State ex rel. Chapman v. Superior Court for Benton County

• Decision Date: 14 December 1942
• Docket Number: 28926.
• Citation: 131 P.2d 958,15 Wn.2d 637
• Parties: STATE ex rel. CHAPMAN, Auditor, et al. v. SUPERIOR COURT FOR BENTON COUNTY.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

131 P.2d 958

15 Wn.2d 637

STATE ex rel. CHAPMAN, Auditor, et al. v. SUPERIOR COURT FOR BENTON COUNTY.

No. 28926.

Supreme Court of Washington

December 14, 1942

Department 1.

Original proceeding by the State on the relation of Harley Chapman, as Auditor for Benton County, and others, constituting the Benton County Canvassing Board of Election Returns, against the Superior Court for Benton County to review judgment granting application of a taxpayer and qualified voter of the county for writ of mandate requiring the board to place the names of certain persons on official ballot for use in general election to be held November 3, 1942, in Benton County, as Republican candidates for offices of treasurer auditor and prosecuting attorney respectively for the county. On motion to quash order to show cause and dismiss the proceedings.

Motion granted.

Clark &amp Grady, of Yakima, and Andrew Brown, of Prosser, for respondent.

MILLARD Justice.

The superior court for Benton county granted application of a taxpayer and qualified voter of that county October 29, 1942, for a writ of mandate requiring the Benton county election board to place the names of certain persons on the official ballot to be used in the general election to be held November 3, 1942, in Benton county as republican candidates for the offices of treasurer auditor and prosecuting attorney, respectively, for said county.

The relators (members of Benton county canvassing board of election returns), by this proceeding seek review and reversal of that judgment. The application to this court for a writ of certiorari was made orally Friday, October 30, 1942, and formally Saturday, October 31, 1942, hence came too late for us to consider the merits of the cause in any orderly manner prior to the election, which was held Tuesday, November 3, 1942; however, we entered an order requiring respondent superior court to show cause in this court November 13, 1942, on which date hearing was had in this court, why the writ should not be granted.

Respondent moves that the order to show cause be quashed and the proceeding dismissed upon the grounds that (1) the question presented is moot and that (2) if petitioners have any standing in court they have a plain, speedy and adequate remedy at law.

If the election board obeyed the order of the trial court to place the names of the three persons in question upon the ballot as candidates for certain offices at the November 3rd election, the election board's act in so doing can not now be undone by any order which we may enter. It is a fait accompli. If the election board did not obey the trial court's order and place the names upon the ballot a review by this court would be pointless for the same reason, as we would be powerless to grant an effectual remedy; any order entered by us would be, as argued by counsel for respondent, wholly inoperative.

In either event the election board has no interest in this proceeding as that board either performed its duty by printing the names upon the ballot or it is now too late to either perform or not perform that duty. It is no concern of the election. board whether the three candidates were elected, nor, if any or all of the three candidates were elected, would it be any concern of the election board whether the election was valid. The sole concern of the election board was the printing of the ballots. The question of validity of the election of the three candidates, if they were elected, is a matter in which the candidates themselves alone are interested. If any one of the three candidates involved were elected, the validity of that election could be challenged by the defeated candidate (not by the election board or taxpayer and qualified elector at whose instance the writ of mandate was issued requiring placing of the three names upon the ballot) in a proper proceeding.

We have consistently held that we will not review a proceeding or cause in which the questions presented have become moot.

In State ex rel. Burnham v. Superior Court, 180 Wash. 519, 41 P.2d 155, we granted a motion for dismissal of an application for a writ of certiorari to review a judgment of the superior court involving the cancellation of a beer license. The license was cancelled by the liquor board effective August 30, 1934. The superior court denied an application November 1, 1934, for review of the board's decision. On December 31 of the year 1934 in which it was issued the license involved expired by operation of law. We held that after December 31, 1934, relator had no beneficial interest in the litigation, the controversy had ceased, and that there was not a live question Before this court. We quoted with approval the following language of the opinion in Mackay v. Dever, 49 Wash. 439, 95 P. 860, 861:

'It has been suggested that the question is a recurring one, and will arise again; but, in the language of the Court of Appeals of New York, 'the demands of actual practical litigation are too pressing to permit the examination or discussion of academic questions, such as this case in its present situation presents.''

In Mackay v. Dever, supra, we held that an appeal from a judgment dismissing an action to enjoin the holding of a primary election will be dismissed because of cessation of controversy where Before the hearing of the appeal the time for holding the election has expired and the election has been held or never can be held.

In State ex rel. Case v. Mead, 52 Wash. 533, 100 P. 1033, we held that certiorari does not lie to review a sentence of a court martial reprimanding the relator after the reprimand has been administered, the court dissolved and the sentence fully executed, the relator not being deprived of any dignity or rank; as the controversy has ceased to exist.

In Holly-Mason Hardware v. Schnatterly, 111 Wash. 29 189 P. 545, we held that an appeal from an order refusing a writ of assistance to put a mortgagee in possession during the period of redemption will be dismissed, where Before the hearing the period of redemption had expired and any...