State ex rel. City of St. Paul v. Minn. Transfer Ry. Co.

• Decision Date: 01 June 1900
• Citation: 83 N.W. 32,80 Minn. 108
• Parties: STATE ex rel. CITY OF ST. PAUL v. MINNESOTA TRANSFER RY. CO.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

80 Minn. 108

83 N.W. 32

STATE ex rel. CITY OF ST. PAUL

v.MINNESOTA TRANSFER RY. CO.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

June 1, 1900

Appeal from district court, Ramsey county; Hascal R. Brill, Charles E. Otis, and George L. Bunn, Judges.

Application by the state, on the relation of the city of St. Paul, for a writ of mandamus againt the Minnesota Transfer-Railway Company. From an order granting the writ, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Syllabus by the Court

1. A railroad company is a quasi public corporation, and all its rights and powers are conferred upon it, not merely for the benefit of the corporation itself, but also in trust for the benefit of the public; and, whenever it neglects or fails to perform any of its corporate duties, it may generally be compelled to perform the same by mandamus.

2. Mandamus will lie to compel a railway company to construct and maintain proper crossings, such as viaducts or bridges, and suitable approaches thereto, at all points where their lines of railway intersect previously established public thoroughfares, if such crossings are necessary for public use.

3. At common law the duty rests upon a railway corporation, when it occupies a public thoroughfare with its tracks, to restore the same, by some reasonably safe and convenient means, to its former condition of usefulness. And the duty is a continuing one, and the way must be kept in repair by the corporation whose act has made the duty necessary.

4. Assuming in this case that the relator city entered into a contract with defendant railway company of the nature set out in the answer herein, it is held, such contract was ultra vires and of no validity. It was not binding upon either party.

5. Where the duty rests upon a railway corporation to restore a public way to its former condition of usefulness, a municipality cannot enter into a valid contract with such corporation whereby it surrenders its power to compel the performance of such duty. It cannot contract with such corporation that it will ‘maintain’ a certain bridge, to be erected by either or both parties, ‘for all future time.’ Such an agreement on the part of a municipality is beyond the power of municipal officers, and is contrary to public policy, and of no effect.

6. It is a general and fundamental principle of law that all persons contracting with a municipal corporation must, at their peril, inquire into the power of the corporation or its officers to make a contract.

7. A municipality is not estopped in such a case to assert the invalidity of the contract by the fact that a bridge has been built by both parties, as the result of a compromise between the municipal authorities and the railway officials, and has thereafter been kept in repair by the municipality for a number of years.

8. Held, that it was not intended by the legislature, when enacting a charter provision of the relator city (Sess. Laws 1885, c. 7, § 3), to relieve railway corporations from the common-law duty before mentioned. W. H. Norris, for appellant.

Jas. E. Markham and Carl Taylor, for respondent.

COLLINS, J.

Appeal from an order directing that a peremptory writ of mandamus issue, requiring and compelling the defendant transfer-railway company to proceed forthwith to repair the bridge described in the pleadings in accordance with certain plans and specifications attached to, and made a part of, the petition for such writ. The bridge in question is the one now in use upon University avenue, in the city of St. Paul. It is more than 1,300 feet in length, and is an overhead crossing of a large number of defendant's tracks, which have been laid over the avenue at grade, and have been, and now are, in constant use as a part of defendant's system of transfer tracks. The latter are close together, cross the avenue obliquely, and occupy a space of about 350 feet in width,-a little more than one-third of the length of the bridge. The defendant's land has not far from 1,300 feet frontage on the avenue, so that the bridge practically spans the entire tract. An overhead crossing having become necessary, the president of defendant company made a proposition in writing to plaintiff's common council to construct the same of a certain width, and in accordance with plans to be satisfactory to the city engineer. Conditions were imposed upon the city, in the proposition, as follows: ‘The city of St. Paul to agree to construct all the necessary approaches on both ends of said bridge, and pay any damages to owners of property abutting on said approaches; and, on the completion of the bridge in accordance with the plans as accepted by the city engineer, the city of St. Paul is to maintain the same for all future time. The city of St. Paul to further agree to prohibit all crossing at grade of tracks of the Minnesota Transfer-Railway Company after the said bridge is completed, ready for use; and, in the event that permission is given by said city to any company to construct a motor line, an elevated railroad, or any other railway upon University avenue across the grounds of the Minnesota Transfer-Railway Company, such road shall not be permitted to cross the tracks of the transfer company at grade, but upon a bridge to be constructed at the expense of said elevated railroad or motor line, and in no manner at the expense of the Minnesota Transfer-Railway Company; and no permission shall be given any elevated railroad or motor line to build a bridge over the tracks of this company on University avenue, unless, coupled with such permission, it is required that the bridge be built to conform to that which the Minnesota Transfer-Railway Company hereby proposes to build, so far as length of spans and clearance above the rails of the tracks of the Minnesota Transfer-Railway Company are concerned.’ In addition, the proposition was made subject to approval by defendant's board of directors. Later the city council instructed, by resolution, the proper officers to enter into a contract with defendant corporation for the construction of the bridge in accordance with the proposition. The bridge was built at an expense of about $98,000 to defendant, and of about $25,000 to the city. It was much more of a structure than defendant deemed necessary for public use at the time, but, according to the answer, defendant ‘participated in the construction thereof, relying upon the good faith of said city and of its officers and common council, and upon the aforesaid acceptance of said proposition and report as a valid and permanently binding agreement of said city to maintain and repair the said bridge for all future time, and at its own sole expense.’ And evidently it was much longer than was necessary for the protection of the public when crossing defendant's tracks. It is further averred in the pleading just mentioned that ever since its construction the city has maintained the bridge, and every part, and has made all repairs thereon, except in one instance, where the damages were occasioned by a collision of cars operated by defendant itself. The order for judgment was upon the petition and answer.

1. It is argued by defendant's counsel that the order appealed from ‘was in plain defiance of Gen. St. 1894, § 5976, for the reason that there is a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.’ The suggestion of counsel is that, if defendant is bound to repair the bridge in question, the plaintiff city can, after demand, make the necessary repairs, and in an action at law recover their cost from his client. Two cases are cited by counsel in support of this claim. Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Borough of Irwin, 85 Pa. St. 336, and Wellcome v. Inhabitants of Leeds, 51 Me. 313. Neither is in point. If defendant is bound to make the necessary repairs, the estimated cost being upwards of $10,000, the character and extent thereof is a question which neither the company nor the city can determine absolutely without the assent of the other. Like all matters involving a controversy concerning public duty and private right, it is to be adjusted and settled by judicial inquiry and determination. The plans and specifications prepared by the relator's engineer and approved by its common council, and the direction to the defendant to repair the bridge in...