State ex rel. Cosmopolis Consol. School Dist. No. 99, Grays Harbor County v. Bruno

• Decision Date: 11 January 1962
• Docket Number: No. 36131,36131
• Citation: 59 Wn.2d 366,367 P.2d 995
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: The STATE of Washington, on the Relation of COSMOPOLIS CONSOLIDATED SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 99, GRAYS HARBOR COUNTY, Washington, Appellant, v. Louis BRUNO, as Superintendent of Public Instruction, State of Washington, and President of the State Board of Education, State of Washington, et al., Respondents.

Page 366

59 Wn.2d 366

367 P.2d 995

The STATE of Washington, on the Relation of COSMOPOLIS CONSOLIDATED SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 99, GRAYS HARBOR COUNTY, Washington, Appellant, v. Louis BRUNO, as Superintendent of Public Instruction, State of Washington, and President of the State Board of Education, State of Washington, et al Respondents.

No. 36131.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

Jan. 11, 1962.

Manley & Kirkwood, Aberdeen, for appellant.

John J. O'Connell, Atty. Gen., Robert J. Doran, Asst. Atty. Gen., James J. Solan, Pros. Atty., Grays Harbor County, Aberdeen, for respondents.

OTT, Judge.

Cosmopolis Consolidated School District No. 99 of Grays Harbor County made application in the Superior Court for Thurston County for a writ of certiorari and joined as defendants Louis Bruno, Superintendent of Public Instruction, the members of the State Board of Education, the members of the Grays Harbor County Committee on School District Reorganization, and Blanche Pennick, County Superintendent of Schools for Grays Harbor County.

The petition alleged that Cosmopolis was a nonhigh school district; that 60 of its students attended the Aberdeen high school; that Aberdeen district's high school enrollment was 976; that the proposed plan submitted by the county committee for a high school building program in the Aberdeen district provided that Cosmopolis' participating contribution would be $210,000, and that of Aberdeen $1,079,544; that the state board, acting through Louis Bruno, its president, rejected the plan and coerced the county committee to submit an increased participation by Cosmopolis of $329,865, and a reduction for the Aberdeen district to $959.679, under threat that any other participation plan would be rejected by the state board and the Aberdeen high school building program cancelled; that the action of the defendants in fixing the amount of Cosmopolis' participation was arbitrary, capricious, inequitable, and based upon an unlawful formula of participation, and that a review of the conduct of the defendant officials was sought by certiorari for the reason that the Cosmopolis district had no other plain or adequate remedy at law.

The defendants' answer denied arbitrary, capricious or inequitable action and, as an affirmative defense, alleged that defendants acted legally and in compliance with RCW 28.56, and prayed that the petition be quashed and the cause of action dismissed.

June 28, 1961, defendants filed a motion to dismiss the petition, contending that the superior court lacked jurisdiction to hear the cause for the reason that

'The State Board of Education when determining what in its judgment constitutes an adequate and satisfactory plan for nonhigh school districts to aid a high school district in construction of facilities (RCW 28.56.040) is not exercising a judicial function and, therefore, its action in approving the proposed plan submitted by defendant Grays Harbor County Committee on School District Reorganization which provides for participation of plaintiff is not subject to review in this court under RCW 7.16.040.'

From a judgment of dismissal, based upon lack of jurisdiction, the Cosmopolis school district has appealed.

This appeal presents a single issue: Can alleged arbitrary, capricious or illegal action on the part of public officials be reviewed by the courts?

Art. 4, § 1, of the state constitution, provides that the judicial power shall be vested in the courts of this state. Art. 4, § 6, provides in part: '* * * Said courts [superior] and their judges shall have power to issue writs of * * * review, certiorari, * * * on petition * * *.'

The trial court held that it did not have jurisdiction to review the alleged conduct of these public officials, for the reason that the legislature did not specifically provide for such a review in RCW 28.56. Statutory authority for review is not necessary. The courts' constitutional power of review cannot be abridged by legislative enactment. The allegations of the petition stated a cause of action. The review of such conduct by public officials is delegated to the courts by the constitution.

The respondents contend that the function to be reviewed is not judicial, but administrative; hence, not subject to review by the courts. We do not agree. The petition alleged that the county committee was not privileged to exercise its discretion in determining a fair and equitable participation, as provided by RCW 28.56, but was coerced by the State Board of Education into adopting a participation suitable to it, under threat of cancellation of the contemplated building program.

We are not here solely concerned with whether the function performed was administrative or judicial, but, also, with whether the function was legally performed. The elgality of the act of the officials is subject to review, as well as their alleged arbitrary and capricious conduct.

The function here performed determines the obligation a municipal corporation must assume to meet certain educational requirements. Such function, because it involves the amount of money or property one must pay or contribute to support government, has historically been subject to review by the courts for either abuse of discretion or arbitrary and capricious action on the part of the one imposing the obligation. In re Harmon, 52 Wash.2d 118, 323 P.2d 653 (1958); Ozette R. Co. v. Grays Harbor County, 16 Wash.2d 459, 133 P.2d 983 (1943); Northern Pac. R. Co. v. Pierce County, 55 Wash. 108, 104 P. 178 (1909); Lewis v. Bishop, 19 Wash. 312, 53 P. 165 (1898). When such an issue is presented, the court will not substitute its judgment for that of the administrative agency, and will set the determination aside only if the evidence establishes that it was the result of unlawful, arbitrary or capricious action. In In re Townsend, 54 Wash.2d 532, 533, 341 P.2d 877, 878 (1959), we said:

'It is well settled that, in cases such as this, the administrative determination of the facts is conclusive, unless it be wholly without evidential support, or wholly dependent on a question of law, or clearly arbitrary or capricious. [Citing cases.]'

The court's review of such conduct by school authorities is not without precedent in this state. In Goodnoe Hills School Dist. No. 24, etc. v. Forry, 52 Wash.2d 868, 329 P.2d 1083 (1958), the superior court did review the alleged arbitrary and capricious action of a county committee in annexing Goodnoe Hills and Cliffs nonhigh school districts to a high school district. In that case, we said [p. 878, 329 P.2d at p. 1088]:

'* * * We find nothing arbitrary and capricious in an annexation which results in the taxpayers of Goodnoe Hills and Cliffs bearing an equitable portion of the capital expense necessary to provide suitable facilities for the high school education of their children. * * *

'Nor do we find anything in the record which supports appellants' assertion that the state board of education unduly influenced the county committee to act under an erroneous interpretation of the law.'

Respondents cite Okanogan County School Dist. No. 400 v. Andrews, 158 Wash. Dec. 369, 363 P.2d 129 (1961), in support of their contention that the courts lack jurisdiction to review such conduct. The cited case involved the standards by which a high school is granted an accredited rating. The directors of the unaccredited school contended that the standards had been met. There was no allegation or proof of arbitrary or capricious conduct on the part of the administrative agency. The cited case is not authority on the issue raised by the pleadings in the instant case.

Finally, respondents contend that, since the voters in the school districts can accept or reject the proposed participation, the discretion exercised by the board in fixing the amounts is not final; hence, not subject to review.

We find no merit in respondents' contention. The petition alleged that the proposed participation which would appear on the ballot was illegally determined; that the state board had coerced the county committee by threatening to cancel the building program, and that the participation was thus determined contrary to law. RCW 28.56.020. The voters of the school districts involved are entitled to have upon the ballot a legally determined participation.

We conclude that the right of Cosmopolis Consolidated School District No. 99 to have the courts review the alleged conduct of the respondents is guaranteed by Art. 4, §§ 1, 6, of the state constitution.

The judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded with instructions to reinstate the action.

MALLERY, WEAVER, HILL, FOSTER and HUNTER, JJ., concur.

ROSELLINI, Judge (dissenting).

In accordance with the provision of RCW 28.56.040, the State Board of Education approved a plan submitted by the defendant Grays Harbor County Committee on School District Reorganization, which provided for the participation of the relator in construction of high school facilities. The question to be determined by this court: In so doing, was the state board exercising a judicial function which was subject to review in the superior court?

RCW 7.16.040 provides:

'A writ of review shall be granted by any court, except a police or justice court, when an inferior tribunal, board or officer, exercising judicial functions, has exceeded the jurisdiction of such tribunal, board or officer, or one acting illegally, or to correct any erroneous or void proceeding, or a proceeding not according to the course of the common law, and there is no appeal, nor in the judgment of the court, any plain, speedy and adequate remedy at law.'

Since the statute provides for judicial review only in cases where the act of an inferior tribunal was done in the exercise of a judicial function, it is necessary in each case to examine the nature of the action which is sought to be reviewed. Floyd v. Department of Labor and Industries, 44 Wash.2d 560, 269 P.2d 563.

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