State ex rel. Childs v. Board of Com'rs of Red Lake County

Decision Date01 February 1897
Docket Number10,473--(303)
Citation69 N.W. 1083,67 Minn. 352
PartiesSTATE OF MINNESOTA ex rel. H. W. CHILDS, Attorney General, v. BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF RED LAKE COUNTY and Others
CourtMinnesota Supreme Court

Information in the nature of quo warranto. Writ discharged.

Writ discharged.

H. W Childs, Attorney General, H. Steenerson, and William Watts for relator.

Laws 1893, c. 143, is unconstitutional, because the subject is not sufficiently expressed in its title. The title is "An act to provide for the creation and organization of new counties," etc. The act not only provides for the creation and organization of new counties, but for changing the lines of counties already organized. The distinction between established and organized counties is clear and definite, and has been recognized since the foundation of the state. State v. McFadden, 23 Minn. 40. Organizing new counties and carving them out of established counties without municipal organization have always been wholly within legislative control without reference to popular vote. By such act of the legislature every county since the adoption of the constitution has come into existence. The title to this act would indicate provisions relative to the organization of new counties out of unorganized or established counties. But its provisions relate exclusively to changing lines of counties already organized, of old counties. See In re Hauck, 70 Mich. 396, 38 N.W. 269; Black Const. L. 287.

The petition for the organization of Red Lake county is invalid, because it is signed by the same persons who signed other petitions filed at the same time. An elector can sign only one petition under this law. Any other construction of this statute would lead to absurdities more extreme than those in the case at bar. State v. Van Camp, 36 Neb. 91, 54 N.W. 113. The proposition for the establishment of Red Lake county conflicts with those for the establishment of Mills and Columbia counties. They defeat each other. State v. Armstrong, 30 Neb. 493, 46 N.W. 618. There is nothing in the law giving priority to any petition by reason of its being filed first. The authorities having placed conflicting propositions upon the ballots, these propositions defeated themselves by reason of their embracing the same territory. To adopt any proposition the act in question requires a majority of all voters, or at least a majority of all votes cast. Alexander v. Worthington, 5 Md. 485; Sutherland, St. Const. 313.

Davis, Kellogg & Severance and Ira B. Mills, for Garfield county.

Laws 1895, c. 124, § 2, should not be construed so as to allow the submission of conflicting propositions at the same election. A construction allowing the submission of several overlapping propositions would lead to an absurd result. 23 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 362; Sutherland, St. Const. § 324; Stickney v. Maidstone, 30 Vt. 742; Perry v. Skinner, 2 M. & W. 471; Perry Co. v. Jefferson Co., 94 Ill. 220; People v. Davenport, 91 N.Y. 585; United States v. Fisher, 2 Cranch, 358; Hantzch v. Massolt, 61 Minn. 361, 63 N.W. 1069.

John B. & E. P. Sanborn, for respondents.

The proposition for the creation of Red Lake county was submitted to the voters in the manner required by the act. The proposition was carried by a majority of the voters voting thereon. It has been so declared by the proclamation of the governor. That other propositions were also submitted and voted upon ought not to affect the result so far as Red Lake county is concerned. Every presumption is in favor of the acts of the governor and executive officers appertaining to this matter. State v. County, 66 Minn. 519, 68 N.W. 767, 69 N.W. 925, and 73 N.W. 631. The decision and the proclamation of the governor are particularly conclusive of the public welfare in a question like this, and the judicial department will not interfere with its conclusion.

OPINION

START, C. J.

This is an information in the nature of quo warranto, whereby the state challenges the corporate existence of the county of Red Lake, which claims to have been created and organized pursuant to Laws 1893, c. 143, as amended by Laws 1895, c. 124.

The facts are admitted, which, so far as here material, are these: On May 8, 1896, there were filed in the office of the secretary of state, pursuant to the act referred to, four petitions for the location and organization of four new counties to be known as "Nelson," "Hill," "Red Lake," and "Garfield," respectively, out of a portion of the territory of the county of Polk as then established and organized. The propositions to create these counties were not inconsistent or competing ones in any respect, -- that is, no territory included in any one of such counties was included in any one or more of the others. The total territory proposed to be taken from the county of Polk for these new counties left the original county with an area exceeding the minimum required by the constitution. Each of the petitions was, in substance and form, as required by the statute, and was signed by the required number of electors, except that each of the petitions was largely signed at the same time and by the same electors. Excluding from the petition for Red Lake county the names of all electors who also signed the other petitions, it was not signed by the necessary 25 per cent. of the electors of Polk county; but including such names it had the full legal number of qualified signers.

On July 14, 1896, two other petitions of like form and substance were filed with the secretary of state for the creation of two new counties to be known respectively as "Mills" and "Columbia." Each of the last-named propositions were competing ones with the previous propositions for the creation of the counties of Red Lake and Nelson, and the county of Columbia was also a competing one with that of Garfield; that is, more than one-half the territory of the proposed county of Red Lake, and a portion of that of the proposed county of Nelson, were included in the proposed county of Mills. A part of the territory of Red Lake county was also included in the proposed county of Columbia, and the last-named county also included a portion of the territory of the proposed county of Garfield.

Such proceedings were had upon all of the petitions, in accordance with the letter of the statute, that the governor of the state issued his proclamations submitting all six of the propositions to the electors of the county of Polk at the next general election. The proclamation as to the first four was issued before the last two petitions were filed. The statute in question contains no express limit to the number of such propositions which may be submitted at the same election, and provides, as amended, that no elector shall vote for or against more than one proposition. State v. Pioneer Press Co., 66 Minn. 536, 68 N.W. 769.

The votes for and against the six propositions respectively were as follows: Proposition to create Nelson county: Yes, 765; no, 1,050. Proposition to create Garfield county: Yes, 603; no, 608. Proposition to create Hill county: Yes, 553; no, 1,574. Proposition to create Red Lake county: Yes, 992; no, 449. Proposition to create Mills county: Yes, 334; no, 56. Proposition to create Columbia county: Yes, 575; no, 107. The votes were duly canvassed by the state canvassing board as here stated. Thereupon the governor duly issued his proclamation declaring the proposition for the creation and organization of the county of Red Lake adopted. Thereafter the individual defendants herein, who were named in the petition as the first county commissioners of the new county of Red Lake, met and duly qualified as the first board of county commissioners thereof, and are now acting as such. The governor has not issued any proclamation as to either of the proposed counties of Mills or Columbia.

1. The state claims that Laws 1893, c. 143, the title whereof is "An act to provide for the creation and organization of new counties and government of the same," is unconstitutional, for the reason that its subject-matter is not expressed in its title, as required by article 4, § 27, of the state constitution. This constitutional provision has been repeatedly construed by this court, and it is settled that:

"The insertion in a law of matters which may not be verbally indicated by the title, if suggested by it, or connected with, or proper to the more full accomplishment of, the object so indicated, is held to be in accordance with its spirit; but a more liberal construction cannot be given without letting in the evils which the provision was intended to exclude." State v. Kinsella, 14 Minn. 395, 397 (524).

We are of the opinion that the subject-matter of the act in question is sufficiently expressed in its title.

It is true, as claimed, that the act provides for the change of the boundaries of organized counties, the temporary location of the county seat of the new counties, the organization of towns and school districts therein, and the division of the indebtedness of the old counties from which new counties are created between the old and the new. But these matters are all directly or indirectly connected with or suggested by the subject-matter expressed in the title of the act, and proper to the more full accomplishment of the object indicated by...

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT