State ex rel. Denton v. Bedinghaus

• Decision Date: 12 March 2003
• Docket Number: No. 2002-1424.,2002-1424.
• Citation: 98 Ohio St.3d 298,784 N.E.2d 99,2003 Ohio 861
• Parties: The STATE ex rel. DENTON, et al., Appellants, v. BEDINGHAUS, Commr., et al., Appellees.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

784 N.E.2d 99

98 Ohio St.3d 298

2003 Ohio 861

The STATE ex rel. DENTON, et al., Appellants, v. BEDINGHAUS, Commr., et al., Appellees.

No. 2002-1424.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Submitted January 7, 2003.

Decided March 12, 2003.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Newman & Meeks Co., L.P.A., Robert B. Newman and Lisa T. Meeks; and Stephen R. Felson, Cincinnati, for appellants.

Michael K. Allen, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, Christian J. Schaefer and Joseph M. Hutson, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellees Bedinghaus, Neyer, Dowlin, Hamilton County Child Support Enforcement Agency, and Hamilton County Department of Human Services.

Montgomery, Rennie & Jonson, Elizabeth A. McCord, Cincinnati, and George D. Jonson, for appellees Judge Hendon and Judge Lipps.

PER CURIAM.

{¶ 1} On January 23, 1998, the Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, issued a warrant for the arrest of James Kinney. On March 6, 1998, following Kinney's arrest, his friend, appellant Cheryl Denton, posted $800 as bail with the juvenile court to secure Kinney's release and to ensure his appearance in court. Denton's receipt noted that the money "can be applied to fines and costs."

{¶ 2} A juvenile court magistrate found Kinney in contempt of a child-support order. The magistrate ordered that the $800 that Denton had posted be applied to Kinney's child-support arrearage. According to Denton, she was never given an opportunity to contest this ruling, she was under no legal obligation to support Kinney's children, and after she had posted bail, Kinney appeared in court as ordered.

{¶ 3} Cary Young ("Cary") was arrested in Hamilton County for contempt of a support order, and bail was set at $10,000. On March 28, 1998, appellant Johnny Young ("Young") deposited $1,000 cash in the juvenile court as security for a $10,000 appearance bond to secure Cary's release and to ensure his appearance in court. On April 10, 1998, a juvenile court magistrate applied the $1,000 that Young had posted to Cary's support arrearage. According to Young, he was never given the opportunity to contest this ruling, he had no legal duty to support any of Cary's children, and after Young had posted bail, Cary appeared in court as required.

{¶ 4} In September 1999, Denton and Young filed an amended complaint in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, Western Division, against appellees Hamilton County Commissioners Bob Bedinghaus, Tom Neyer, and John Dowlin, the Hamilton County Child Support Enforcement Agency, and the Hamilton County Department of Human Services. The suit sought class-action status, punitive and compensatory damages, injunctive relief, and attorney fees under Section 1983, Title 42, U.S.Code. The complaint requested this relief for the "violation of the rights of [Denton and Young] and of all class members under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, as applied to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment, in confiscating contempt bond funds belonging to [Denton and Young] and to class members without just compensation and without a hearing."

{¶ 5} In August 2000, the federal district court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the amended complaint. The federal court ruled that the complaint did not state a claim upon which relief can be granted because (1) the contested juvenile court forfeiture orders were not issued pursuant to an official county policy, since a common pleas court is a unit of the state, not the county, (2) the forfeiture orders were issued under an official state policy, but the state is immune from suit and Section 1983 liability under the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution, and (3) the defendants were entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity because they distributed the bail money in accordance with court orders. The district court further observed that it was "not unsympathetic" to Denton and Young's "predicament" because "[a]t a minimum, the practice complained of seems to be a violation of Ohio law regarding forfeiture of bond." The district court opined that "[t]he appropriate remedy for [Denton and Young] would appear to be to petition the Ohio Court of Appeals for either a writ of mandamus or a writ of prohibition compelling the Juvenile Court to cease the practice complained of and ordering the return of their funds."

{¶ 6} On October 12, 2000, appellees Judge Sylvia Sieve Hendon and Judge Thomas R. Lipps of the Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, issued a memorandum directing the court's magistrates to follow court policy regarding R.C. 2937.40(B) in applying bail to child-support arrearages:

{¶ 7} "Therefore, it will continue to be the policy of this Court, that bonds posted by a person other than the accused, should be forfeited, only if the accused fails to appear before the Court. If the accused does appear, as required by the Court, the bond should be released to the person or surety, who posted the bond. If the person who posted the bond wishes to voluntarily apply the bond refund to the legal obligation of the accused person, they are free to deposit such funds with the Child Support Enforcement Agency." (Emphasis sic.)

{¶ 8} On December 1, 2000, Denton and Young followed the district court's suggestion and filed a complaint against the original district court defendants and Judge Hendon and Judge Lipps in the Court of Appeals for Hamilton County. In their class-action complaint, as subsequently amended, Denton and Young sought writs of mandamus and prohibition requiring the defendants to "cease and desist the practices described" and "to return all illegally confiscated funds to their rightful owners, namely, [Denton and Young] and the class members." Denton and Young alleged that "the practice of confiscating contempt bonds to pay child support arrearages owing to [sic, owed by] someone other than the person furnishing the bond is a commonplace occurrence in Hamilton County and is undertaken pursuant to a policy initiated and carried out by the Defendants." Denton and Young claimed that the defendants' conduct violated (1) their due process rights under Section 16, Article I of the Ohio Constitution, (2) state statutory law, including R.C 2937.40(B), and (3) Section 1983, Title 42, U.S.Code.

{¶ 9} The nonjudicial defendants had filed an answer and a motion for summary judgment on the original complaint and the judges had filed an answer. On February 16, 2001, the court of appeals granted the nonjudicial defendants' motion for summary judgment and denied the writs. The court of appeals permitted the claims to proceed against the judges. The judges filed an answer to the amended complaint and a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment.

{¶ 10} On June 28, 2002, the court of appeals granted the judges' motion for summary judgment and denied the writs. The court of appeals reasoned that the mandamus claim lacked merit because (1) the federal district court judgment is res judicata, (2) the judges are immune from federal liability because of the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution, and (3) the judges are entitled to immunity for violations of state law. The court of appeals ruled that the prohibition claim was moot because the judges had issued a memorandum clarifying the court's policy to adhere to R.C. 2937.40(B) before the writ action was filed.

{¶ 11} Denton and Young appealed from the February 2001 and June 2002 court of appeals judgments to this court in August 2002. In July, though, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit had reversed the federal district court's August 2000 dismissal of Denton and Young's amended federal complaint and remanded the cause to the district court for further proceedings. Denton v. Bedinghaus (July 19, 2002), C.A.6 No. 00-4072, 2002 WL 1611472. The federal court of appeals held that the district court's dismissal of the Section 1983 civil rights claims was erroneous and that the defenses of lack of municipal policy or custom, Eleventh Amendment immunity, and quasi-judicial immunity did not warrant dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Id.

{¶ 12} This cause is now before us upon Denton and Young's appeal as of right of the state appellate court's judgment denying their requests for writs of mandamus and prohibition.

Res Judicata

{¶ 13} Denton and Young assert that the court of appeals erred in denying the writs. The court's primary rationale was res judicata based on the federal district court's August 2000 judgment.

{¶ 14} Under the doctrine of res judicata, "[a] valid, final judgment rendered upon the merits bars all subsequent actions based upon any claim arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action." Grava v. Parkman Twp. (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 379, 653 N.E.2d 226, syllabus. At issue is whether that reversal requires vacating the state appellate court's res judicata holding.

{¶ 15} We hold that res judicata is no longer a basis to deny either writ. "A judgment based on an earlier judgment is not nullified automatically by reason of the setting aside, or reversal on appeal, or other nullification of that earlier judgment; but the later judgment may be set aside, in appropriate proceedings, with provision for any suitable restitution of benefits received under it." (Emphasis added.) 1 Restatement of the Law 2d, Judgments (1982), Section 16. More specifically, "[i]f, when the earlier judgment [that poses the res judicata bar] is set aside or reversed, the later judgment [applying the earlier judgment as a bar] * * * is still open to appeal * * *, a party may inform the trial or appellate court of the nullification of the earlier judgment and the consequent elimination of the basis for the later judgment. The court should then normally set aside the later judgment." (Emphasis added.) Id. at 146, Comment c.

{¶ 16} In Metropolis Night...