State ex rel. Coleman v. Lewis

• Decision Date: 30 June 1936
• Docket Number: 14323.
• Citation: 186 S.E. 625,181 S.C. 10
• Parties: STATE ex rel. v. LEWIS et al. COLEMAN
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

186 S.E. 625

181 S.C. 10

STATE ex rel. COLEMAN v. LEWIS et al.

No. 14323.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

June 30, 1936

Original proceeding, by permission, by the State of South Carolina, on the relation of W. A. Coleman, against J. Woodrow Lewis and others, constituting the State Highway Commission of South Carolina, and others.

Judgment in accordance with opinion.

Act creating state highway commission which was signed by President of Senate and by Speaker of House of Representatives and passed by House and Senate over Governor's veto and was filed in office of secretary of state with great seal of state affixed, was sole expository of its own contents and conclusive evidence of its existence and valid enactment, and Supreme Court could not look to extraneous evidence to ascertain its history or its provisions, or inquire into manner of its enactment. Act May 14, 1936, 39 St. at Large, p. 1557, Const. art. 3, § 18.Nathans & Sinkler, of Charleston, and Robinson & Robinson of Columbia, for petitioner.

John M Daniel, Atty. Gen., and J. Ivey Humphrey and M. J. Hough Asst. Attys. Gen., for respondents.

FISHBURNE Justice.

The plaintiff, a citizen and taxpayer of the county of Richland state of South Carolina, by permission, instituted this proceeding in the original jurisdiction of the court, for the purpose of having declared unconstitutional Act No. 831 (39 St. at Large, p. 1557), enacted by the General Assembly at its 1936 session, and which became effective on the 14th day of May, 1936, when it was passed over the objection of the Governor.

It will be hereinafter referred to as the act.

The case now comes before this court upon the order of the Chief Justice dated June 3, 1936, based upon the verified petition, requiring the respondents to show cause why the prayer of the petition should not be granted, and why the respondents, and especially the state treasurer, E. P. Miller, should not be permanently enjoined from issuing the certificates of indebtedness referred to in the petition. The respondents have answered and made a return to the rule to show cause in which they put at issue all of the allegations of unconstitutionality.

The purposes and objects to be achieved by the act are set out in the title, as follows: "To Create a New State Highway Commission; to Prescribe a Statewide Program of Highway Construction by Said Commission and to Provide for the Financing Thereof; to Provide for the Election of District Highway Commissioners; to Constitute District Highway Commissioners as the State Highway Commission; to Fix the Term of Office of District Highway Commissioners: to Direct the State Highway Commission to Reduce Annually the Principal of its Outstanding Obligations; to Limit the Aggregate Amount of Certificates of Indebtedness and Reimbursement Obligations that may be Issued in Any One Year; to Direct How and By Whom State Highway Certificates of Indebtedness may be Issued and Sold Hereafter, and to Provide Funds for the Construction of the State Highway System and for Refinancing Purposes; to Reduce the Annual License Fees on Certain Motor Vehicles; to Require the Payment Thereof, and to Provide Penalties for Violations."

The petitioner in this case launches a direct attack upon the validity of the act, and challenges its constitutionality upon many grounds.

In determining the constitutionality of statutes, it is a well-settled rule in South Carolina that:

"A statute will, if possible, be construed so as to render it valid; that a legislative act will not be declared unconstitutional unless its repugnance to the Constitution is clear and beyond reasonable doubt; that every presumption will be made in favor of the constitutionality of a legislative enactment; that it will be declared unconstitutional only when its invalidity appears so clearly as to leave no room for reasonable doubt that it violates some provision of the Constitution; that all reasonable presumptions must be made in favor of the validity of the Act; and that the Constitution of South Carolina is a limitation upon, rather than a grant of, legislative power.

See State v. Moorer, 152 S.C. 455, 150 S.E. 269; Wingfield v. Tax Commission, 147 S.C. 116, 144 S.E. 846; Battle v. Willcox, 128 S.C. 500, 122 S.E. 516; Xepapas v. Richardson, 149 S.C. 52, 146 S.E. 686; Scroggie v. Scarborough, 162 S.C. 218, 160 S.E. 596; Santee Mills v. Query, 122 S.C. 158, 115 S.E. 202; Duke Power Company v. Bell, 156 S.C. 299, 152 S.E. 865; Fripp v. Coburn, 101 S.C. 312, 85 S.E. 774; Cathcart v. Columbia, 170 S.C. 362, 170 S.E. 435; Park v. Greenwood County, 174 S.C. 35, 176 S.E. 870." Clarke v. South Carolina Public Service Authority, 177 S.C. 427, 181 S.E. 481, 484.

It is contended that the act violates article 3, section 15, of the Constitution, in that it is a revenue bill which should have originated in the House.

The record shows that the bill did originate in the House, as House Bill No. 1420, and was introduced on the 24th day of January, 1936, as will appear from the Journal of the House of that date. It is true that the Senate amended the bill, as it had a constitutional right to do, but the only income-producing feature of the act is the license tag feature, which was in the bill from its inception in the House. For this reason it is apparent that there is no merit in this contention. But aside from this, the provision (section 3 of the act) requiring the payment of an annual motor vehicle license fee is not within the purview of this section of the Constitution, in that it is not a bill to raise revenue in the constitutional sense. State v. Stanley, 131 S.C. 511, 127 S.E. 574.

It is next contended that the act violates article 3, section 17, of the Constitution, in that it relates to more than one subject, not expressed in the title, in violation of said section. This question has been before the court on numerous occasions. It is concluded adversely to the position of the petitioner by the case of State v. Moorer, supra, and the supporting authorities therein cited and quoted from. In the Moorer Case, the court, speaking through Mr. Chief Justice Stabler, had this to say:

"In Verner v. Muller, 89 S.C. 117, 71 S.E. 654, 655, with regard to this provision, the court said:

'The mandate of the Constitution is complied with if the title states the general subject of legislation and the provisions in the body of the act are germane thereto as means to accomplish the object expressed in the title. Connor v. Green Pond, W. & B. Railroad Co., 23 S.C. 427; State v. O'Day, 74 S.C. 448, 54 S.E. 607.' * * *

'It is not necessary that the title should be an index of the contents of the statute.' Briggs v. Greenville County, 137 S.C. 288, 135 S.E. 153, 163. See, also, Means v. Highway Department, 146 S.C. 19, 143 S.E. 360; McKiever v. City of Sumter, 137 S.C. 266, 135 S.E. 60."

The argument for the petitioner is that the act relates to many subjects, in that it provides: (a) The creation of a new state highway commission; (b) for the election of commissioners; (c) a direction to the commission to reduce its outstanding obligations; (d) directs the issuance of certificates of indebtedness; and (e) to reduce the annual license fee on motor vehicles.

An examination of the terms of the act shows that it encompasses only one cognate subject, and that is, the creation of a state highway commission, and the definition of the powers, duties, and functions of that commission. Every portion of the act relates unerringly to the state highway commission, and the entire act is very analogous to others which have been passed upon by this court and held not to be repugnant to article 3, section 17, of the Constitution. Its provisions are clearly germane to the title.

For analogous cases, see Clarke v. South Carolina Public Service Authority, supra; Lillard v. Melton, 103 S.C. 10, 87 S.E. 421; Poulnot v. Cantwell, 129 S.C. 171, 123 S.E. 651; Spartanburg County v. Miller, 135 S.C. 348, 132 S.E. 673; Connor v. Green Pond W. & B. R. Co., 23 S.C. 427.

It is also contended that the act violates article 3, section 18, of the Constitution, which requires that each act and joint resolution shall be read three times in each House.

This court has held in numerous cases that when an act has been enrolled, signed by the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House, its terms can be ascertained only by an inspection of the enrolled act, and evidence from the Journal of the House and of the Senate is not competent for this purpose. The court conclusively presumes that the act has been properly passed.

This question received a full consideration and elaborate discussion in State ex rel. Richards v. Moorer, supra, from which we quote as follows:

"'In the case of State ex rel. Hoover v. Chester, 39 S.C. 307, 17 S.E. 752, decided in 1893, the question was again considered. In a unanimous opinion the court overruled the Platt [ State v. Platt, 2 S.C. 150, 16 Am.Rep. 647] and Hagood [ State v. Hagood, 13 S.C. 46] Cases, and adopted the enrolled bill rule in the following unmistakable language:

We announce that the true rule is, that when an act has been duly signed by the presiding officers of the General Assembly, in open session in the Senate-House, approved by the Governor of the state, and duly deposited in the office of the secretary of state, it is sufficient evidence, nothing to the contrary appearing upon its face, that it passed the General Assembly, and that it is not competent either by the journals of the two houses, or either of them, or by any other evidence, to impeach such an act. And this being so, it follows that the court is not at liberty to inquire into what the journals of the two houses may show as to the successive steps which...