State ex rel. Casey v. Wood
Decision Date | 12 December 1972 |
Docket Number | No. 13274,13274 |
Citation | 193 S.E.2d 143,156 W.Va. 329 |
Court | West Virginia Supreme Court |
Parties | STATE ex rel. Patrick CASEY, Prosecuting Attorney, etc. v. George W. WOOD, Judge, etc. |
Syllabus by the Court
Prohibition does not lie to prohibit a court from entertaining a motion pertaining to the appearance of witnesses who have been legally served by a properly issued court's process to testify before a special grand jury convened by said court.
Patrick Casey, Pros. Atty., Charleston, for relator.
John A. Field, III, Charleston, for respondent.
This is an original prohibition proceeding instituted in this Court on November 14, 1972 by Patrick Casey, Prosecuting Attorney of Kanawha County, to prohibit George W. Wood, Judge of the Intermediate Court of Kanawha County, from restraining petitioner from having two witnesses, for which subpoenas had been issued, testify before a special grand jury of the Intermediate Court of Kanawha County. A rule was granted by this Court returnable November 21, 1972. The proceeding was heard on the return day upon arguments and briefs for the respective parties.
This matter arose as a result of a motion filed in the Intermediate Court of Kanawha County, West Virginia, by John A. Field, III, United States Attorney for the Southern District of West Virginia, requesting that the subpoenas issued and served upon C. L. Hughes and H. Benton Kesler be quashed, or in the alternative, that their testimony before the grand jury of Kanawha County be limited to matters not being investigated by the federal grand jury before which these two witnesses had previously appeared and testified. The motion had not been disposed of by the respondent when this proceeding was instituted in this Court. Therefore, this Court was of the opinion that the writ should be denied because the Intermediate Court of Kanawha County had jurisdiction to entertain the motion and thus had not exceeded its legitimate powers in so doing. An order was entered on November 28, 1972 disposing of this proceeding so that the respondent would have an opportunity to rule on the motion before the special grand jury was automatically dissolved on December 1, 1972. This opinion is now written giving the reasons for refusing to grant the writ.
The motion of the United States District Attorney to either quash the writ or limit the testimony of the witnesses in question to matters not involved before the federal grand jury was filed on October 19, 1972 and a hearing was held pertaining thereto on the same day. The transcript of the hearing on the motion was filed by the petitioner, with his petition, on November 14, 1972. At the beginning of the hearing the respondent stated: '* * * we are here on this motion of the United States of America to quash the subpoenae, or in the alternative, the testimony be limited to an area of inquiry beyond the scope of the Federal investigation.' The respondent judge asked the attorneys if they had any law on the subject as to what he could do, and not do, and the petitioner, after making a lengthy statement, objected to the filing of the motion. He stated that if the respondent believed that it was proper for the motion to be filed he requested permission to be allowed to respond to the motion in writing, and if the respondent requested additional legal research to be done he stated that he was ready to help, and would research the question. Later in the hearing, the respondent told the petitioner that he was going to accept his suggestion with regard to researching the law pertaining to the matters involved in the motion. The respondent stated that they could set their own time-table with regard to submitting the authorities because he was tied up in court 'from now until Christmastime', and for them 'to work out a schedule that would fit in with their schedule which would be agreeable with me.' The respondent requested that briefs be filed at a time convenient to the parties and discussed several dates for the filing of the briefs and finally the parties were given three weeks to exchange their briefs which set the date for the filing of the briefs on November 10th, and November 13th was discussed as a possible date for argument. After this the petitioner asked the respondent if the respondent were directing him not to take the witnesses, Hughes and Kesler, before the special grand jury. The following statements as shown in the transcript were made by the parties closing the hearing:
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