State ex rel. Curtis v. De Corps

• Decision Date: 03 August 1938
• Docket Number: 26840.
• Citation: 134 Ohio St. 295,16 N.E.2d 459
• Parties: STATE ex rel. CURTIS v. DeCORPS et al.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

16 N.E.2d 459

134 Ohio St. 295

STATE ex rel. CURTIS v. DeCORPS et al.

No. 26840.

Supreme Court of Ohio

August 3, 1938

The City Council of Canton passed an ordinance in August, 1932 [sic; agreed statement of facts], creating nine pumpmen positions in the waterworks department of that city. On June 27, 1932, appellant and another who had passed a competitive civil service examination were appointed to two of these positions. More than a half year later, namely, on February 3, 1933, seven others were appointed from an eligible list furnished by the civil service commission to fill the remaining positions.

On February 26, 1934, the City Council of Canton passed an ordinance, effective March 1, 1934, reducing the number of these positions from nine to seven. On February 27, 1934 appellant was notified, in writing, by Service Director Frank L. DeCorps, appellee herein, that he was being laid off for the purpose of economy. There was then in force and effect the following worded resolution, adopted by the Canton Civil Service Commission in 1921:

'Whenever from lack of work or funds, or other cause, it becomes necessary in any department or subdivision thereof temporarily reduce the working force in any position, such reduction shall be made in the inverse order of the appointment of the employees in such position, and the employees last appointed being first laid off; and in determining the order in which such employees shall be laid off, the order in which such employees were certified by the commission shall control.'

Since the lay-off of appellant, the number of pumpmen has continued at seven, during which time but one vacancy was filled, and that by the other pumpman who was examined with appellant.

Appellant instituted this action in mandamus in the Court of Common Pleas to compel his reinstatement, and to recover the emoluments of that position for the period during which he has been deprived thereof. The writ prayed for was denied and the judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The cause is here on the allowance of a motion to certify.

D. O. Curtis and H. Clifton Graybill, both of Canton, for appellant.

Paul G. Weber, city solicitor, and O. Lee Thomas, both of Canton, for appellees.

BY THE COURT.

The question submitted is whether the civil service commission of a municipality has the power to make a regulation which would require the appointing authority to lay off employees in the inverse order of appointment.

That portion of Section 486-19, General Code, which is here pertinent, reads:

'Such municipal commission shall prescribe, amend and enforce rules not inconsistent with the provisions of this act for the classification of positions in the civil service of such city and city school district; for examinations and registrations therefor; and for appointments, promotions, removals transfers, layoffs, suspensions, reductions and reinstatements therein; and for standardizing positions and maintaining efficiency therein. Said municipal commission shall have and exercise all other powers and perform all other duties with respect to the civil service of such city and city school district, as herein prescribed and conferred upon the state civil service commission with respect to the civil service of the state; and all authority granted to the state commission with respect to the service under its jurisdiction shall, except as otherwise provided in this act be held to grant the same authority to the municipal commission with respect to the service under its jurisdiction.'

Municipal civil service commissions are thereby vested with broad and comprehensive rule-making powers, limited only by the requirement that the rules and regulations adopted be not inconsistent with the provisions of the Civil Service Act. To be thus inconsistent, they must contravene or be in derogation of some express provision of the Civil Service Act. Though the authority conferred is broad, it does not, nor can it, include a delegation of legislative power. The civil service commission, being confined exclusively to matters of administration, may enforce but may not declare public policy.

Has the commission here violated any of these principles?

By the enactment of the Civil Service Act, the General Assembly fixed the establishment of a merit system as the ultimate aim in view, and laid down certain principles upon which the institution of civil service is to be built. It is not conceivably possible for the Legislature to prescribe the entire host of detail incident to administration. Of necessity, many of these must be left to the administrative bodies charged with putting the policy into practical effect. 'In the nature of things there must be many things on which the wisdom of legislation must depend, which can only properly be determined in the course of the administration of the legislative will as expressed in law.' Green v. State Civil Service Commission, 90 Ohio St. 252, 256, 107 N.E. 531, 532.

The resolution of the civil service commission here questioned does not, in our opinion, declare policy. It deals merely with a matter of administrative detail, by means of which it seeks to enforce the policy declared by the Legislature. It is but an administrative means for the accomplishment of the legislative end. In the adoption of the rule, the civil service commission exercised a valid administrative function, not amendatory of, but subordinate to, the will of the Legislature as expressed in the act.

Appellees argue that the Legislature, by enacting Section 486-17b General Code, 'having made lay-off in the police and fire departments in the inverse order, has...