State ex rel Collins v. Grenada Cotton Compress Co

• Decision Date: 28 June 1920
• Docket Number: 20976
• Citation: 123 Miss. 191,85 So. 137
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE EX REL COLLINS, ATTY. GENERAL v. GRENADA COTTON COMPRESS CO

85 So. 137

123 Miss. 191

STATE EX REL COLLINS, ATTY. GENERAL v. GRENADA COTTON COMPRESS CO

No. 20976

Supreme Court of Mississippi

June 28, 1920

March 1920

.

1 LICKNSKS. Statute imposes only one privilege tax on cotton compress company having several 'branches.

Under section 3798, Code of 1906, section 6501, Hemingway's Code, as amended by chapter 74, Laws of 1908, imposing privilege tax on each cotton compress company, only one state privilege tax is imposed upon a corporation engaged in the business of compressing, although the company owns branch plants or establishments in several counties other than that of its principal office or domicile.

2 STATUTES. Statutes imposing duties or taxes are to be strictly construed.

Laws imposing duties or taxes are not to be construed beyond the natural import of the language and are never to be construed as imposing burdens upon doubtful interpretation.

3 STATUTES. Departmental interpretation cannot be resorted to where language is plain.

The ultimate duty and responsibility of construction is upon the court, and departmental interpretation cannot well be resorted to where the language of the statute is plain but only where the language is doubtful, ambiguous, or uncertain.

HON. B B. MATES, Special Chancellor.

APPEAL from chancery court, of Madison county, HON. R. B. MAYES, Special Chancellor.

Bill by the state, on relation of Ross A. Collins, Attorney General, against the Grenada Cotton Compress Company. From a decree of dismissal relator appeals. Affirmed.

Affirmed.

J. N. Flowers, Ellis B. Cooper & H. S. Holden, for appellant.

The decision of this case turns upon the interpretation and construction of section 3798, Code of 1906, section 6501, Hemingway's Code. Appellee maintains that under this statute it is not required to pay a privilege tax on each of its nine compress plants which it owns and operates at various towns and cities, and that if it pays one privilege tax to the state and one to the city of Grenada, it may own and operate any number of compress plants throughout the state. We respectfully submit that this interpretation and construction of the statute is erroneous; that the words "each compress company" mean each compress plant, and no other meaning was ever given to them until may, 1918, when appellee refused to pay privilege taxes on eight of its plants.

CONSTRUCTION OF THE STATUTE.

It is the general rule in the United States that statutes imposing taxes are to be strictly construed against the state and in favor of the citizen. This rule, however, when rightly understood, does not compel a rigid adherence to the letter of the law or to strict grammatical construction so as to defeat the plain legislative intent, and in the federal circuit court of appeals it was held in De Bary v. Souer, 101 F. 425, that a statute imposing a license tax should be fairly and judicially construed as between both parties. (36 Cyc. 1190, citing cases.)

We take it, therefore, to be the law that statutes imposing taxes should be strictly construed against the taxing power except in cases where to do so would defeat the intention of the legislature and the object and purpose of the statute; or where such construction would result in injustice or absurdity, or contradiction of other statutes.

INTENTION OF THE LEGISLATURE.

The object of all interpretation and construction of statutes is to ascertain and carry out the intention of the lawmakers, and when the intention is ascertained it must always govern. The intention of the legislature is always to be sought in the words of the statute where they are plain and unambiguous, but where they are doubtful or ambiguous, resort must be had to other facts and considerations.

It is one of the canons of the law of statutory construction that wherever the meaning is plain, the letter controls; wherever the meaning is in doubt, the spirit controls. A literal interpretation of a statute may lead to an absurdity or defeat entirely the intent of the framers. When this is the case, resort is had to the principle that the spirit of the law controls the letter, so that a thing which is within the intention of the statute is as much within the statute as if it were within the letter; and a thing which is within the letter of a statute is not within the statute unless it be within the intention of the lawmakers.

CONTEMPORANEOUS CONDITIONS AT THE TIME OF ENACTMENT AND RE-ENACTMENT OF SECTION 3340, CODE 1892; SECTION 3798 CODE OF 1906.

This court may take judicial notice of historical facts and of facts as to the growth, progress, and development of science and industry, provided these facts are within the common knowledge of men living in the community or section of country where the history was made or the growth, progress, and development took place.

It is a fact commonly known to the people of this state and for other cotton-growing states in the South, that at the time this statute was originally enacted, namely in 1892, cotton compresses were all separate and individual plants, operating independently of each other. It was only in very recent years that corporations were formed to own and operate more than one compress plant or that one compress company owned and operated several compress plants. When the statute was framed and passed it was not contemplated that later in the future one compress company would operate more than one compress plant. The fact that there were no such companies doing this at that time is conclusively shown by the failure of the lawmakers in 1892 to provide for a privilege tax on each separate plant where several were owned and operated by one company. The statute enacted then reads the same as now, "on each compress company" and from the time of its enactment to the adoption of the Code of 1906, each compress plant (not each compress company) paid the privilege tax without protest.

IN 1906, this statute was re-enacted. In 1908 it was amended slightly, but in neither case were the words "each compress company" changed, up to that time (1908) the great majority of compress companies owned and operated only a single plant. One or two perhaps owned and operated more than one plant. The legislators for this commonly known reason, did not, see fit to change the wording of the statute especially since even those compress companies who did own several plants had never, protested paying a privilege tax on each paint. When this re-enactment and amendment was made, it must have been the intention of the law-makers that a tax should be paid by each compress plant. That must have been the idea they had. What other could they have had, in view of conditions in this industry at that time? Would they have framed the statute as they did if they had known conditions were different? That most compress companies owned and operated not one plant, but several plants? Would they, as reasonable men and duly cognizant of their duties to the state as members of the legislature, have framed a statute which would enable certain businesses to evade the payment of just taxes? If compress companies at that time generally owned and operated several plants, instead of just one plant, would they not have known that fact and provided specifically for it.

When those three legislatures said "each compress company," they each and all meant "each compress plant" because at the time each one passed this statute, "compress company" and "compress" and "compress plant" were one and the same thing, and this court judicially knows that these three terms or titles meant one and the same thing in 1892, 1906, and 1908.

INTENTION AS SHOWN BY WORDS OF STATUTE.

Webster defines "company" as "a number of persons joined together for one purpose, or in one joint concern," and says further that the word may mean a firm, partnership or corporation. It is certainly true that "company" does not refer to one, single particular thing; it is an ambiguous term, and has been held by the courts to mean corporation, firm, partnership, joint stock concern, or association of persons.

The words "compress company" are to be interpreted with the presumption that they were used in the popular sense and have the popular meaning at the time they were placed in the law. As we have shown above, the popular meaning of "compress company" at the time this statute was enacted and re-enacted and amended, was a single compress or compress plant and this meaning prevailed until very recent years when it became known that compress companies were owing and operating several plants instead of just one.

Courts have held many times that where the word "corporation" was used in a statute, it meant and included also "person" and "persons" and other forms of business organization not designated technically as "corporations." Conversely, they have held many times that where the word "person" or "persons" was used in a statute, it meant and included "corporation." Many states, including Mississippi, have statutes providing that these terms are synonymous. In all of these decisions and in the statutes, it was the purpose of the courts and the legislature to carry into effect the intention of the legislature and the purpose and policy of the particular statute where such words were found.

IN the instant case, we submit that the legislature in using the words "each compress company" intended that a tax should be paid by each compress plant or each compress, since such was the universally accepted meaning of the words at the time they were embodied in the statute.

"A statute must be construed with reference to the time of the passage thereof, or with reference to its going into effect the meaning must be given to words which they had at the date of the act...