State ex rel. City of Indianapolis v. Hancock Circuit Court of Hancock County

• Decision Date: 17 November 1967
• Docket Number: No. 30987,30987
• Citation: 249 Ind. 377,231 N.E.2d 32,12 Ind.Dec. 39
• Parties: STATE of Indiana on the relation of the CITY OF INDIANAPOLIS et al., Relators, v. The HANCOCK CIRCUIT COURT OF HANCOCK COUNTY, Indiana, and the Honorable George B. Davis, as Judge of said Court, Respondents.
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Page 32

231 N.E.2d 32

249 Ind. 377

STATE of Indiana on the relation of the CITY OF INDIANAPOLIS et al., Relators,

v.

The HANCOCK CIRCUIT COURT OF HANCOCK COUNTY, Indiana, and the Honorable George B. Davis, as Judge of said Court, Respondents.

No. 30987.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

Nov. 17, 1967.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 19, 1968.

Michael B. Reddington, Barnes, Hickam, Pantzer & Boyd, Alan W. Boyd, John W. Houghton, Indianapolis, Melville E. Watson, Greenfield, for relators.

Willis K. Kunz, William A. Waddick, Patrick J. Smith, James R. McClarnon, Indianapolis, Glenn T. Williams, Greenfield, for respondents.

PER CURIAM.

The relators have filed in this court a writ of prohibition requesting the respondents from issuing any order, judgment or decree assuming jurisdiction in Cause No. 32895 in the Hancock Circuit Court, and in the alternative, that this court issue a writ of mandate against the respondents to set aside and vacate an order requiring the witness Nordsiek to produce documents specified in plaintiffs' subpoena duces tecum and requiring the witness Nordsiek to show cause why he should not be adjudged in contempt for failure to produce said documents and answer questions upon this deposition.

This cause involved the jurisdiction of the Hancock Circuit Court in an action commenced by one Robert P. Knowles against the relators as defendants to quiet title to certain real estate in Marion County, Indiana. Said cause was commenced on September 3, 1965 in Room 5 of the Marion Superior Court of Marion County. The venue of said cause was subsequently changed to the Hancock Circuit Court where said cause is presently pending as Cause No. 32895 therein.

On September 21, 1965 Robert P. Knowles, the same plaintiff, together with his wife and a mortgage loan association holding a mortgage on said real estate, commenced a second action in Room 4 of the Superior Court of Marion County being Cause No. S465449 in said court which is a statutory appeal from the decision of the Board of Flood Control Commissioners of the City of Indianapolis, one of the relators with respect to the same real estate which is pending in said court and undisposed. The petitioner filed a petition for a writ of prohibition and mandate with the clerk of the Supreme Court on June 13, 1966. The temporary writ was denied on the same day. Respondents contend, among other things, that the writ was tardily filed, that the quiet title suit was filed prior to the initiation of the Marion Superior suit, and that the parties are different, and that it is impossible to determine from the face of the complaint whether the real estate to which quiet title suit and the Marion Superior suit pertained are identical.

It appears by respondents' own contention that the Marion Superior suit, Cause No. S465449 and the legal descriptions attached thereto, include all the land for which the Hancock Circuit quiet title action was initiated. It has been well established in this state that where the issue is which of two courts of coordinate jurisdiction has acquired exclusive jurisdiction, it is only necessary that the cases involve the same parties and subject matter. In the case of State ex rel. Ferger v. Marion Circuit Court (1949), 227 Ind. 212, 84 N.E.2d 585, which was an original action brought by the relator against the Circuit Court of Marion County, Indiana and the Judge thereof for a writ of prohibition prohibiting the court from continuing to assume jurisdiction in a suit for specific performance, there the Court held that the same subject matter was involved as well as the same parties. The first action between the parties was by a lessor against a lessee for reformation of the description of leased real estate. The second action between them was by the lessee against the lessor for specific performance of an option to purchase real estate described in the lease. The lessor filed a plea in abatement in the second action alleging that the action for reformation had been commenced first, was still pending and involved the same parties and subject matter. A motion to strike out the plea in abatement was sustained and the lessor as relator applied for and was granted finally a permanent writ of prohibition. The court held that since both cases involved the same subject matter, namely the rights of the parties under the lease, the court first acquiring jurisdiction has exclusive jurisdiction until the case in that court is finally disposed of on an appeal or otherwise. That the cause of action in each case was entirely different was immaterial.

It appears that the statutory remedy had been instituted by the appeal to the Superior Court of Marion County being Cause No. S465449 in said court. This case sustains the principle that the appeal is a continuation of the proceeding commenced by plaintiff Knowles. See State ex rel. Public Service Commissioner v. Boone, (1956), 236 Ind. 202, 138 N.E.2d 4, 139 N.E.2d 552.

In State ex rel. Ferger v. Marion Circuit Court supra, the court quoted from State ex rel. Kunke v. Laporte Circuit Court, 209 Ind. 682, 693, 200 N.E. 614, 618:

'The purpose of the statute and of prohibition at common law is not only to protect parties from injury by the unwarranted usurpation of jurisdiction, but to protect the dignity of the sovereign state by preserving the integrity of its judicial system and preventing unseemly confusion and controversy between co-ordinate courts and their officers.'

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