State ex rel. DaimlerChrysler Corporation v. Industrial Commission, 2007 Ohio 5093 (Ohio App. 9/27/2007), 06AP-895
| Decision Date | 27 September 2007 |
| Docket Number | No. 06AP-895,06AP-895 |
| Citation | 2007 Ohio 5093 |
| Parties | STATE OF OHIO EX REL. DAIMLERCHRYSLER CORPORATION, Relator, v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION of Ohio and Gregory P. Breuer, Respondents. |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
Eastman & Smith Ltd., Thomas J. Gibney, Mark A. Shaw, and Lynn Vuketich Luther, for relator.
Marc Dann, Attorney General, and Kevin J. Reis, for respondent Industrial Commission of Ohio.
Gallon, Takacs, Boissoneault & Schaffer Co., L.P.A., and Theodore A. Bowman, for respondent Gregory P. Breuer.
DECISION
{¶1} Relator, DaimlerChrysler Corporation ("relator"), filed this original action for a writ of mandamus ordering respondent, Industrial Commission of Ohio ("commission"), to vacate its orders awarding wage-loss compensation under R.C. 4123.56(B) to respondent, Gregory P. Breuer ("claimant"), and to enter orders denying such compensation. In the alternative, relator requests a writ ordering the commission to vacate its order denying relator's motion for allocation of the compensation between two industrial claims and to enter an order granting that motion.
{¶2} This court referred this matter to a magistrate pursuant to Civ.R. 53(C) and Loc.R. 12(M) of the Tenth District Court of Appeals. The magistrate issued a decision, including findings of fact and conclusions of law, recommending that this court grant a writ of mandamus ordering the commission to vacate its orders granting wage-loss compensation under R.C. 4123.56(B) and to enter orders denying such compensation. (Attached as Appendix A.) Claimant and the commission (collectively, "respondents") filed objections to the magistrate's decision, arguing that the magistrate misinterpreted the law as it applies to wage-loss compensation and, in particular, misapplied the decision of the Supreme Court of Ohio in State ex rel. Jordan v. Indus. Comm., 102 Ohio St.3d 153, 2004-Ohio-2115.
{¶3} No party filed objections to the magistrate's findings of fact, and we adopt them as our own. The facts most pertinent to our consideration of the objections are as follows.
{¶4} On June 2, 2002, claimant suffered an industrial injury while employed as a mechanic for relator. He underwent surgery, and his doctor imposed permanent work restrictions. These restrictions did not limit the number of hours claimant could work in a day.
{¶5} On September 4, 2003, claimant returned to work. While relator argues that claimant returned to his former position as a mechanic, claimant argues that he was not able to perform that position within his restrictions and, therefore, did not "return" to that position. On the day of his return, claimant bid on a new position in the sanitation department, and his transfer to that department became effective October 20, 2003.
{¶6} On May 3, 2005, claimant filed his first application for wage-loss compensation, beginning September 8, 2003, based on his alleged reduced wages in the sanitation position. As detailed in the magistrate's decision, relator raised a number of issues regarding claimant's application, and the commission issued multiple decisions on the application. In order to address the objections most efficiently, we limit our discussion to the full commission's decision based on the January 5, 2006 hearing and, specifically, the following conclusion regarding the impact of claimant's reduced overtime in the sanitation position:
The Commission finds that the injured worker returned to work and suffered a wage loss for the weeks noted above as the result of the conditions allowed in this claim. * * * Due to a fluctuation in the number of overtime hours available, the injured worker periodically earned less per week than his average week wage. The Commission finds that during those weeks, the injured worker suffered a wage loss as the result of the allowed conditions in this claim. * * *
{¶7} In essence, the commission concluded that claimant suffered a compensable wage loss, even though his hourly wages were roughly the same in the two positions, because claimant had fewer overtime hours in the sanitation position—a position his injury forced him to take. While he was able to work overtime, and did work some overtime in the sanitation position, his weekly wages were sometimes lower in the new position simply because the sanitation department offered less overtime. Because his injury caused him to take the sanitation position, there was a causal connection between his injury and his loss in wages.
{¶8} The magistrate found that the commission's conclusion in this respect was inconsistent with Jordan. We agree.
{¶9} In Jordan, as the magistrate explains, the claimant suffered an injury, took a new position within his work restrictions, and received a lower weekly wage because he worked less overtime in the new position. The record contained no evidence, however, as to the reason for his reduced overtime. The Supreme Court of Ohio stated:
* * * Two key questions thus remain unaddressed. First, was overtime offered? If it was and was declined, claimant's refusal—unless supported by medical restrictions on the number of hours claimant could work—would break the requisite causal connection. Second, if it was not offered, then why not? If, for example, overtime was rescinded on a plantwide basis for economic reasons, then again there would be no causal connection. If, however, the employer singled out claimant because of his injury, a causal relationship between injury and wage loss could be present.
Jordan at ¶10. Because the evidence did not address these questions, the court found that "further consideration of the question of causal relationship is warranted." Id. at ¶11.
{¶10} Here, we know the answers to the questions the Supreme Court raised in Jordan. As to whether overtime was offered and declined for medical reasons in the new position, we know that claimant could and did work the overtime hours available to him. As to those hours of overtime not available to him in the new position, the evidence indicates that it was simply a matter of the fluctuation in hours available in different departments. Claimant offers no evidence that the employer singled him out in any way or that his ability to work overtime in the new position was directly related to his injury or work restrictions.
{¶11} We acknowledge respondents' assertion that, once the commission determines that an industrial injury has forced a claimant to find a new position, applicable wage-loss compensation rules should require only a straightforward week-by-week comparison of a claimant's former weekly wage to his present earnings. That is not the approach the Supreme Court took in Jordan, however.
{¶12} Importantly, in Jordan, the Supreme Court did not rely on a straightforward comparison between the claimant's former weekly wage (with substantial overtime) and his present earnings (with less overtime). Instead, the court returned the case to the commission for "further consideration of the question of causal relationship." Id. at ¶11. And as to that further consideration, the court indicated its belief that an employer's limitation of overtime for economic reasons, as opposed to reasons specific to a claimant, was sufficient to break the causal connection between a claimant's injury and his loss of wages based on reduced overtime.
{¶13} Applying Jordan here, because the evidence shows no direct causal relationship between claimant's injury and his reduced overtime, we need no additional evidence or further consideration to determine that the commission should have denied compensation on these grounds. Accordingly, we overrule respondents' objections.
{¶14} Having conducted an independent review of the evidence in this matter, and finding no error of law or other defect on the face of the magistrate's decision, we adopt the magistrate's decision as our own, including the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in it. In accordance with the magistrate's decision, we grant a writ of mandamus ordering the commission to vacate its orders granting R.C. 4123.56(B) wage-loss compensation and to enter orders denying said compensation.
Objections overruled, writ of mandamus granted.
MAGISTRATE'S DECISION
Eastman & Smith LTD., Thomas J. Gibney, Mark A. Shaw and Lynn Vuketich Luther, for relator.
Marc Dann, Attorney General, and Kevin J. Reis, for respondent Industrial Commission of Ohio.
Gallon, Takacs, Boissoneault & Schaffer Co. L.P.A., and Theodore A. Bowman, for respondent Gregory P. Breuer.
{¶15} In this original action, relator, DaimlerChrysler Corporation, requests a writ of mandamus ordering respondent Industrial Commission of Ohio ("commission") to vacate its orders awarding R.C. 4123.56(B) wage loss compensation to respondent Gregory P. Breuer, and to enter orders denying wage loss compensation. In the alternative, relator requests that the writ order the commission to vacate its order denying relator's motion that wage loss compensation be allocated equally between two industrial claims, and to enter an order granting relator's motion for an allocation.
Findings of Fact:
{¶16} 1. Respondent Gregory P. Breuer ("claimant") has two industrial claims that arose out of and in the course of his employment with relator, a self-insured employer under Ohio's workers' compensation laws. Claimant began his employment with relator on April 25, 1973.
{¶17} 2. On August...
To continue reading
Request your trial