State ex rel. Early v. Wunderlich

• Decision Date: 02 January 1920
• Docket Number: 21,487
• Citation: 175 N.W. 677,144 Minn. 368
• Parties: STATE EX REL. FLORENCE E. EARLY v. ALBERT WUNDERLICH, AS COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY OF ST. PAUL, AND ANOTHER
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

175 N.W. 677

144 Minn. 368

STATE EX REL. FLORENCE E. EARLY v. ALBERT WUNDERLICH, AS COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY OF ST. PAUL, AND ANOTHER

No. 21,487

Supreme Court of Minnesota

January 2, 1920

Upon the application of relator the district court for Ramsey county granted its writ of alternative mandamus directing the commissioner of education of the city of St. Paul to reinstate relator in her position as teacher in the public schools of that city and to place relator's name upon the payroll of the city, or show cause why he had not done so. Respondents separately demurred to the petition and writ on the ground that they did not state facts sufficient to entitle relator to the relief demanded. From an order, Haupt J., sustaining demurrers to the alternative writ of mandamus plaintiff appealed. Affirmed.

SYLLABUS

Municipal corporation -- appointment to and removal from office.

1. A municipal body or official, having power to appoint an officer or subordinate, has power to remove such appointee in the absence of any law restricting that power.

Municipal corporation -- when removal must be for cause -- hearing.

2. Where an appointee can be removed only for cause, he is entitled to a hearing and an opportunity to refute the charges against him, unless the law prescribes a different procedure for making such removals.

Municipal corporation -- when procedure for removal is specified by law.

3. Where the law authorizes an officer to remove an appointee, if in his judgment a cause for such removal exists, and prescribes the procedure which he shall follow in making the removal, the only questions open to examination by the courts are whether the prescribed procedure has been followed, and whether the reasons assigned for the removal are sufficient to justify it.

Municipal corporation -- procedure named in city charter.

4. The charter having prescribed the procedure for making removals without providing for a trial, relator was not entitled to a trial.

Mandamus will not lie to reverse decision of officer empowered to remove.

5. While mandamus will lie to reinstate an appointee removed in violation of law, it will not lie to reverse the decision of an officer empowered by law to determine as a matter of fact whether cause for removal existed.

Decision of commissioner of education not reviewable by mandamus.

6. The commissioner of education, having removed the relator in the exercise of the power vested in him by the charter, and having followed the procedure prescribed by the charter for making such removals, and the reasons assigned for the removal being sufficient to justify it, his decision cannot be reviewed by mandamus.

J. P. Kyle, for appellant.

O. H. O'Neill and W. J. Giberson, for respondents.

OPINION

TAYLOR, C.

The relator appeals from an order sustaining a demurrer to her petition for a writ of mandamus and to the alternative writ issued thereon by which she sought to compel the defendants to reinstate her as a teacher in the public schools of the city of St. Paul.

Prior to the year 1914, the schools of the city were controlled by a board of school inspectors which had the power to remove teachers at will. In 1914 the present charter establishing a commission form of government went into effect. The present charter vests the control of the schools in the commissioner of education, subject to the supervisory power of the council, and provides for the appointment of a superintendent of schools and further provides:

"On nomination by said superintendent said commissioner of education shall appoint all assistants to said superintendent, all office assistants to said superintendent, all principals and all teachers in the public schools, all of whom shall be subject to removal by said commissioner on his own motion or on the complaint of said superintendent, by the mayor, or by a two-thirds vote of the members elected to the council, provided that, however removed, the officer making the removal shall state specific reasons therefor in writing, and the person removed shall have an opportunity to reply in writing, and both reasons and reply shall become permanent public records of the office of the commissioner of education. All teachers and supervisors and assistants to the superintendent other than office assistants doing clerical work shall meet the qualifications required by the state of Minnesota for teachers of like grades in other public schools. It is the intent of this charter that, unless removed for cause as above stated, teachers and assistants once appointed shall serve during efficiency and good behavior. The council may provide for probationary appointment previous to regular appointment, during which time the teachers or supervisor or assistant shall be subject to removal at the pleasure of the commissioner of education."

The relator had been a teacher in the St. Paul schools for six years. On May 23, 1918, the commissioner of education wrote her that he did not feel that he could approve her reappointment for another year, as the advisory staff had reported her work as "not efficient and not of the quality to which the school children of St. Paul are entitled," and that he gave her this advance notice in order that she might voluntarily resign before the appointments for the next year were given out. Relator did not resign, and on June 18, 1918, the commissioner of education preferred formal charges against her to which, on June 28, she made a lengthy reply, in which she asserted that the charges had no foundation in fact. On August 29, 1918, the commissioner informed her that her answer to the specific charges was not satisfactory and that he could not reappoint her to a position in the St. Paul schools.

We deem it unnecessary to discuss the charges preferred further than to say that we are of the opinion that, if true, they were sufficient to justify the action of the commissioner.

It is the general rule that a municipal body or official having the power to appoint an officer or subordinate also has the power to remove the appointee at pleasure in the absence of any law restricting the power of removal. Where the law provides that removals shall be made only for cause, the arbitrary power to remove at pleasure is taken away, and before the appointee can be removed the body or official vested with the power of removal must determine, in the manner prescribed by law, that a cause which the law recognizes as a sufficient ground therefor exists.

The relator cites numerous authorities in support of the proposition that where the law provides that an appointee shall hold his position during efficiency and good behavior, or that he shall be removed only for cause, he is entitled to a trial and an opportunity to controvert the evidence against him, and cannot be removed until he has been accorded that right. This is a well established general rule, but does not apply where the law points out a different procedure. The manner of making such removals is wholly within the control of the legislature, and when the law which gives the power to remove provides by whom and in what manner that power shall be exercised, the only question open to examination by the courts is whether the statutory requirements have been complied with. Here the commissioner of education had the power to remove; the charges were sufficient in law to justify exercising the power, and the procedure followed was that prescribed by the charter.

The relator asserted in her answer that she had not been derelict in any of the respects alleged, and contends that under the charter provision quoted she was entitled to a trial and an opportunity to controvert the evidence adduced in support of the charges.

The provisions of this same charter in respect to the removal of policemen were under consideration in State v. McColl, 127 Minn. 155, 149 N.W. 11, and the court said:

"New York has for many years had a statute containing similar provisions for removal of subordinate municipal officers and employees. It was early held that, while these provisions gave no right to a formal trial, they were intended as a substantial limitation of the general power of removal, and that under these provisions removals can be made only for cause and the process for removal prescribed by statute must be pursued. The cause must be some delinquency or incapacity touching the fitness and the qualification of the...