

The point made by relator is that when a judgment of imprisonment is imposed, and the same is not stayed as expressly authorized by law, and the court makes an order which postpones the operation thereof, discharging defendant from custody, it has no power or jurisdiction, after the time fixed by the judgment as the term of imprisonment, to issue a commitment and thereunder cause the defendant to be taken into custody. This position is sustained by the general rule that where not otherwise expressly provided by statute, or the sentence or judgment of the court, the date for the commencement of the term of imprisonment is that on which the sentence or judgment is pronounced. The rule is enforced strictly by some of the authorities. In re Markuson, 5 N. D. 180, 64 N. W. 939;State v. Murphy et al., 23 Nev. 390, 48 Pac. 628. In the first case the relator was sentenced to 90 days' imprisonment for contempt of court, ‘commencing to-day.’ At the time of pronouncing the sentence, the court made a further order staying all proceedings for 30 days to facilitate an appeal, and providing that in case an appeal was taken the term of imprisonment should commence on the date of filing the remittitur from the appellate court. An appeal was taken, the sentence affirmed, and upon the remanding of the cause, which was subsequent to the expiration of the term of the sentence, commitment was duly issued for the apprehension of the accused. On habeas corpus, the court held that the term of imprisonment had expired, and relator was discharged; the basis of the decision being that the stay of proceedings ordered...