State ex rel. City of Martinsburg v. Sanders

• Decision Date: 29 June 2006
• Docket Number: No. 32868.,32868.
• Citation: 632 S.E.2d 914
• Parties: STATE of West Virginia ex rel. City of Martinsburg, a Municipal Corporation, Petitioner, v. Honorable David H. SANDERS, Judge of the Berkeley County Circuit Court; Christopher W. Beard, Mark Stroop, Steven T. Canby, Scott W. Stroop, Daniel M. Thomas, Donna Harmison, Derrick Crawford, Michael A. Johnson, Fred Pearrell, R.A. Talbott, Jr., Anthony Sirna, John Glen Holben, Jonathan Fink, Jason Gochenour and Jason E. Hoover, Respondents.
• Court: West Virginia Supreme Court

632 S.E.2d 914

STATE of West Virginia ex rel. City of Martinsburg, a Municipal Corporation, Petitioner, v. Honorable David H. SANDERS, Judge of the Berkeley County Circuit Court; Christopher W. Beard, Mark Stroop, Steven T. Canby, Scott W. Stroop, Daniel M. Thomas, Donna Harmison, Derrick Crawford, Michael A. Johnson, Fred Pearrell, R.A. Talbott, Jr., Anthony Sirna, John Glen Holben, Jonathan Fink, Jason Gochenour and Jason E. Hoover, Respondents.

No. 32868.

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

Submitted: March 29, 2006.

Decided: June 29, 2006.

Dissenting Opinion of Justice Starcher July 11, 2006.

Syllabus by the Court

1. "Prohibition lies only to restrain inferior courts from proceeding in causes over which they have no jurisdiction, or, in which,

having jurisdiction, they are exceeding their legitimate powers...." Syl. Pt. 1, in part, Crawford v. Taylor, 138 W.Va. 207, 75 S.E.2d 370 (1953).

2. "In determining whether to entertain and issue the writ of prohibition for cases not involving an absence of jurisdiction but only where it is claimed that the lower tribunal exceeded its legitimate powers, this Court will examine five factors: (1) whether the party seeking the writ has no other adequate means, such as direct appeal, to obtain the desired relief; (2) whether the petitioner will be damaged or prejudiced in a way that is not correctable on appeal; (3) whether the lower tribunal's order is clearly erroneous as a matter of law; (4) whether the lower tribunal's order is an oft repeated error or manifests persistent disregard for either procedural or substantive law; and (5) whether the lower tribunal's order raises new and important problems or issues of law of first impression." Syl. Pt. 4, in part, State ex rel. Hoover v. Berger, 199 W.Va. 12, 483 S.E.2d 12 (1996).

3. "If the claims asserted by appellants would result in no benefits under any workers' compensation law or any employer's liability law, that is to say, if there is no recovery of benefits under such laws in lieu of damages recoverable in a civil action, then notwithstanding W.Va.Code § 29-12A-5(a)(11), such claims are not `covered' within the meaning of the immunity statute and may be asserted in the courts of this State against a political subdivision which is not their employer, and such recovery had as may be proved under a recognized cause of action." Syl. Pt. 3, Marlin v. Bill Rich Construction, Inc., 198 W.Va. 635, 482 S.E.2d 620 (1996).

4. The immunity from liability afforded all employers participating in the Workers' Compensation system through West Virginia Code § 23-2-6 (2003) (Repl.Vol.2005) protects a political subdivision against awards of medical monitoring damages based on common law tort theories.

Charles F. Printz, Jr., Joseph L. Caltrider, Bowles Rice McDavid Graff & Love, L.L.P., Martinsburg, for the Petitioner.

Harry Patton Waddell, Martinsburg, for the Respondents.

ALBRIGHT, Justice.

City of Martinsburg (hereinafter referred to as "Martinsburg") invokes this Court's original jurisdiction¹ by seeking a writ of prohibition to bar the Circuit Court of Berkeley County from conducting further proceedings in an action based on a negligence claim seeking award of medical monitoring expenses brought against Martinsburg by current and former firefighters (hereinafter referred to as "Respondents") employed by the city. Martinsburg maintains that the lower court committed clear legal error by denying its motion for judgment on the pleadings, thereby requiring Martinsburg to proceed with litigating the case, despite the statutory immunity afforded it by the provisions of the Governmental Tort Claims and Insurance Reform Act (hereinafter referred to as "Governmental Tort Claims Act"), West Virginia Code Chapter 29 Article 12A. After careful consideration of this matter, we grant the writ as requested for the reasons stated below.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

The action for which Martinsburg sought dismissal below was brought by Respondents as employee firefighters of the city who claimed that significant exposure to diesel exhaust from fire engines and/or emergency vehicles stored at Martinsburg's central fire station increased their risk of cancer, respiratory difficulties, heart disease and hearing loss. The object of Respondents' negligence suit is to obtain medical monitoring damages, although none of Respondents claim present physical injury due to the exposure to the exhaust fumes at their workplace.

On June 10, 2005, Martinsburg filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure, asserting governmental immunity. On August 4, 2005, the lower court denied Martinsburg's motion finding that the city had failed to meet its burden to establish its right to immunity under West Virginia Code § 29-12A-5(a)(11), a provision of the Governmental Tort Claims Act. Thereafter, Martinsburg petitioned this Court for a writ of prohibition for which we issued a rule to show cause on October 6, 2005.

II. Standard of Review

This Court has used prudence in granting relief through prohibition because "[p]rohibition lies only to restrain inferior courts from proceeding in causes over which they have no jurisdiction, or, in which, having jurisdiction, they are exceeding their legitimate powers...." Syl. Pt. 1, in part, Crawford v. Taylor, 138 W.Va. 207, 75 S.E.2d 370 (1953). In the matter now pending, no question is raised about the lower court acting outside its authority; Martinsburg instead maintains that the court below exceeded its legitimate powers by denying its motion on the pleadings. Where a circuit court is acting within its jurisdiction, this Court has traditionally examined the following five factors to determine whether a writ of prohibition should issue:

(1) whether the party seeking the writ has no other adequate means, such as direct appeal, to obtain the desired relief; (2) whether the petitioner will be damaged or prejudiced in a way that is not correctable on appeal; (3) whether the lower tribunal's order is clearly erroneous as a matter of law; (4) whether the lower tribunal's order is an oft repeated error or manifests persistent disregard for either procedural or substantive law; and (5) whether the lower tribunal's order raises new and important problems or issues of law of first impression.

Syl. Pt. 4, in part, State ex rel. Hoover v. Berger, 199 W.Va. 12, 483 S.E.2d 12 (1996). We have further noted that "[t]hese factors are general guidelines that serve as a useful starting point" in our deliberations of a petition for writ of prohibition, and "[a]lthough all five factors need not be satisfied, ... the existence of clear error as a matter of law[] should be given substantial weight." Id. It is with these principles in mind that we consider the merits of the petition.

III. Discussion

The fundamental question raised in this case is whether a claim of simple negligence, without injury, against a political subdivision² employer for allegedly failing to maintain a reasonably safe workplace for its employees is actionable in light of the immunity provisions of the Governmental Tort Claims Act. W.Va.Code § 29A-12-5(a)(11) (1986) (Repl.Vol.2004). The immunity provision relied upon by Martinsburg states that "[a] political subdivision is immune from liability if a loss or claim results from: ... (11)[a]ny claim covered by any workers' compensation law or any employer's liability law."

Respondents successfully argued below that Martinsburg failed to satisfy its burden as set forth in Marlin v. Bill Rich Construction, Inc., 198 W.Va. 635, 482 S.E.2d 620 (1996). The lower court's order denying Martinsburg's motion for judgment on the pleadings concluded as follows:

The Court further finds that the defendant has failed to meet the burden set forth in Marlin v. Bill Rich Construction, Inc., 198 W.Va. 635, 482 S.E.2d 620 (1996)[,] to establish to the satisfaction of the Court that each plaintiff has or could bring a claim covered by the West Virginia workers compensation law or some other employer liability law. The Court finds that the plaintiffs' claims for medical monitoring are based upon the increased risk of contracting future diseases and not upon any present injury that would be covered under any workers compensation law or other employer liability law. The Court further finds that ... under the plain language of W.Va.Code § 29-12A-5(a)(11) the statutory immunity only applies to claims covered by workers' compensation law or other employer's liability law. The Court cannot conclude on the record before it, that the plaintiffs have, in fact and presently, contracted any occupational disease by reason of the inhalation of minute particles of diesel exhaust over a period of time or that they have suffered a perceptible aggravation of a previously existing occupational disease. Accordingly, it cannot be said that, as a matter of law, plaintiffs may successfully maintain a workers' compensation claim for "injury" by reason of any occupational disease. The Court further finds that plaintiffs' claims for fear of contracting lung cancer or heart disease also would not meet the statutory requirements necessary to establish a claim compensable under workers compensation. The Court finds that the defendant has failed to meet its burden to establish its right to immunity under W.Va.Code § 29-12A-5(a)(11) ... [and] DENIES the defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings.

In Marlin, the question before this Court was whether a board of education had governmental immunity under West Virginia Code § 29-12A-5(a)(11) from claims of construction workers not employed by the board but performing services at a school through an independent contract. The workers alleged that they were exposed to asbestos fibers at the worksite, but they claimed no physical injury. The board argued in Marlin that the construction workers' claims against it were...