State ex rel. Dawson v. Dinwiddie

Decision Date17 October 1939
Docket NumberCase Number: 28955
Citation186 Okla. 63,95 P.2d 867,1939 OK 406
PartiesSTATE ex rel. DAWSON, County Supt., v. DINWIDDIE, School Dist. Clerk
CourtOklahoma Supreme Court
Syllabus

¶0 1. SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS--Authority for single common school district to change its status and maintain its school system as two or more districts united under provisions of statutes relating to "union graded schools."

By virtue of section 6946, O. S. 1931 (sec. 6, art. 8, ch. 219, S. L. 1913), a single common school district may, in the manner prescribed by sec. 6940, O. S. 1931 (see. 1, art. 8, ch. 219, S. L. 1913, as later amended), change its status and thereafter establish and maintain its school system as two or more districts united under the provisions of art. 11, ch. 34, O. S. 1931 (art. 8, ch. 219, S. L. 1913, as subsequently amended).

2. SAME--Statutory authority to effect change in status of single school districts not destroyed by use of technically erroneous designation "union graded schools."

Single school districts which have changed their status, as authorized by art. 11, ch. 34, O. S. 1931, have by departmental construction been referred to in this state as "Union Graded Schools." Held, that the use of such name, though technically erroneous, does not destroy the statutory authority to effect the change in status. The substance of the change rather than the name subsequently applied to the district determines its status.

3. SAME--Petition of electors of school district looking to change in status of district-Duties of district clerk mandatory.

The requirements of section 6940, O. S. 1931, requiring the clerk of a district to examine a petition presented for the purposes therein stated and act in accord with the statute, are mandatory.

4. SAME--MANDAMUS--Resort to mandamus against district clerk not precluded by confusion involved in change in status of school district.

A change in the status of a school district as authorized by section 6946, O. S. 1931, does not involve such confusion as to preclude a resort to mandamus in connection with the proceedings if the remedy is otherwise appropriate.

Appeal from District Court, Muskogee County; E. A. Summers, Judge.

Mandamus by the State on relation of E. V. Dawson, Superintendent of Public Instruction for Muskogee County, against Dave Dinwiddie, Clerk of School District No. 16, Muskogee County. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appeals. Reversed.

A. Camp Bonds and Eck Brook, both of Muskogee, for plaintiff in error.

Phil K. Oldham and Crump & Boatright, all of Muskogee, for defendant in error.

D. A. Stovall, of Hugo, amicus curiae.

DAVISON, J.

¶1 This is an action in mandamus. It was instituted in the district court of Muskogee county by the State of Oklahoma ex rel. E. V. Dawson, County Superintendent of Public Instruction in and for Muskogee County, to compel Dave Dinwiddie, as clerk of school district No. 16 of that county, to examine a petition presented to the petitioner by a group of qualified electors within the district to vote upon a proposed change in the character of the district from a common school district to one authorized to establish and maintain a graded or high school therein, and to be known as a "Union Graded" district. It was also sought to compel Dinwiddie (if he should find the petition contained the signatures of more than one-third of the qualified electors of the district) to attach a certificate thereto so indicating, in order that the petitioner, as county superintendent, might call an election for the purpose above mentioned.

¶2 The petition was verified, and upon presentation thereof an alternative writ was issued reciting in substance the facts above stated.

¶3 The defendant filed a demurrer. The pleading, under our Code, was inappropriate (sec. 738, O. S. 1931, 12 Okla. St. Ann. § 1459), but under the liberal judicial attitude which prevails in this jurisdiction in connection with matters of pleading, the demurrer was properly treated as an answer "admitting the facts stated and invoking the court's application thereto of the law." Ellis et al. v. Armstrong et al., 28 Okla. 311, 114 P. 327; Lauer v. Clark, County Supt., 84 Okla. 206, 202 P. 1035.

¶4 The trial court decided, upon the facts stated, that relief should not be granted, and entered its judgment accordingly. The plaintiff appeals, appearing herein as plaintiff in error. The original order of appearance is thus preserved in this court. Our continued reference to the parties will be by their trial court designation.

¶5 The principal question in this case is dependent upon the meaning and effect of section 6946, O. S. 1931 (70 Okla. Stat. Ann. § 285), which reads:

"Any single district shall possess power to establish a graded or highschool subject to the provisions of this article, in like manner as two or more districts united."

¶6 The plaintiff in his brief says:

"The only question presented by this plaintiff and the only one for consideration is:
"'Under the provisions of section 6946, supra, may a single common school district become a union graded school district by following the procedure set out in section 6940, supra.'"

¶7 We are of the opinion that the use of the name "union" in connection with graded schools leads to some confusion of thought, and that the substance and purpose of the change in status of the schooldistrict, if permissable, is the matter of primary consideration, rather than the name to be applied to the district subsequent to the contemplated change. The word "union," in its ordinary acceptation, implies a joinder of separate entities, and though names are frequently inappropriately used, the use of the word as an adjective in a measure "begs the real question," since it must be recognized at the outset that a change in status of one school district does not involve union of two or more separate existing districts.

¶8 We, therefore, prefer to approach the problem upon consideration of the question: Can a single school district change its status so that it is authorized by law to establish, maintain, and operate its school system in the same manner as a district made up of the union of two or more districts under authority of section 6940, O. S. 1931 (70 Okla. St. Ann. § 281), which provides the method of creating such a united district and contains additional provisions relating to the mode of operating schools therein? If our answer to this question is in the affirmative, we can then decide whether the name "Union Graded School District" is an appropriate or permissible appellation for the district whose status has been thus changed.

¶9 The question here presented is one of first impression in this court although section 6946, supra (with changes by amendment to authorize the establishment of high schools) has been a part of the statutory law in this jurisdiction since 1895 (Laws 1895, p. 244, R. L. 1910, sec. 7869). It depends for its solution upon an interpretation of the statutes involved, and we may with propriety resort to the rules of statutory construction to resolve doubt or uncertainty.

¶10 Determining the legislative intent is the primary consideration in ascertaining the meaning of any law. Board of Com'rs of Creek County et al. v. Alexander, State Treas., 58 Okla. 128, 159 P. 311; Grayson v. Thompson, 77 Okla. 77, 186 P. 236; Wagner v. Swan, 162 Okla. 95, 19 P.2d 555; Bryan & Son v. Vernor, 172 Okla. 382, 45 P.2d 468; Childers v. Paul, 177 Okla. 111, 57 P.2d 872. In ascertaining the legislative intent, the purpose intended to be accomplished claims a degree of consideration. Brown v. Woods, 2 Okla. 601, 39 P. 413; In re Cleveland's Claim, 72 Okla. 279, 180 P. 252; Blevins v. Graham Co., 72 Okla. 308, 182 P. 247. And the history of the statute may be traced for guiding light (Pure Oil Co. v. Cornish, 174 Okla. 615, 52 P.2d 832) even though it has passed through a revision (Ramsey v. Leeper et al., 168 Okla. 43, 31 P.2d 852).

¶11 It should be mentioned at this point that section 6940, supra, is a part of the same article as section 6946, supra (art. 8. ch. 219, S. L. 1913, subsequently amended) and that the procedure followed in this case to procure an election for the purpose of changing the status of the district corresponded to the requirements of section 6940, supra. The procedure has not always been exactly as now prescribed. The forerunner of what is now section 6940, supra, was section 1 of art. 5, S. L. 1895, p. 242, R. L. 1910 (reenacted by art. 8, ch. 219, S. L. 1913).

¶12 At the time the statutory provisions now under consideration, or their forerunners, first became a part of our law, the one-room, one-teacher school constituted a major portion of our school system. Facilities for transportation to centers of population where more elaborate school systems were in operation were seldom available, and country children were infrequently afforded the educational opportunities available to children living in towns and cities. To a certain, although greatly minimized, extent, these conditions still exist. Their diminution has been due in part to the increasing number of towns and cities, and the development of more adequate facilities for transportation and in part to the operation of laws such as the one now before us, which tend to bring the school to the child.

¶13 The Legislature, in recognition of the existing educational problems, sought to make more elaborate educational facilities available, when, in the judgment ofa prescribed majority of the local electorate, such change should be desirable and not prohibitive from a pecuniary standpoint.

¶14 It was contemplated that in many instances the desired end could best be accomplished by the union of existing common school districts. The provisions of sec. 6940, supra, and following sections of the same article (article 5, S. L. 1895, now article 11, chapter 34, O. S. 1931) authorized such unions, but it was also contemplated that a single district might desire a...

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