State ex rel. Chandler v. Allen
| Citation | 138 S.W. 339,235 Mo. 298 |
| Parties | THE STATE ex rel. CHANDLER v. CHARLES C. ALLEN, Judge |
| Decision Date | 17 June 1911 |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Writ denied.
Joseph S. Laurie for relator.
(1) When Judge McQuillin was transferred by order of general term from Division No. 6 to Division No. 12 he lost jurisdiction of all causes belonging to Division No. 6, including the cause in question, which he, at the time of the transfer held under advisement. This being true, there remained no alternative save that his successor in Division No. 6 respondent herein, should reinstate said cause upon the docket for trial. State v. Mason, 82 Mo.App. 240; State v. Nast, 209 Mo. 708; Haehl v Railroad, 119 Mo. 325; State v. Eggers, 152 Mo 485; Goddard v. Delaney, 181 Mo. 581. (2) Judge McQuillin can have legally no opportunity to decide this case. He cannot decide it from the bench of the criminal division where he presides; neither can he come back to his former division for that purpose, for the reason that such division is already occupied. The rule of impenetrability prevails in law as well as physics, and two judges cannot occupy the same division at the same time. Judge McQuillin cannot be called in to "aid" the present judge of No. 6 by trying this case, for the reason that the same, having been already tried, is no longer on the docket. (3) When Judge McQuillin was assigned to the criminal division, his connection with the case at bar was absolutely severed, and he cannot, while judge of said division, be reinvested with power to decide this case under any of the provisions of the statute. If the statute does not authorize the calling in of Judge McQuillin by Judge Allen to decide this case, it cannot be done. State v. Gilham, 174 Mo. 675.
In Banc.
Mandamus.
This is an application for a writ of mandamus to require the respondent, a judge of the Eighth Judicial Circuit, to take jurisdiction of a cause alleged to be pending in Division No. 6 of the circuit court of the city of St. Louis. The city of St. Louis alone constitutes the Eighth Judicial Circuit. The court for certain purposes is divided into twelve divisions, there are twelve judges, to each division one judge is assigned; each division sits separately for the trial and determination of causes which have been assigned to it, and, when so sitting, is called a court in Special Term. For certain purposes prescribed by statute the twelve judges, or a majority of them, may sit In Banc, and hold a session of court which is called a General Term. The court in General Term has power to make rules and orders for certain purposes, among which purposes are rules regulating the assignment of causes to the several divisions, and orders assigning the several judges to the several divisions. In June, 1909, Judge McQuillin was, and still is, one of the judges of that court, his term of office being six years from January 1, 1909. He had been duly assigned to Division No. 6, and there was a suit pending in the court, which had been regularly assigned to that division, in which suit Albert B. Chandler, the relator herein, was plaintiff and the United Railways Company was defendant. It was an equity suit; it came on for trial before Judge McQuillin, who as chancellor heard the cause on the pleadings and proof on both sides; it was argued by counsel and duly submitted for judgment and was by the court taken under advisement. While the cause was so held under advisement the court in General Term made an order, as it had authority to do, transferring Judge McQuillin from Division No. 6 to Division No. 12 of that court, and at the same time and by the same authority Judge Allen was transferred from Division No. 12 to Division No. 6; whereupon the two judges made the exchange of positions, Judge McQuillin assuming the position of presiding judge in No. 12 and Judge Allen in No. 6. After this exchange the relator went into No. 6 and moved the court to set aside the submission of the above mentioned cause and remand it to the docket for trial, on the theory that Judge McQuillin being no longer the judge of that division of the court had no jurisdiction to render judgment therein, and that Judge Allen, not having tried the cause, could not render judgment. Judge Allen was of the opinion that he had not jurisdiction of the cause and therefore refused the motion, then the relator came to this court for a writ of mandamus to require Judge Allen to take jurisdiction.
The relator contends that when Judge McQuillin was transferred from No. 6 to No. 12 his jurisdiction of the cause was as completely terminated as if his term of office had expired. In the opinion of the learned counsel for relator, in a case like this there is no difference between the condition caused by the transfer of a judge of the circuit court of the city of St. Louis from one division to another and that caused by the death or expiration of the term of office of a judge in a circuit where there is but one judge. We do not concur in that view. If a judge having tried a cause and taken it under advisement, should allow his term of office to expire before he renders his judgment he could not of course render the judgment, nor could his successor who had not tried the cause; but to say that a judge who has tried the cause and taken it under advisement and still holds his office cannot render judgment is not logical. Judge McQuillin was not elected and qualified as judge of Division No. 6 of the circuit court of the city of St. Louis, but as judge of that court; he tried this cause as such and he is as much judge of the circuit court of the city of St. Louis now as he was then; he derived his authority to try the cause from his election, commission and qualification, and that authority he still has. That is the difference between the authority of the judge whose term has expired and the judge whose term has not expired.
The whole argument of the relator is based on the proposition that each division of the court has, for the trial of a case regularly assigned to it, exclusive jurisdiction, and therefore another judge of the court sitting in another division cannot make an order or render a judgment in that case.
The organization of the court with its twelve divisions creates the necessity of dividing the cases pending therein and assigning causes to the several divisions respectively and the necessity of giving to each division the exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine the causes assigned to it. If it were not so, if a division in a Special Term or a judge thereof should have jurisdiction to make orders or render judgments in causes assigned to other divisions, confusion would result and the administration of justice be impeded. This court has decided in a number of cases cited by counsel for relator that when a cause is assigned to a division of that court that division has as exclusive jurisdiction of that cause as would the circuit court in a county where there is but one judge have of a cause pending therein. We have nothing to take back in any of the points decided in either of those cases, but those decisions do not go to the extent that the counsel would have us go in this case; what is said in the decision in each of those cases is said in reference to the facts of that case.
In Voullaire v. Voullaire, 45 Mo. 602, the cause had been tried by a judge in one division, judgment rendered, and a motion for a new trial filed; the cause was then by order of that court in Special Term transferred to another division where the motion for a new trial was overruled. This court held that the judge that tried the cause alone had jurisdiction to pass on the motion for a new trial and render final judgment.
In Haehl v. Railroad, 119 Mo. 325, the cause was duly assigned and pending in Division No. 5 and was set for trial but on a day before the trial, when No. 5 was not in session, the defendant went into No. 3 and made application for a special...
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