State ex rel. Doe v. Madonna, 48751
| Citation | 295 NW 2d 356 |
| Decision Date | 30 May 1980 |
| Docket Number | No. 48751,48766.,48751 |
| Parties | STATE of Minnesota ex rel. Mary DOE et al., Appellants, v. Sister Mary MADONNA, General Director, St. Mary's Hospital et al., Respondents, Honorable Melvin Peterson, Judge, Hennepin County Probate Court, Respondent. STATE of Minnesota ex rel. Jane DOE et al., Appellants, v. Frank LARKIN, General Director, Metropolitan Medical Center et al., Defendants, Honorable Melvin Peterson, Judge, Hennepin County Probate Court, Respondent. STATE of Minnesota ex rel. Douglas A. VINGE, Appellant, v. Tom MATTISON, Director, Hennepin County Medical Center et al., Respondents. |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
William F. Messinger and John W. Elwell, Minneapolis, Beverly Balos, Legal Assistance of Ramsey County, of counsel, for appellants.
Gary W. Flakne, County Atty., George H. Elwell, Peter J. Fransway, and John J. Ryan III, Minneapolis, for Honorable Peterson and Mattison.
Rebecca Moos, Minneapolis, for Sister Mary Madonna.
Warren Spannaus, Atty. Gen., Paul G. Zerby, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Alan A. Held, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., St. Paul, for State.
Dayton, Herman, Graham & Getts and James A. Payne, Minneapolis, for Mental Health Assn. in Hennepin County.
Heard, considered, and decided by the court en banc.
These cases arise out of several orders (hold orders) pursuant to Minn.St. 253A.07, subd. 3, to confine individuals pending a determination as to whether the individuals should be committed to mental institutions. The facts of the individual cases are as follows:
Mary Doe
On October 7, 1977, a petition was filed in Hennepin County Probate Court for the commitment of Mary Doe due to mental illness. On October 11, a referee in probate issued a hold order, and she was taken to a hospital. On October 13, she left the hospital, and on October 14, another hold order was issued. She was returned to the hospital on October 18, and on October 20, the court continued the matter without a hearing until November 3. On October 24, she filed in the Hennepin County District Court a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, a class action complaint for declaratory judgment, a motion for class certification, and a motion to intervene in the John Doe case.1 (The John Doe case was dismissed February 2, 1978.) At her commitment hearing on November 3, the commitment petition was dismissed, and Mary Doe was released. (Both her attorney and the opposing attorney concurred in a doctor's recommendation as to dismissal and as to her need for outpatient treatment.) Also on November 3, the juvenile court, under an emergency hold order, placed Mary Doe's children in foster care. On January 23, 1978, hospital defendants in Mary Doe's class action complaint filed a motion for dismissal of her complaint, and Mary Doe filed a motion for class certification and joinder with the Jane Doe case. On March 8, Judge Allen Oleisky denied the motions for class certification and joinder and dismissed the action. Mary Doe appeals from this decision.
On October 17, 1977, a petition was filed to commit Jane Doe as mentally ill, and a hold order was issued by the Hennepin County Probate Court. The order was signed by a referee in probate. On October 27, Jane Doe filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, a complaint for declaratory judgment, a motion for class certification, and a motion to join and intervene in the John Doe case in Hennepin County District Court. (The John Doe case was dismissed February 2, 1978.) On November 3 and 8, her commitment hearing took place in Hennepin County Probate Court. On November 8, she was released on condition that she enter a voluntary mental health program, and the hearing was continued for 60 days. On January 10, 1978, the commitment petition was dismissed in probate court.2 On January 23, Jane Doe filed a motion in her district court action for class certification and joinder with Mary Doe. On March 8, District Court Judge Allen Oleisky denied the motions of Jane Doe and dismissed the action. Jane Doe appeals from this decision.
On February 28, 1978, Douglas A. Vinge was subjected to a 72-hour emergency hospitalization in the Hennepin County Detoxification Receiving Center. On March 2, a petition for his commitment was filed, alleging him to be mentally ill and inebriate, and a hold order was issued by a referee in probate of the Hennepin County Probate Court. On March 6, Vinge filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in Minnesota Federal District Court and in Hennepin County District Court. On March 7, the Federal writ was denied due to failure to exhaust state remedies. On March 9, the district court denied his district court writ and held § 253A.07, subd. 3, constitutional. Douglas Vinge appeals from this denial.
On March 10, Douglas Vinge's commitment hearing was held in probate court. The mental illness allegation was dismissed and Vinge voluntarily entered a chemical dependency unit. On April 10, he was found not to be an inebriate by the probate court. This was conditioned on his voluntarily remaining in a chemical dependency unit.
In these appeals, appellants Jane Doe and Mary Doe contend that their actions should have been joined and certified as a class action under Rule 23, Rules of Civil Procedure; that their actions are not moot; and that § 253A.07, subd. 3, under which they were initially confined, is unconstitutional. Appellant Douglas Vinge also contends that his action is not moot and that § 253A.07, subd. 3, is unconstitutional. He also contends that the probate court referee does not have legal authority to issue hold orders. Because of our disposition of these issues, we affirm Mary Doe v. Peterson and Jane Doe v. Peterson and reverse Vinge v. Mattison. We do not find it necessary to reach other issues raised by the appellants.
Appellants Mary Doe and Jane Doe allege that they represent the class of "all persons who have been, now are, or may be apprehended, transported, admitted and/or confined to an institution or hospital as alleged mentally ill persons pursuant to § 253A.07(3)." Appellants filed a motion for certification as a class action on this basis. The motion was summarily denied by the Hennepin County District Court. Appellants contend that they meet the four class action requirements of Rule 23.01, Rules of Civil Procedure, as well as the requirement of Rule 23.02(3). Thus, they feel certification of a class action should have been granted. Respondent does not oppose appellants' contention that the case arises under Rule 23.02(3). See, Hoehle v. Likins, 538 F.2d 229, 231 (1976). Respondent argues, however, that appellants do not meet the four class action requirements of Rule 23.01: numerosity, commonality, typicality, and representativeness. Because we hold that the proposed class does not meet the requirement of representativeness, we need not consider the other requirements.
Respondents argue that not all members of the class would be in favor of this action and thus would not want the commitment procedure to be struck down. Thus, appellants would not fairly and accurately represent the interests of the class. Respondents cite Nguyen Da Yen v. Kissinger, 70 F.R.D. 656 (1976). In that case, a class action was commenced to reunite Vietnamese children in the United States with their biological parents in VietNam. The court recognized that the decision as to whether or not an individual child should be returned to VietNam was best made on an individual basis. "The individual interests of each child would, if plaintiffs' attorneys were allowed to represent all children, be dangerously `buried in the catchall of the class action.'" 70 F.R.D. 666. We believe that a similar situation exists here. We agree with respondents that a potential conflict could exist between those individuals who would be subjected to an additional traumatic court action and the representatives of the class who foster such procedures.
Appellants allege that their causes of action are not moot because:
(a) The action should have been certified as a class action, and the certification should "relate back" to prevent mootness;
(b) Appellants suffer collateral consequences resulting from the alleged denial of due process; and
(c) The actions complained of are capable of repetition, yet would evade judicial review.
(a) We have already concluded that this is not a proper case for a class action. See, I, supra. Thus, we need not consider the "relation-back" doctrine.
(b) Appellants also argue that the case is not moot due to collateral consequences which result from prehearing confinement. Respondents argue that legislative intent is to protect the rights of committed patients and prevent collateral consequences. This does not mean that collateral consequences should be ignored when they do occur, however, and thus, respondents' argument is irrelevant. Collateral consequences are presumed in a criminal case. Pollard v. United States, 352 U.S. 354, 77 S.Ct. 481, 1 L.Ed.2d 393 (1957). Some courts will presume that collateral consequences exist where commitment has occurred. See, Justin v. Jacobs, 449 F.2d 1017, 1020 (D.D.C.Cir.1971).
Though they are attacking only prehearing confinement provisions, appellants' arguments as presented in their brief depend upon the collateral consequences of an actual commitment, not merely prehearing confinement.3 But, in the present cases, only prehearing confinement has occurred. Though this is a major intrusion on the individual during the period of prehearing confinement, once release has occurred the possibility of collateral consequences may be minimal. Thus, we conclude that actual evidence of collateral consequences must be shown.
As to actual proof of collateral consequences resulting from the prehearing commitments, appellants offer no evidence concerning Jane Doe or Douglas Vinge. Mary Doe, however, was immediately served with a warrant, alleging negligence in the...
To continue reading
Request your trial