State ex rel. Childs v. Holman

• Decision Date: 14 July 1894
• Citation: 59 N.W. 1006,58 Minn. 219
• Parties: STATE EX REL. CHILDS, ATTY. GEN., v. HOLMAN ET AL.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

58 Minn. 219

59 N.W. 1006

STATE EX REL. CHILDS, ATTY. GEN.,

v.HOLMAN ET AL.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

July 14, 1894.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

1. The provision of the charter of the city of St. Paul (Sp. Laws 1891, c. 6, § 1) that, of the members of the assembly to be elected at large from the body of electors of the city, four shall reside east of Wabasha and Rice streets and north of the Mississippi river, four west of Wabasha and Rice streets and north of the Mississippi river, and one in the sixth ward, relates to their eligibility or qualification for election, and not to where they shall reside after election.

2. Section 7, art. 7, of the constitution of the state, providing that every person entitled to vote at any election shall be eligible to any office elective by the people in the district wherein he shall have resided 30 days previous to such election, applies to statutory (including municipal) as well as constitutional offices.

3. Where the constitution prescribes the qualifications for eligibility to office, it is not in the power of the legislature to add any additional qualifications, or to impose any limitations upon the terms of eligibility fixed by the constitution.

4. The provision of the city charter referred to is in this respect in conflict with the constitution.

Quo warranto by the state of Minnesota, on the relation of H. W. Childs, attorney general, against Oscar E. Holman and William Banholzer. Demurrer to answer sustained.

Canty, J., dissenting.

H. W. Childs, Atty. Gen., W. H. Lightner, and F. W. Zollman, for relator.

F. G. B. Woodruff and J. C. Michael (F. W. M. Cutcheon and John H. Ives, of counsel), for respondents.

MITCHELL, J.

In their answer to the information filed to test respondents' title to the office of assemblymen of the city of St. Paul, two defenses are interposed. To the first defense the state demurred, and the issue raised by this demurrer is the one now submitted to the court. Its determination depends upon the construction and constitutionality of the provision relating to the residence of assemblymen contained in the city charter (Sp. Laws 1891, c. 6, § 1).

1. This provision, so far as here material, is as follows: “Said assembly shall be composed of nine (9) members. The members of the assembly shall be elected at large from the body of electors of said city, and four (4) of same shall reside east of Wabasha and Rice streets and north of the Mississippi river, and four (4) shall reside west of Wabasha and Rice streets and north of the Mississippi river, and one (1) shall reside in the Sixth (6th) ward of said city. *** At the general municipal election of said city in eighteen hundred and ninety-two, (1892) *** there shall be elected at large, from the electors of said city, and at each general municipal election held each two (2) successive years thereafter, there shall be elected at large, from the electors of said city, nine (9) assemblymen, who shall reside in such portions of said city as hereinbefore provided.” The state contends that this has no reference to the eligibility of candidates for the office, but is merely directory as to where the assemblymen shall reside after they are elected. The language is not susceptible of any such construction. It clearly means that four of the assemblymen shall be elected from the electors residing in one part of the city, four from those residing in another part, and one from those residing in a third part. This construction is also the only one that is consistent with the manifest object of the provision (to secure local representation to the different parts of the city), or that would work in practice. Suppose the nine candidates receiving the highest number of votes all resided in one of these districts; which five of the nine would be required to change their residences? And to which of the remaining districts should each of the five remove? And, if they all refused to change their residences, what then? The provision relates to eligibility or qualification for election.

2. The provision of the constitution to which the state claims this provision of the charter is obnoxious is article 7, § 7, which reads as follows: “Every person who by the provisions of this article shall be entitled to vote at any election shall be eligible to any office which now is, or hereafter shall be, elective by the people in the district wherein he shall have resided thirty days previous to such election, except as otherwise provided in this constitution, or the constitution and laws of the United States.” The contention of the respondents is that this applies only to constitutional, and not to municipal, offices. It must either apply to all elective offices, both constitutional and statutory, or else only to constitutional offices. There is no warrant for adopting a middle ground, and drawing the line at municipal (i. e. city or village) offices. The language of this constitutional provision will not admit of the limitation sought to be attached to it. By its express terms, it applies to “any office which now is, or hereafter shall be, elective by the people.” The words italicized must of necessity refer to statutory offices, for the constitution presently determined what constitutional offices should be elective. Section 1 of the same article, fixing the qualification of voters, and section 6, providing that elections shall be by ballot, also indicate that wherever, in this article, elective offices and elections for elective offices are mentioned, reference is had to statutory as well as constitutional offices. This court has always construed section 7 as being applicable to statutory offices. State v. Clough, 23 Minn. 17. See, also, Brisbin v. Cleary, 26 Minn. 107, 1 N. W. 825;Harrington v. Town of Plainview, 27 Minn. 224, 6 N. W. 777;State v. Fitzgerald, 37 Minn. 27, 32 N. W. 788. Hence, whenever any public office of any kind is made elective, section 7, art. 7, of the constitution becomes ex proprio vigore applicable and operative, and fixes the qualifications for eligibility. This is a denial of power to the legislature to impose any greater restrictions or to add other qualifications for eligibility to those prescribed by the constitution. Thus far we do not understand that there is any difference of opinion in this court.

3. The remaining question is whether this provision of the city charter imposes greater restrictions upon eligibility, or adds qualifications for eligibility additional to those prescribed by the constitution. It seems to us that they do, and that is the way we think it would naturally strike the common sense of men. The situation, plainly stated, is just this: All the electors of the city may vote for all nine assemblymen, but no elector is eligible to any of these offices except the four or one, as the case may be, belonging to the district in which he resides. We cannot see this in any other light than as an attempt to impose a restriction or limitation upon eligibility which is equivalent to imposing a qualification for election in addition to those fixed by the constitution. It is urged with a good deal of plausibility that this provision of the charter does not render any elector ineligible to the office of assemblyman, for every one is eligible either to one of the offices included in one or the other of the two groups of four, or to the single office pertaining to the Sixth ward, and there fore no elector is deprived of any substantial constitutional right. The very subtility and refinement of reasoning resorted to in support of this proposition tends to create doubt as to its soundness. We cannot view this...