State ex rel. Dix v. Celeste

• Decision Date: 13 June 1984
• Docket Number: No. 83-1408,83-1408
• Citation: 464 N.E.2d 153,11 Ohio St.3d 141,11 OBR 436
• Parties: , 11 O.B.R. 436 The STATE, ex rel. DIX, v. CELESTE, Governor, et al.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Page 141

11 Ohio St.3d 141

464 N.E.2d 153, 11 O.B.R. 436

The STATE, ex rel. DIX, v. CELESTE, Governor, et al.

No. 83-1408.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

June 13, 1984.

Syllabus by the Court

The one-subject rule contained in Section 15(D), Article II of the Ohio Constitution is merely directory in nature; while it is within the discretion of the courts to rely upon the judgment of the General Assembly as to a bill's compliance with the Constitution, a manifestly gross and fraudulent violation of this rule will cause an enactment to be invalidated. (Pim v. Nicholson, 6 Ohio St. 176, approved and followed, and extended; State, ex rel. Attorney General, v. Covington, 29 Ohio St. 102, paragraph seven of the syllabus, modified.)

The parties stipulated and agreed to the truth of the following facts and to the authenticity of the documentary evidence in support thereof.

Relator, Thomas J. Dix, was appointed by the Governor of the state of Ohio, with the consent of the Senate, to the Ohio Development Financing Commission for a term beginning January 1, 1978 and ending December 31, 1984. Relator's compensation, as specified by R.C. 122.40, was $5,000 annually, payable in monthly installments.

On July 14, 1983, Amended Substitute Senate Bill No. 227 (Am.Sub. S.B. No. 227) was signed by Richard F. Celeste, Governor of the State of Ohio. The subject matter of this Bill, as expressed in pertinent part in its title, is as follows:

"To amend * * *, to enact * * * and to repeal sections [various sections of the] Revised Code to abolish the Ohio Development Financing Commission and transfer its duties to the Director of Development, to create the Development Financing Advisory Board, the Development Financing Policy Board, and the Division of Development Financing in the Department of Development * * *, to abolish the Development Advisory Committee, to provide for the appointment of legislative members to the various development program advisory boards and commissions, and to generally consolidate and reorganize the state's economic development assistance programs, and to make an appropriation."

The bill became law immediately upon approval of the Governor, containing an appropriation for the current expense of state government.

On September 9, 1983, relator filed this original action in mandamus and prohibition, naming as respondents the following officials of the State of Ohio: Richard F. Celeste, Governor, Thomas E. Ferguson, Auditor, Mary Ellen Withrow, Treasurer, Alfred S. Dietzel, Director of Development, Myrta Cristina Sale, Director of Budget and Management and William G. Sykes, Director of Administrative Services. In his complaint relator prayed this court to declare that Am.Sub.S.B. No. 227 is unconstitutional and void, that the Ohio Development Financing Commission continues in force, that members of the Ohio Development Financing Commission as of July 13, 1983 may serve to the ends of their respective terms, and that a writ of mandamus issue to effectuate these ends. Relator further sought a writ of mandamus to cause legal payroll warrants to be issued in payment of his statutory compensation as a member of the Ohio Development Financing Commission for July and August 1983. Additionally, relator prayed for a writ of prohibition to be issued to respondents Celeste and Dietzel barring them from taking any further action to implement Am.Sub.S.B. No. 227 and to respondent Withrow prohibiting the issuance of state of Ohio revenue bonds pursuant to Am.Sub.S.B. No. 227.

Gerald A. Donahue and John M. McElroy, Columbus, for relator.

Anthony J. Celebrezze, Jr., Atty. Gen., Kathleen McManus and Richard A. Green, Columbus, for respondents.

Anthony J. Celebrezze, Jr., Atty. Gen., Stanley J. Dobrowski and Simon B. Karas, Columbus, urging denial for amicus curiae, Ohio Building Authority.

Boyd & Boyd Co., L.P.A., and Robert E. Boyd, Jr., Columbus, urging allowance for amicus curiae, Lewis R. Trembly, Jr.

WILLIAM B. BROWN, Justice.

The general issue presented is whether Am. Sub. S.B. No. 227 was enacted in violation of Section 15(D), Article II of the Ohio Constitution which provides in part that "[n]o bill shall contain more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title * * *." For the reasons that follow, this court holds that Am. Sub. S.B. No. 227 is not unconstitutional; and relator's requests for writs of mandamus and prohibition are denied.

Perhaps there is no task more grave in the adjudication of civil controversies than passing on the constitutionality of legislation. The legislature possesses, subject only to the limitations of our state and federal Constitutions, plenary power to make the laws. This court, in considering the issue presented by this case, has remained mindful that there is a strong presumption supporting the constitutionality of a legislative enactment.

Ohio is one of among forty-one states whose Constitution contains a one-subject provision. ¹ The primary and universally recognized purpose of such provisions is to prevent logrolling--"* * * the practice of several minorities combining their several proposals as different provisions of a single bill and thus consolidating their votes so that a majority is obtained for the omnibus bill where perhaps no single proposal of each minority could have obtained majority approval separately." ² 1A Sutherland, Statutes and Statutory Construction (4 Ed.1972), Section 17.01; see 73 American Jurisprudence 2d (1974) 335, Statutes, Section 119. In Pim v. Nicholson (1856), 6 Ohio St. 176, this court likewise recognized that the one-subject provision was directed at logrolling.

The one-subject provision attacks logrolling by disallowing unnatural combinations of provisions in acts, i.e., those dealing with more than one subject, on the theory that the best explanation for the unnatural combination is a tactical one--logrolling. By limiting each bill to a single subject, the bill will have unity and thus the purpose of the provision will be satisfied.

The one-subject provision also has the related benefit of operating to prevent "riders" from being attached to bills that are "* * * so certain of adoption that the rider will secure adoption not on its own merits, but on the measure to which it is attached." ³

The resultant effect of the one-subject provision is a more orderly and fair legislative process. By limiting each bill to one subject, the issues presented can be better grasped and more intelligently discussed. The rule prevents extraneous matters from being introduced into consideration of the bill by disallowing amendments not germane to the subject under consideration.

It must be strongly emphasized that the constitutional mandate that every bill shall have but one subject was imposed to facilitate orderly legislative procedure, not to hamper or impede it. Professor Sutherland has so recognized, stating in his treatise, supra, at page 2, as follows: "* * * [This rule] was not designed as a loophole of escape from, or a means for the destruction of legitimate enactments. The number of statutes required to effect a given purpose is not to be needlessly multiplied, nor is the scope of the required single subject to be unduly restricted."

Professor Ruud has made a similar observation, by stating that, "* * * this purpose relates to the legislative procedure; it does not aim to eradicate devices designed to pervert the rule of majority vote but rather to eliminate rambling, discursive deliberations. This is an internal institutional problem, one that could have been left to the legislative rules to treat." (Emphasis added.) Ruud, "No Law Shall Embrace More Than One Subject" (1958), 42 Minn.L.Rev. 389, 391.

Ohio law has long recognized that one of the purposes of the one-subject rule is to provide for an orderly and fair legislative process. Ohio law has not, however, lost sight of Professor Ruud's observation noted above that "* * * this is an internal institutional problem, one that could have been left to the legislative rules to treat." Accordingly, this court has, in a long line of unbroken cases, held that Section 15(D), Article II of the Ohio Constitution, or its predecessors, are directory rather than mandatory, Pim v. Nicholson, supra; Lehman v. McBride (1863), 15 Ohio St. 573; State, ex rel. Attorney General, v. Covington (1876), 29 Ohio St. 102, paragraph seven of the syllabus; Oshe v. State (1882), 37 Ohio St. 494; Ex Parte Falk (1885), 42 Ohio St. 638. As was stated in Pim, supra, at 180, "[i]t would be most mischievous in practice, to make the validity of every law depend upon the judgment of every judicial tribunal of the state as to whether an act or a bill contained more than one subject * * *. Such a question would be decided according to the mental precision and mental discipline of each justice of the peace and judge. No practical benefits could arise from such inquiries."

This court echoed these sentiments in Lehman v. McBride, supra, at 605: "[A holding that the one-subject provision is mandatory rather than directory in nature] would result in consequences truly 'alarming.' It would at least nullify many statutes which the courts and the people of the state have hitherto regarded as valid, and have governed themselves accordingly in their transactions."

There is no question that by holding that the one-subject rule is directory and not mandatory, judicial interference with legislative action is reduced. While Ohio is the only state which holds its one-subject provision to be directory rather than mandatory, ⁴ other states have achieved the laudable aim of judicial non-interference in the legislative process by holding that their one-subject constitutional provisions should be liberally construed or that they should be construed so as not to hamper the legislature or to embarrass honest legislation. ⁵ It is indeed most noteworthy that while this provision has been invoked in hundreds of cases in...