State ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 35488

Decision Date18 June 1958
Docket NumberNo. 35488,35488
Citation168 Ohio St. 123,151 N.E.2d 523
Parties, 5 O.O.2d 377 The STATE ex rel. EATON, Appellant, v. PRICE, Chief of Police, Appellee.
CourtOhio Supreme Court

Syllabus by the Court

1. Under the authority granted by Sections 715.26 and 715.29, Revised Code, a municipal corporation may 'provide for the inspection of buildings or other structures and for the removal and repair of insecured buildings,' and 'regulate by ordinance the use, control, repair, and maintenance of buildings used for human occupancy or habitation,' and 'compel the owners of such buildings to alter, reconstruct, or modify them * * * for the purpose of insuring the healthful, safe, and sanitary environment of the occupants thereof,' and 'prohibit the use and occupancy of such buildings until such rules, regulations, and provisions have been complied with.'

2. An ordinance establishing minimum standards 'governing utilities, facilities and other physical things and conditions essential to make dwellings safe, sanitary and fit for human habitation,' and 'governing the conditions and maintenance of dwellings,' and containing a provision which authorizes a housing inspector to make inspections of 'dwellings, dwelling units, rooming houses, rooming units and premises located within the city' and which also authorizes such inspector 'upon showing appropriate identification * * * to enter, examine and survey at any reasonable hour all dwellings' and which requires that the 'owner or occupant of every dwelling' shall give such inspector 'free access to such dwelling * * * at any reasonable hour for the purpose of such inspection, examination and survey,' with penalties of fine or imprisonment or both for violation of such provision, is not violative of Section 14 of Article I of the Ohio Constitution prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures.

On March 20, 1957, one Earl Taylor was served by a police officer with an instrument, captioned 'Affidavit and Warrant,' issued out of the Dayton Municipal Court. The affidavit, sworn to and signed by one George Cooper on March 19, states that 'on or about the 12 day of March A.D. 1957 * * * Early Taylor being the owner of premises located at 130 Henry Street, did unlawfully refuse to permit a duly authorized agent of the Division of Housing Inspection of the City of Dayton, to enter and survey the said premises for the purposes of repairs or alteration as are necessary to comply with the provisions of minimum housing standards contrary to the form of the ordinances to wit: Section 806.30 of Dayton, Ohio * * *.'

It appears from the record that Taylor had previously received a notice from the office of the Prosecutor in the criminal division of the Dayton Municipal Court, dated March 12, notifying him to appear at that office on March 19, 1957, to answer a complaint made against him for refusing entry for housing inspection, to which notice Taylor did not respond.

When served with the affidavit and warrant he was not physically placed under arrest but was ordered to appear in Municipal Court on March 26. On that day he appeared in court, entered a plea of not guilty and, bond having been fixed in the sum of $1,000, was placed in the city jail. Late in the afternoon of the same day a writ of habeas corpus was sought in the Common Pleas Court of Montgomery County against the Chief of Police of Dayton on the application of Arthur T. Eaton to produce the body of Taylor, at which time he was released on his own recognizance by order of the court, and the matter was set for hearing on April 8.

Following the hearing, the writ was allowed on May 26, 1957, and Taylor was discharged from custody, the court finding in its entry that 'Section 806.30 of the Code of General Ordinances of the City of Dayton, Ohio, being ordinance No. 18099 * * * is unconstitutional as it applies to the facts in this case as violative of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution of the state of Ohio.'

An appeal on questions of law was taken by the City Attorney of Dayton, representing the Chief of Police, from the judgment of the Common Pleas Court to the Court of Appeals, which court, with one judge dissenting, reversed the judgment of the trial court and remanded the cause.

It is now before this court on an appeal as of right and upon the allowance of a motion to certify. Further facts as required are stated in the opinion.

Arthur T. Eaton, Dayton, for appellant.

Herbert S. Beane, City Atty., Dayton, Maurice J. Gilbert and Joseph P. Duffy, Dayton, for appellee.

HERBERT, Judge.

In the case of State ex rel. Smilack v. Bushong, 93 Ohio App. 201, 112 N.E.2d 675, 677, affirmed by this court in 159 Ohio St. 259, 111 N.E.2d 928, Guernsey, J., stated at the outset of the opinion:

'The cause is incorrectly captioned as it is not brought upon the relation of the state of Ohio and should be captioned 'In the Matter of the Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus by Oscar Smilack."

Although not pertinent to the issue here, we certainly approve of the principle embodied in the foregoing quoted statement. The incorrectness of the caption in the Smilack case is further compounded here in that Taylor's attorney, Eaton, is designated as relator. However, reference hereinafter to the relator will be intended to mean Taylor and not Eaton.

Condensing the assignments of error, relator contends that Section 806-30 of the Code of General Ordinances of the City of Dayton, being a part of ordinance No. 18099, is violative of the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States and of Section 14 of Article I of the Ohio Constitution. The question of whether this ordinance--or, for that matter, any statute of the state of Ohio--is violative of the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States is settled and disposed of in the first paragraph of the syllabus in the case of State v. Lindway, 131 Ohio St. 166, 2 N.E.2d 490, 491, which states:

'1. The Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures and compulsory self-incrimination, are directed exclusively against the activities of the federal government and have no application to the various states and their agencies.'

Section 14 of Article I of the Ohio Constitution is almost the same verbatim as the federal constitutional provision and states:

'The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and possessions, against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person and things to be seized.' Section 806-30, which the relator is charged with violating, provides in part:

'The Housing Inspector is hereby authorized and directed to make inspections to determine the condition of dwellings, dwelling units, rooming houses, rooming units and premises located within the city of Dayton in order that he may perform his duty of safeguarding the health and safety of the occupants of dwellings and of the general public. For the purpose of making such inspections and upon showing appropriate identification the Housing Inspector is hereby authorized to enter, examine and survey at any reasonable hour all dwellings, dwelling units, rooming houses, rooming units, and premises. The owner or occupant of every dwelling, dwelling unit, rooming house, and rooming unit or the person in charge thereof, shall give the Housing Inspector free access to such dwelling, dwelling unit, rooming house or rooming unit and its premises at any reasonable hour for the purpose of such inspection, examination and survey.'

Section 806-83 fixes a penalty of a fine of not more than 200 dollars or imprisonment for not more than 30 days, or both, for the violation of any provision of ordinance No. 18099. This ordinance, of which these sections are a part, was passed in November 1954. The caption states:

'An ordinance establishing minimum standards governing utilities, facilities and other physical things and conditions essential to make dwellings safe, sanitary and fit for human habitation; establishing minimum standards governing the conditions and maintenance of dwellings * * *; fixing certain responsibilities and duties of owners, operators and occupants of dwellings * * *; establishing a Bureau of Housing Inspection and Slum Prevention in the Division of Building Inspection and establishing a Housing Appeals Board; fixing the powers and duties of the Housing Inspector for administration and enforcement of the ordinance * * *; authorizing the inspection of dwellings, the rehabilitation of dwellings and the vacation and removal of dwellings unfit for human habitation; and providing penalties.' The preamble states:

'Whereas, in the city of Dayton there are dwellings and rooming houses which are so dilapidated, unsafe, dangerous, unhygienic or insanitary as to constitute a hazard and menace to the health, safety, morals and welfare of the residents of such dwellings and rooming houses as well as of the people of the city of Dayton * * *.'

By the ordinance, Sections 806-27 to 806-83, both inclusive, were added to the Code of General Ordinances of the City of Dayton. In Section 806-28 the Bureau of Housing Inspection and Slum Prevention in the Division of Building Inspection was created under the supervision of a Chief Housing Inspector.

Section 806-31 provides:

'Whenever the Housing Inspector determines that there has been a violation of any provision of this ordinance he shall give notice of such violation to the person or persons responsible therefor and order compliance with the ordinance, as hereinafter provided. Such notice and order shall:

'(a) Be put in writing on an appropriate form;

'(b) Include a list of violations, refer to the section or sections of the...

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