State, ex rel. City of Columbus v. Price

Decision Date21 May 1934
Docket Number29241
Citation254 N.W. 889,127 Neb. 132
PartiesSTATE, EX REL. CITY OF COLUMBUS, APPELLEE, v. WILLIAM B. PRICE, AUDITOR OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTS, APPELLANT
CourtNebraska Supreme Court

APPEAL from the district court for Lancaster county: LINCOLN FROST JUDGE. Reversed, with directions.

REVERSED.

Syllabus by the Court.

1. Constitutional provision relative to method of amendment has no application to legislation independent and complete as to its subject matter.

2. Where provisions of statutes are new and complementary independent and complete as to subject matter, they are not amendatory of existing laws.

3. If by a fair and reasonable construction the title calls attention to the subject matter of the bill, it may be said that the object is expressed in the title.

4. Title of a bill may be general, but must be specific enough to answer the purpose of the constitutional requirement.

5. The title of an independent act authorizing the con struction of sewers and providing that owners or occupants of the premises shall be charged for the services, and to raise money, is broad enough to include legislation authorizing issuance of mortgage and revenue bonds which do not impose a general liability upon the municipality but are secured only by the property and revenues of the sewerage system.

6. All bonds issued by the city, except paving district bonds, are required to be payable at the option of the city after five years, by section 16-721, Comp. St. 1929.

7. All bonds issued by city are required to be registered by the auditor of public accounts by section 11-201, Comp. St. 1929.

Appeal from District Court, Lancaster County; Frost, Judge.

Mandamus proceeding by the State, on the relation of the City of Columbus, against William B. Price, Auditor of Public Accounts. From a judgment granting the writ, the relator appeals.

Judgment reversed, and cause remanded with directions.

Paul F. Good, Attorney General, and George W. Ayres, for appellant.

George S. Reeder and Lowell L. Walker, contra.

Heard before ROSE, GOOD, EBERLY, DAY and PAINE, JJ., and LESLIE and RYAN, District Judges.

OPINION

DAY, J.

This is an action in mandamus brought by the city of Columbus, as relator, against the state auditor of public accounts, as respondent, to secure a writ requiring the auditor to register certain sewer bonds of the city of Columbus in the amount of $ 60,000. The trial court issued the writ, and the auditor has appealed from the judgment.

The petition sets out the history of the bonds and alleges that the auditor refused registration. The auditor in his answer admits his refusal, and pleads justification for a number of reasons. These will be discussed in the order in which they appear in the answer.

First. It is contended by respondent that the act under which the bonds were issued, chapter 146, Laws 1933, now sections 18-1401 to 18-1408, Comp. St. Supp. 1933, was amendatory of the sections of the statute which governed the construction of sewer systems in various cities of Nebraska, which it did not purport to amend or repeal as the Constitution requires, and is therefore invalid and void. Prior to the enactment of this statute, the city of Columbus had authority to erect, extend or improve and maintain a sewerage system and issue bonds payable from taxes. Comp. St. 1929, secs. 16-649 to 16-654. The 1933 act was either amendatory of sections 16-649 to 16-654, Comp. St. 1929, or it was an independent and complete act. If it was amendatory, it violated section 14, art. III of the Constitution, which provides that no law be amended unless the new act contains the sections as amended and repeals the sections amended. State v. Moore, 48 Neb. 870, 67 N.W. 876; State v. Cornell, 50 Neb. 526; Commercial Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Pyramid Realty Co., 121 Neb. 493, 237 N.W. 575; Minier v. Burt County, 95 Neb. 473, 145 N.W. 977. In the last case cited, Minier v. Burt County; supra, the appellant places much reliance to sustain his position. Searching the opinion to determine the applicable value of the opinion here, we find that "The original act, as amended and still in force, provides that the county board may raise funds for that purpose by the regular 15 mill levy without a vote of the people, provided that they do not require more than $ 1,500. This statute provides that they may raise the funds in the same manner to the amount of $ 100,000 if the proper petition is filed." The Minier case is not applicable to the situation here. The question for our determination is whether chapter 146, Laws 1933, was an act complete in itself, or manifestly amendatory to the existing statutes to which it does not refer. See State v. Moore, 48 Neb. 870, 67 N.W. 876; Commercial Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Pyramid Realty Co., 121 Neb. 493, 237 N.W. 575. Quoting from Stewart v. Barton, 91 Neb. 96, 135 N.W. 381: "Where an act is passed as original and independent legislation and is complete in itself so far as applies to the subject-matter properly embraced within its title, the constitutional provision respecting the manner of amendment and repeal of former statutes has no application." See, also, 1 Lewis' Sutherland, Statutory Construction (2d ed. ) 446.

We think the test applied by this court in State v. Bauman, 126 Neb. 566, 254 N.W. 256, is accurate in its determination. It is: "The words of this act standing alone would be meaningless. It is only after it is applied to existing statutory provisions that it evidences any 'command.' It provides for no agencies, machinery, or means by which the object sought to be promoted may be secured. When applied to existing laws nothing new, independent, or complementary results. In other words, if the careful student should take House Roll 345 and with it annotate his Compiled Statutes, marking the changes it effects, when his labor was completed not a single new paragraph would be written therein, but old provisions irreconcilable therewith would be changed." Applying that test here, the provisions of the statutes in question are new, independent and complementary. They are independent and complete, and not amendatory. State v. Cornell, 50 Neb. 526; Hoopes v. Creighton, 100 Neb. 510, 160 N.W. 742. The authority given the city of Columbus by sections 16-649 to 16-654, Comp. St. 1929, was not curtailed, restricted, or enlarged by sections 18-1401 to 18-1408, Comp. St. Supp. 1933. The latter provides for a different kind of a sewerage system to be built with a rental charge to the users and to be paid for from such rentals without tax money. The same powers remain, but another and a different power was conferred upon the city. Bridgeport Irrigation District v. United States, 40 F.2d 827.

Secondly. It is urged that the provisions of the act (Laws 1933, ch 146) are broader than the title. The act attempts to authorize the issue of bonds by cities and villages in the state of Nebraska which shall not be a general liability upon the city or village issuing them but shall be secured only by the property pertaining to the sewer system of the municipality and the revenue derived therefrom, and which attempts to authorize a municipality to secure the payment of such bonds by giving a mortgage upon its sewer system and the revenue derived therefrom. The title reads as follows: "An act authorizing cities and villages to provide a sanitary means of disposing of the sewage and night soil thereof; to charge owners or occupants of premises therefor; to raise money and...

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