State ex rel. Dept. of Finance, Budget and Business v. Thurston County

• Decision Date: 29 June 1939
• Docket Number: 27428.
• Citation: 199 Wash. 398,92 P.2d 234
• Parties: STATE ex rel. DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, BUDGET AND BUSINESS v. THURSTON COUNTY.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

92 P.2d 234

199 Wash. 398

STATE ex rel. DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, BUDGET AND BUSINESS v. THURSTON COUNTY.

No. 27428.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

June 29, 1939

Action by the State of Washington, on the relation of the Department of Finance, Budget and Business, against Thurston County, to recover the sum of $34,096.18 with interest, for the care and maintenance of insane patients committed from Thurston County to the Western State Hospital for the Insane. Judgment for the State in the sum of $6,482.92 and interest, and the State appeals.

Reversed and remanded with instructions.

SIMPSON MAIN, MILLARD, and BEALS, JJ., dissenting.

Appeal from Superior Court, Thurston County; John M. Wilson, judge.

G. W Hamilton, Atty. Gen., and W. A. Toner, of Olympia, for the State.

Smith Troy, E. A. Philbrick, and John S. Lynch, Jr., all of Olympia, for respondent.

JEFFERS Justice.

This action was instituted by the state of Washington to recover from Thurston county the sum of $34,096.18, together with interest, for the care and maintenance of insane patients committed from Thurston county to the Western State Hospital for the Insane, from January 1, 1934, to September 30, 1937.

The complaint, in so far as material to the questions raised herein, alleges that all of the persons committed to the Western Hospital during the period above mentioned have been adjudged by the superintendent of the hospital to be non-violently insane, and that each of said persons remained non-violently insane for the period hereinBefore mentioned. It is further alleged that none of the persons so committed, or his estate, or his relatives have paid anything for the maintenance of such person, while so confined, except as shown by the bill of particulars attached to the complaint.

The bill of particulars sets out the names of the persons committed for whom a charge of $4.50 a week was made, and also all payments made. After deducting all credits, the bill of particulars shows a balance due, for such maintenance, of $34,096.18, the amount claimed by the state herein

The county, by its answer, denied generally its liability, and alleged affirmatively that in each instance where a patient was committed from Thurston county, a hearing was had in the superior court, upon a complaint filed therein; that witnesses were sworn, and in each instance at least two medical experts were sworn, and examined such person, in the presence of the court and counsel for the state; that such medical experts swore to their findings and conclusions; and that at the conclusion of all the evidence, the court in each and every case found such person to be violently insane and dangerous to life and property

It is further alleged that Rem.Rev.Stat. sec. 6930, in so far as it undertakes to authorize the superintendent of the hospital to set aside, revise, or in any manner alter or affect the judgment of the superior court theretofore made in each of such cases, is unconstitutional and void, as an attempt by the legislature to confer judicial powers on an administrative officer, and as an attempt to confer upon such administrative officer power to revise, set aside and alter a judgment of the superior court.

The reply put in issue the affirmative matter set up in the answer.

The cause was submitted to the court upon an agreed statement of facts, and after a consideration thereof, the court entered judgment in favor of plaintiff in the sum of $6,482.92, and interest, this being the amount the court found due for patients in regard to whom the trial court did not make a finding that they were dangerous to be at large. The state has appealed.

Appellant contends the trial court erred in not allowing recovery for the remainder of the persons mentioned in the complaint and the agreed statement of facts, or, in other words, in refusing to allow recovery for all of those patients whom the superintendent, upon examination, had determined to be not violently insane and dangerous to be at large. Appellant also claims the court erred in deciding that the superintendent was without authority to make a finding as to whether or not the patient was violently insane and dangerous to life and property.

The following are the material facts contained in the agreed statement of facts: From January 1, 1934, to September 30, 1937, the appellant maintained, cared for and treated, in the Western State Hospital, approximately one hundred persons committed to this institution from Thurston county, a definite statement of such care and maintenance being set forth in the bill of particulars, to which reference has been made, and which shows the sum of $34,096.18 as remaining unpaid for such care and maintenance. None of the persons, or his estate, or his relatives, have paid anything for the care of such person, except as credited in the statement, nor have any of such persons been found financially able to pay, except as shown in the statement. All of the persons were committed to the Western State Hospital by the superior court of Thurston, county, and each person so committed has been found by the superintendent of the hospital to be not violently insane and dangerous to life and property. The county commissioners of Thurston county have been notified of the result of such examination. The superior court of Thurston county in each case mentioned, made a commitment, and also made findings of fact with respect to the financial ability of the patient and his relatives to pay the costs and expenses, costs of transportation and court costs. Upon the hearings, legally qualified physicians examined the persons so adjudged to be insane, as to the character of their insanity, for use in the physician's certificate attached to the official commitment by the court. The order of commitment was made upon a form provided by the state, a copy of such form being made a part of the statement. None of the cases is of imbecility, harmless chronic mental disorder, order, or mania a potu.

The form of the commitment used by the court in each case, in so far as material, was as follows: '_____, the person named in the foregoing affidavit, being this day brought Before me, for examination on a charge of insanity, and no jury having been demanded either by or on behalf of said person, and having heard the testimony of _____ witnesses who have been acquainted with the accused during the time of the alleged insanity; and Drs. _____ and _____, legally qualified and reputable physicians, after hearing the testimony of witnesses, and after a personal examination of the accused, having made the certificate by law required; and being myself satisfied that the said _____ is insane, and being further satisfied of the truth of all the matters set forth in the certificates of said physicians, I do hereby order that the said _____ be confined in the _____ Hospital for Insane.'

In the form of commitment used in each case, the following questions were submitted to the examining physicians, and answered by them:

'26. Are there suicidal, homicidal or incendiary tendencies?'

'27. If suicidal, is the propensity now active and in what way?'

28. Is there a disposition to injure others? If so, is it from sudden passion or premeditation?'

'61. With what form of insanity is the patient afflicted?'

'67. Do you consider the patient dangerous to be at large?'

'69. Briefly state the reasons why you consider this patient insane.'

Respondent contends that Rem.Rev.Stat. sec. 6930, is unconstitutional and void, as in contravention of sec. 1, article 4, of the state constitution, which vests in the courts the judicial power of the state, in so far as this section attempts to delegate to the superintendent the authority to determine whether or not a patient, after his admission to the hospital, is violently insane and dangerous to life and property. It is further contended by respondent that the section is in violation of sec. 3, article 1, of the constitution, in that the effect of such determination by the superintendent amounts to the taking of county property without due process of law.

Prior to 1925, Rem.Rev.Stat. sec. 6930, vested in the court the power to determine whether or not a patient was violently insane and dangerous to life and property, for the purpose of determining whether the state or the county should bear the expense of maintaining such patient. This section, in State v. Pierce County, 132 Wash. 155, 231 P. 801, 46 A.L.R. 594, was held to be constitutional and valid in all respects. In 1925, Laws 1925, p. 334, the legislature amended section 6930, supra, and delegated to the superintendent the right to determine whether or not a patient, after his commitment, was violently insane and dangerous to life and property, such determination to be used as a basis for liability of either the state or county. Section 6930, Rem.Rev.Stat. as amended, is now Rem.Rev.Stat. sec. 6930.

In passing upon the constitutionality of a legislative enactment, several things must always be kept in mind. Courts will not sit to review or revise legislative action, but rather to enforce the legislative will, when acting within its constitutional limits. A legislative act carries with it the presumption of its constitutionality, and will not be declared void unless its invalidity appears beyond a reasonable doubt. If the act is fairly and reasonably open to more than one construction, that construction will be adopted which will harmonize the statute with the constitution and avoid a conflict therewith. Smith v. City of Seattle, 25 Wash. 300, 65 P. 612; Litchman v. Shannon, 90 Wash. 186, 155 P. 783; Record Publishing Co. v. Monson, 123 Wash. 569, 213 P. 13; Robb v. City of Tacoma, 175 Wash. 580, 28 P.2d 327.

For the...