State ex rel. City of St. Paul v. St. Paul City Railway Company
| Decision Date | 15 December 1899 |
| Docket Number | 11,686 - (10) |
| Citation | 81 N.W. 200,78 Minn. 331 |
| Parties | STATE ex rel. CITY OF ST. PAUL v. ST. PAUL CITY RAILWAY COMPANY |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Alternative writ of mandamus from the district court for Ramsey county directing defendant to extend its lines of street railway in accordance with Ordinances Nos. 1925 and 1227 of relator and to operate its cars thereon or to show cause why it should not be done. The case was tried before Bunn, J., who found in favor of defendant and directed the writ to be dismissed. From an order denying a motion for a new trial, relator appealed. Reversed.
City of St. Paul -- Use of Streets by Street Railway -- Ordinances.
A municipality cannot abdicate or barter away, at least without express legislative authority, its governmental powers conferred upon it for public purposes. Hence any authority to use the streets granted to a street-railway company must be construed as being subject to the general police power of the municipality over the public streets. Section 18 of Ordinance No. 1227 of the city of St. Paul, known as the "General Electric Ordinance," construed, and held, that the power therein reserved to the common council to order the St. Paul City Railway Company to extend any existing or future lines of its railway is not limited to extensions on streets or parts of streets not provided with any car service, but authorizes the extension of the car service of one line to or into the business or central part of the city, over streets or parts of streets upon which there is an existing track upon which the cars of another line are already operated.
James E. Markham, for appellant.
Ordinance No. 1925 is valid as a proper exercise of the power reserved by Ordinance No. 1227, § 18. Ordinance No. 1925 is furthermore a proper exercise of the police power of the city, and should be sustained as such. In determining what regulations are reasonable and necessary in the exercise of the police power, much must be left to the judgment and discretion of the common council. When they have exercised their judgment and discretion in passing an ordinance, it is prima facie valid; and to justify a court in setting aside their action its unreasonableness and want of necessity as a measure for protection of the interests of the public must be clearly manifest, and it must amount to an abuse of discretion or a mere arbitrary exercise of power. Evison v. Chicago, St. P., M. & O. Ry. Co., 45 Minn. 370; Knobloch v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 31 Minn 402; People v. Detroit, 116 Mich. 132. Where a business is a proper subject of police regulation, the legislature may adopt any measures they see fit, provided they adopt such as have some reasonable relation to, and tendency to accomplish, the desired end; in which case the courts will not assume to determine whether the measures are wise, or the best that might have been adopted. State v Donaldson, 41 Minn. 74; Rippe v. Becker, 56 Minn. 100; Mayor v. Dry Dock, 133 N.Y. 104; Milwaukee E. Ry. & L. Co. v. City of Milwaukee, 87 F. 577, 578. By the city charter (chapter 4, § 3), the legislature has conferred on the common council power to make this regulation and to adopt all needful measures for protection of the public interests. The laws of the city, by way of ordinance and resolution, on subjects named and within the powers delegated by that section, are as effectual as if they emanated directly from the legislature. City of St. Paul v. Smith, 27 Minn. 364, 366; State v. Robinson, 42 Minn. 107.
The charter confers on the common council "the care, supervision, and control of all the public highways, bridges, streets, alleys," etc.; authority to ordain such ordinances as shall be deemed expedient "for the good government of the city, the protection of its property, the preservation of peace and good order, the suppression of vice, and the benefit of trade and commerce"; and authority to regulate * * * hacks, carts * * * and other vehicles, etc. These provisions amount to a grant of police power, including the right to regulate travel in the public streets. State v. Robinson, supra. The company's cars are vehicles within the term of the charter. City of Duluth v. Mallett, 43 Minn. 204. See Frankford v. City, 58 Pa. St. 119; Mayor v. Third Ave., 117 N.Y. 404; Milhau v. Sharp, 17 Barb. 435; State v. Herod, 29 Iowa 123. The imposition of the duty of supervision and control of the streets is a sufficient grant of power to adopt all needful ordinances for regulation of travel in the streets. Michigan Tel. Co. v. City of Charlotte, 93 F. 11. See Horr & B., Pol. Ord. § 30.
All contracts of municipal corporations not authorized by charter are void. 1 Dillon, Mun. Corp. (4th Ed.) § 89; Spaulding v. City, 23 Pick. 71. The only express power granted with reference to street railways is found in Sp. Laws 1889, c. 37. Even if this provision applies to electric railways, intention to authorize the city to contract for a period of years will not be inferred. Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U.S. 659, 666. The manifest purpose of the ordinance authorizing the company to lay tracks, etc., was to confer the exclusive right of carrying passengers for profit on these streets. Davis v. Mayor, 14 N.Y. 506, 516. The grant of a practical monopoly and of an easement in the streets beyond the power of the city to recall or to regulate ought not to be inferred, unless the language of the grant clearly authorizes the making of such a contract. Richmond v. Town, 59 N.Y. 228; Long v. City of Duluth, 49 Minn. 280; City v. Danville, 178 Ill. 299; South Covington v. Berry, 93 Ky. 43; City of Detroit v. Detroit C. Ry. Co., 56 F. 867. The contract is not authorized under the head of governmental powers. The ordinance is at most effective as a mere license. Nash v. Lowry, 37 Minn. 261.
Even if the ordinances were in the nature of contracts within the power of the city to make, the company must be deemed to have accepted them with knowledge that the city had power to legislate by ordinance as to streets and highways, and to make all needed regulations for convenient enjoyment of the same by the citizens; and the company is bound by an implied agreement to hold its privileges subject to proper exercise of the police power. The legislature cannot deprive itself by contract of the right to pass such laws as are necessary for the general welfare of the public. Flynn v. Little Falls E. & W. Co., 69 Minn. 180; City v. Fort Wayne, 95 Mich. 456; Sternberg v. State, 36 Neb. 307; West Philadelphia v. City, 10 Phila. 70; South Covington v. Berry, supra; Frankford v. City, supra; City v. Navin, 151 Ind. 139; City v. McKeesport, 2 Pa. Supr. Ct. 242; People v. Boston, 70 N.Y. 569; State v. City, 59 N.J.L. 396; Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113; Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, supra; Sioux City St. Ry. Co. v. Sioux City, 138 U.S. 98; Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co. v. Nebraska, 170 U.S. 57; Michigan Tel. Co. v. City of Charlotte, supra. See also Rippe v. Becker, supra; Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U.S. 700, 747; Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 819; Corporation v. Mayor, 5 Cow. 538; Wabash R. Co. v. Defiance, 167 U.S. 88; 1 Dillon, Mun. Corp. § 97; Elliott, Roads & S. 573. In any case, such a contract, by which the hands of the city would be tied fast for 50 years, would be unreasonable, and beyond the power of its officers to make. Flynn v. Little Falls E. & W. Co., supra.
Munn & Thygeson, for respondent.
Ordinance No. 1925 is not authorized by Ordinance No. 1227. Ordinance No. 1227 and the other ordinances appearing in the record constitute a contract, the full nature and extent of which it is not necessary to determine in this case. That issue was not presented below, and consideration of other ordinances and evidence are necessary to its determination. Should the court deem it necessary to consider the question, the following provisions of the charter and authorities are referred to. Section 1 of the charter provides that the city shall be capable of contracting, and shall have the general powers of municipal corporations at common law, and in addition the powers thereinafter specifically granted. Power is given to the common council "to grant the right of way upon * * * any of the public streets * * * to a steam railway or horse railway company or corporation, upon such limitations and conditions as they may prescribe by ordinance" (chapter 4, page 53). The only limitations on this power are found on page 56, where certain limitations are imposed as to steam railways, and then follows a proviso that such limitations shall not apply "to any railroad running cars upon the surface of the streets and not using steam as a motive power." This shows that it was the intention of the legislature to confer as broad power as possible relative to granting rights to surface roads, i.e street railways. See Cleveland C. Ry. Co. v. City of Cleveland, 94 F. 385; Walla Walla City v. Walla Walla W. Co., 172 U.S. 1; New Orleans G. Co. v. Louisiana L. Co., 115 U.S. 650; New Orleans Water-Works Co. v. Rivers, 115 U.S. 674; Louisville G. Co. v. Citizens G. Co., 115 U.S. 683; St. Tammany Water-Works v. New Orleans Water-Works, 120 U.S. 64; City Ry. Co. v. Citizens St. R. Co., 166 U.S. 557, 562; Old Colony T. Co. v. City of Atlanta, 83 F. 39; Cooley, Const. Lim. 335; Booth, St. Ry. Law, § 36; Morawetz, Corp. §§ 1050, 1051; Van Hostrup v. Madison City, 1 Wall. 291; City v. Newport, 84 Ky. 166, 170; City of Savannah v. Kelly, 108 U.S. 184; Los Angeles City W. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 88 F. 720; Levis v. City of Newton, 75 F. 884, 887; Detroit C. St. Ry. Co. v. City of Detroit, 64 F. 628; Columbus v. City, 46 Kan. 666; Columbus v. City, 48 Kan. 99; Evansville v. Dennett, 161 U.S. 434; Christensen v. City, 45 Neb. 160; Dickson v. Kewanee...
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