State ex rel. Duluth Diamond Drilling Company v. District Court of St. Louis County
| Decision Date | 28 May 1915 |
| Docket Number | 19,157 - (103) |
| Parties | STATE ex rel. DULUTH DIAMOND DRILLING COMPANY v. DISTRICT COURT OF ST. LOUIS COUNTY |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Upon the relation of the Duluth Diamond Drilling Co. this court granted a writ of certiorari to review the proceedings in the district court for St. Louis county, Hughes, J., in an action by Emil Clemets, employee against relator employer. Judgment modified.
Workmen's Compensation Act -- hearings.
1. Hearings under the Workmen's Compensation Act are to be held at the time and place fixed by the judge, regardless of the time and place of holding the regular terms of court.
Workmen's Compensation Act -- notice of accident.
2. Where the employer has actual knowledge of the happening of the accident and of the resulting injury, the giving of notice thereof is not necessary.
Workmen's Compensation Act -- jurisdiction of court.
3. The court has jurisdiction of all proceedings arising under the act, and the making of a demand upon the employer for compensation is not a condition precedent to the power of the court to entertain such proceedings
Finding not supported by evidence.
4. The finding that the claimant was totally disabled at the time of the hearing is not sustained by the evidence.
Statutory costs -- attorney's fee.
5. The allowance of attorney's fees is not authorized by the act, but the court may allow statutory costs although designated in the order as attorney's fees.
Abbott MacPherran, Lewis & Gilbert, for employer relator.
Victor L. Power and M. H. Crocker, for employee respondent.
Emil Clemets was injured on March 2, 1914, while at work for the relator near Hibbing in St. Louis county. On March 24, 1914, he made an application to a judge of the district court for compensation for the injury under the Workmen's Compensation Act; and, on the same day, the judge made an order fixing May 2, 1914, at Hibbing, as the time and place for the hearing thereon. Relator is a corporation having its principal office and place of business at Duluth in St. Louis county, and on that ground demanded that the place of hearing be changed from Hibbing to Duluth. This demand was denied. Relator admitted that it had full knowledge of the injury, and also that Clemets was entitled to compensation; but insisted that the action should be dismissed on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction, that there was no controversy between the parties, and that the action was prematurely brought. The parties submitted their evidence, and the court rendered judgment awarding compensation to Clemets. Thereafter relator brought the matter before this court by certiorari.
1. Relator contends that the court erred in refusing to change the place of hearing from Hibbing to Duluth. Duluth is the county seat of St. Louis county, but the statute provides that both general and special terms of the district court shall also be held at Hibbing. G.S. 1913, §§ 176, 177. The statute further provides that civil actions brought in the district court of that county, against residents of that county, shall be tried at the place of holding regular terms of court which is nearest the residence of the defendant; that the place where its principal office is located shall be deemed the residence of a corporation for the purpose of the statute; and that the defendant may have the place of trial changed to the place of holding court which is nearest his residence, if a different place has been designated by the plaintiff. G.S. 1913, §§ 183, 184. Relator insists that, by virtue of these statutes, it had the absolute right to have the place of hearing changed to Duluth which is the county seat and its place of residence. We cannot assent to this proposition. The statutes referred to provide for holding the regular terms of court, and for determining the place of trial of ordinary civil actions triable at such terms. The Workmen's Compensation Act contemplates that applications thereunder shall not wait for trial until they can be brought before the court at a regular term thereof, but shall be heard and decided summarily by the judge, regardless of such regular terms. This act provides that either party may present a verified complaint to the judge, and that, thereupon, he "shall fix by order a time and place for the hearing thereof," and, at the time so fixed, "shall hear such witnesses as may be presented by each party, and in a summary manner decide the merits of the controversy." Proceedings under this act are governed by the provisions contained in the act itself, and not by the general provisions cited by the relator, and the ruling of the learned trial judge was correct.
2. Relator contends that an injured employee cannot apply to the court for compensation unless he has previously made a demand therefor upon his employer; that the making of such demand is a jurisdictional prerequisite to his right to invoke the aid of the court. The statute provides for giving notice of the injury to the employer, unless he has actual knowledge thereof; but, if he has such actual knowledge, the giving of the notice is not necessary. G.S. 1913, § 8213. It further provides that "the interested parties shall have the right to settle all matters of compensation between themselves," but requires such settlements to be substantially in accordance with the provisions of the act and to be "approved by a judge of the district court." It further provides that "in case of a dispute over, or failure to agree upon a claim for compensation * * * either party may submit the claim * * * to the judge of the district court * * * which judge is hereby authorized to hear and determine such disputes in a summary manner." G.S. 1913, § 8216. Other provisions regulate the method of procedure.
Relator admits having full knowledge of the injury, and consequently formal notice thereof was unnecessary. The statute suggests that the parties make an attempt to agree upon terms of settlement before taking the matter into court, and it...
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