State ex rel. Clifton v. Granger
| Decision Date | 28 January 1893 |
| Citation | 54 N.W. 79,87 Iowa 355 |
| Parties | STATE EX REL. CLIFTON v. GRANGER. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from district court, Harrison county; George W. Wakefield, Judge.
Proceeding under the bastardy act. From a verdict of guilty, and a judgment for maintenance, the defendant appeals.S. H. Cochran, for appellant.
John A. Berry, Co. Atty., John Y. Stone, Atty. Gen., and Joe H. Smith, for appellee.
1. Anna Clifton is the mother of a bastard child born July 22, 1890. The jury found that defendant was the father of said child, and the usual order for its maintenance by defendant was made. On cross-examination the complainant was asked this question: “Did you go into a barn, between 2 and 3 o'clock in the morning, in the month of August, 1888, with an unmarried man by the name of Mike Goodwin?” An objection was sustained to the question, as immaterial. Defendant claims the question was material, and relies on State v. Borie, 79 Iowa, 606, 44 N. W. Rep. 824;State v. Karver, 65 Iowa, 53, 21 N. W. Rep. 161;State v. Woodworth, 65 Iowa, 141, 21 N. W. Rep. 490. In the first case cited, it had been shown that one Damon, with whom the prosecutrix, years before, had a marriage engagement, was in her company just prior to the time she alleged the child was begotten. She was then asked if seven or eight years before she was with Damon at an hotel, locked in a room. The testimony was excluded, and this court held it error. The holding was based on the facts of the renewal of the intimacies just prior to the conception of the child. In the Karver Case certain testimony touching the complainant's leaving defendant's house on account of imprudent acts with another man was erroneously excluded; the court holding that the circumstances were such as not to preclude the possibility that the person referred to was the father of the child. In the Woodworth Case it appeared that the prosecutrix was the mother of two bastard children, and she was asked who was the father of the first one. It was held error not to permit the witness to answer the question. The fact that she had had intercourse once with another man than the accused was proper to be shown, as a circumstance in corroboration of defendant; especially so, if it be shown that this other man's intimacies and opportunities continued until the child was begotten. A careful examination of those cases clearly shows that the facts in each were widely different from those in the case at bar. In this case it is not shown that the prosecutrix was acquainted with Goodwin, or ever saw him. There is no evidence that such a man had an...
To continue reading
Request your trial