State ex rel. Corella v. Pence

• Decision Date: 13 May 1924
• Docket Number: 24933
• Citation: 262 S.W. 360,303 Mo. 598
• Parties: THE STATE ex rel. PETE CORELLA, by Next Friend, v. CHARLES R. PENCE et al., Judges of Circuit Court of Jackson County
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

262 S.W. 360

303 Mo. 598

THE STATE ex rel. PETE CORELLA, by Next Friend, v. CHARLES R. PENCE et al., Judges of Circuit Court of Jackson County

No. 24933

Supreme Court of Missouri

May 13, 1924

Motion for Rehearing Overruled May 13, 1924.

Preliminary rule discharged.

W T. Alford for relator.

(1) The action of the criminal court in refusing to transfer the cases herein, constituted a collateral attack on the judgment of the juvenile court, since said court had in an original proceeding adjudged relator's age at a time when the issues were the same as well as the parties thereto; the finding of said juvenile court is res judicata. Secs. 1137 to 1152, R. S. 1919; Outram v. Morewood, 3 East. 366; Southern Pac. Rd. Co. v. United States, 168 U.S. 1; Black on Judgments, sec. 505; Coffey v United States, 116 U.S. 436; State v. Intoxicating Liquors, 72 Vt. 253, 82 Am. St. 937; State v Kennedy, 60 Nebr. 300; Hartman v. Henry, 280 Mo. 478, 483; Cole v. Parker Washington Co., 276 Mo. 220. (2) The criminal court has no jurisdiction in the cases herein, but the proceedings should have been filed and a trial had in the juvenile court charging your relator as a delinquent child. Laws 1923, p. 153; Secs. 1137 to 1152, R. S. 1919; State v. Tincher, 258 Mo. 1; Ex parte Loving, 178 Mo. 194; State ex rel. Buckner, 254 S.W. 179; State ex rel. v. Griffin, 7 Tenn. Civ. App. 230, 253. (3) When once the jurisdiction of the juvenile court attaches it continues and has original and exclusive jurisdiction until the minor reaches his majority. Laws 1923, p. 153; Secs. 1137 to 1152, R. S. 1919; State ex rel. v. Griffin, 7 Tenn. Civ. App. 230, 253; McPherson v. Day, 144 N.W. 4; Sams v. State, 180 S.W. 173. (4) The jurisdiction of the juvenile court has always been liberally construed. State ex rel. Coffield v. Buckner, 198 Mo.App. 230; State ex rel. v. Griffin, 7 Tenn. Civ. App. 230; McPherson v. Day, 144 N.W. 4; Ex parte Willis, 57 P. 819; Sams v. State, 180 S.W. 173; Mattingly v. Commonwealth, 188 S.W. 370; Talbot v. Commonwealth, 179 S.W. 621.

W. G. Lynch for respondents.

(1) The circuit court had jurisdiction of the subject-matter, namely, the crimes charged against relator. Laws 1921, p. 220 et seq. (a) Where a court has jurisdiction of the subject-matter, and the question of its jurisdiction over the person turns upon some fact to be determined by the court, its decision, if wrong, is an error, for which prohibition will not lie. State v. Calvird, 191 S.W. 1080; 32 Cyc. 605; Railroad v. Rogers, 52 W.Va. 450, 6 L. R. A. 178; State v. McElhenney, 97 S.W. 161. (b) Prohibition does not lie to correct errors of the trial court, which can be corrected by appeal or writ of error. State v. Burney, 186 S.W. 28. The general rule is that where the judicial action complained of was within the jurisdiction of the court, prohibition will not lie, however erroneous the action may be which the superintending tribunal is asked to prohibit. State ex rel. v. Riley, 203 Mo. 175, 12 L. R. A. (N. S.) 900; State v. Withrow, 108 Mo. 1. (c) The question of the age of relator, and the question whether relator was a ward of the juvenile court, had to be passed upon by the judge of the circuit court, in the first instance, and if that court had jurisdiction to pass upon those questions, its decision cannot be controlled by prohibition, however erroneous. State v. Burney, 186 S.W. 28; State v. Stobie, 92 S.W. 196. (2) The question of res judicata does not arise in the case. 2 Black on Judgments, p. 764, sec. 504. The court did not adjudge, or by its judgment judicially determine, the age of relator. Nevins v. Coleman, 198 Mo.App. 252; 23 Cyc. 669. A finding of relator's age in 1919 would not be conclusive as to relator's age in 1923. 2 Black on Judgments (2 Ed.) p. 925, sec. 609. It was not essential to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court in March, 1919, that that court at that time should find that relator was twelve years of age. Its jurisdiction would attach if he were at that time a day under eighteen. 2 Black on Judgments (2 Ed.) secs. 612, 614. The construction of Juvenile Court Law insisted upon by relator would render it unconstitutional. Ex parte Loving, 178 Mo. 194.

James T. Blair, J. Woodson, C. J., White and Ragland, JJ., concur; David E. Blair, J., concurs in the result in an opinion to be filed.

OPINION

BLAIR

Relator, by next friend, instituted this proceeding to prohibit the further prosecution of criminal charges which are pending against him in Division A of the Circuit Court of Jackson County. In the beginning the then judge of Division A and the prosecuting attorney were made respondents. After the preliminary rule issued and the returns came in, leave to amend the application was applied for and granted (December 12, 1923), and all the circuit judges of Jackson County were brought in, to the end that the system of rotation of judges in Division A might not rotate relator's chosen adversary out of the division and out of the case and relator out of court, but that the judgment might reach whatever judge was sitting in Division A when it was rendered.

Relator alleges that there are three charges of crime pending against him in Division A of the Jackson Circuit Court. In this division criminal cases are tried. The accusation in each case is of robbery in the first degree. He has been arraigned on all three charges and is at liberty on bonds aggregating $ 40,000. It is further alleged relator "is now a minor under the age of eighteen years; that he will become eighteen years of age on the 20th day of October, 1923;" that in February, 1919, relator "was adjudged by the Judge of the Juvenile Court of Jackson County, Missouri, a ward of said juvenile court" and that the jurisdiction of that court over relator's person continues under the statutes until he reaches the age of twenty-one years, and that in these circumstances the juvenile court alone has jurisdiction to proceed against him for crime. Relator then alleges particularly the existence, constitution and jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court of Jackson County, and proceeds:

"Relator further avers that by reason of the fact that he is already a ward of the Juvenile Court of Jackson County, Missouri, having been adjudged the same as aforesaid, and of the fact he was not of age and will not become so until the 20th day of October, 1923, the above named judges of the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri, Criminal Division A, which are now presiding or which will hereafter preside over said court, have not now or have they ever had jurisdiction to hear the above entitled and numbered causes, but that said jurisdiction is exclusively vested by the statutes of the State of Missouri in the juvenile court, which is a branch of the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri.

" Relator further avers that he has no other plain, adequate and complete remedy at law except the application of this writ, and your relator therefore prays for a preliminary rule in prohibition commanding the above named judges to desist from further action on any of said cases so docketed in said Criminal Division A of said Circuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri, and the said Clarence A. Burney to desist from further prosecutions relative thereto, until such time when the defendants herein can show cause why they should retain jurisdiction in the premises; and that the court herein upon said hearing make said writ of prohibition permanent, and if necessary that the court appoint a special commissioner to take testimony to ascertain the issues herein presented, and for such other and further relief as the court may deem just and proper in the premises."

Attached to the original petition are copies of an information and two indictments, each of which charges relator with robbery in the first degree. There is also attached what purports to be a transcript of testimony of relator's mother and brother taken on a motion to transfer one of the cases to the juvenile court. Their testimony accords with the age alleged in the petition. There is no reference to this testimony in the petition, original or amended, and no reference to the motion to transfer. A copy of a motion to transfer in one case (C-299) has been filed with the papers and is printed in the abstract. There is in the abstract a statement that a motion to transfer was filed and overruled. The returns are not attached and the case has proceeded on the theory that they raise the questions discussed by respondents' counsel.

Relator contends (1) that the overruling of the motion to transfer constituted a collateral attack on the judgment of the juvenile court of February, 1919, "since said court had in an original proceeding adjudged relator's age at a time when the issues were the same as well as the parties thereto; the finding of said juvenile court is so adjudicated;" (2) the criminal court has no jurisdiction; "the proceedings should have been filed and a trial had in the juvenile court charging your relator as a delinquent child;" (3), "When once the jurisdiction of the juvenile court attaches, it continues and . . . is exclusive until the minor reaches his majority;" (4), "The jurisdiction of the juvenile court has always been liberally construed."

I. The statute (Secs. 2591 et seq., R. S. 1919; Laws 1923, p. 153 et seq.) expressly provides that "when jurisdiction has been acquired under the provisions" of the Juvenile Court Law for counties of 50,000 or more "over the person of a child, such jurisdiction shall continue, for the purpose of this article, until the child shall have attained its majority." Respondents contend this cannot be applied literally without rendering the act in that respect unconstitutional, since, it is insisted, it would place some...