State ex rel. Edmisten v. Tucker

• Decision Date: 04 December 1984
• Docket Number: No. 453PA84,453PA84
• Citation: 323 S.E.2d 294,312 N.C. 326
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE of North Carolina, ex rel. Rufus L. EDMISTEN, Attorney General v. The Honorable Elton G. TUCKER, District Court Judge for the Fifth Judicial District et al.

Page 294

323 S.E.2d 294

312 N.C. 326

STATE of North Carolina, ex rel. Rufus L. EDMISTEN, Attorney General v. The Honorable Elton G. TUCKER, District Court Judge for the Fifth Judicial District et al.

No. 453PA84.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

Dec. 4, 1984.

Rufus L. Edmisten, Atty. Gen. by Isaac T. Avery, III, Sp. Deputy Atty. Gen., and David Roy Blackwell and W. Dale Talbert, Asst. Attys. Gen., Raleigh, for the State.

Tharrington, Smith & Hargrove by Wade M. Smith, Roger W. Smith, and Douglas E. Kingsberry, Raleigh, for defendant-Judges Philip O. Redwine, George R. Greene, Narley L. Cashwell and Lewis Bulwinkle.

Harris, Bumgardner & Carpenter by James R. Carpenter and R. Dennis Lorance, Gastonia, for defendant John Bernard Howren, Jr.

Lucas, Brown & Lock by Thomas H. Lock, Selma, for defendant Anthony Wayne Rose.

Van Camp, Gill & Crumpler by William B. Crumpler, Raleigh, for defendants Stephen J. Hartwig, Willie A. Johnson, Dannie Lin Tew, and Gary Raymond Henry.

Hafer, Hall & Schiller by Kyle S. Hall, Raleigh, for defendant David Adcock Powell.

Merriman, Nicholls, Crampton, Dombalis & Aldridge, P.A. by Nicholas J. Dombalis, II, Raleigh, for defendant Maxie Thomas Coker. ^*

MEYER, Justice.

This unprecedented civil action poses many novel and interesting questions concerning the operation of the Declaratory Judgment Act, G.S. § 1-253 et seq. and the process of constitutional adjudication. The narrow legal issues presented by the State's appeal concern whether the complaint alleged a controversy justiciable under the Declaratory Judgment Act and whether the trial court was without jurisdiction to issue the writs of mandamus or prohibition to the judicial defendants. ¹ We hold that the State's complaint was properly dismissed and the petition properly denied. A brief summary of the events leading up to this appeal will precede the examination of the jurisdictional and jurisprudential issues raised.

I.

The present action arose out of the Attorney General's attempt to secure an expedited and conclusive judicial determination of the constitutionality of the Safe Roads Act of 1983. The Act represents a comprehensive and unified approach to the problem of the drunken driver on North Carolina roadways. Its provisions fundamentally altered the substantive and procedural law The Safe Roads Act carried an effective date of 1 October 1983. Since that time, various defendants across the state have raised numerous questions concerning the Act's application and the constitutional validity of many of its provisions. These challenges initially arose in the district courts as a part of the criminal prosecutions for "driving while impaired" or in review proceedings following civil license revocations. As is customary, individual district court judges ruled upon the legal issues raised by individual defendants on a case-by-case basis. Case-by-case adjudication of challenges to the Safe Roads Act brought the not surprising result of conflicting judicial interpretation of the Act's various provisions. Particular judges found portions of the Act constitutionally infirm, whereas other judges upheld the identical provisions as constitutionally sound. While these cases made their way through the various stages of appeal to the superior court for trial de novo and then for further appellate review, the district courts in several of the state's most congested districts built huge backlogs of unadjudicated "driving while impaired" cases. In addition, the conflicting interpretations of the Act's validity from district to district led to different treatment for defendants charged with identical offenses under the Act.

concerning drunken driving, including the elements of the criminal offense; pre and post-arrest chemical and psycho-motor testing; trial and sentencing procedures, including evidentiary rules; and civil as well as criminal penalties. In short, the Act altered long standing trial practices in the district and superior courts.

Concern on the part of the Attorney General about the prospect of a long period of uneven enforcement of the Act's provisions while the various individual cases progressed through the superior and appellate courts prompted a comprehensive review of the issues raised in the Safe Roads Act challenges. Based upon this review, the Attorney General chose to consolidate the various individual challenges to, and judicial rulings on, the main driving while impaired provisions of the Safe Roads Act and to present them for expedited judicial resolution in a single civil lawsuit.

Citing a massive backlog of pending driving while impaired cases in the district courts, limited statutory authority on the part of the State to appeal from adverse rulings in the district courts, and the lengthy, time-consuming process that would normally be afforded the State for resolution of these issues on a case by case basis in the appellate division, the Attorney General, on behalf of the State of North Carolina, filed this declaratory judgment action and, in the alternative, petition for writ of mandamus or prohibition. The action requested a declaratory judgment as to those issues repeatedly raised concerning the constitutionality and application of the Safe Roads Act. ² Named as party defendant-respondents were those judges who had declared portions of the Act unconstitutional or construed its provisions in a manner adverse to the State. The complaint further named as defendants those individual defendants in whose cases the district court judges had so ruled.

Jurisdiction as to the individual and judicial defendants is alleged in the following manner:

III GENERAL ALLEGATIONS

C. The judicial defendants named herein have all at one time or another ruled certain provisions of the Safe Roads Act to be unconstitutional or otherwise have construed the statute contrary to the intent of the General Assembly. Likewise, the individual defendants named herein have raised constitutional challenges to the Safe Roads Act at one point or another or have alleged certain provisions of the Safe Roads Act denied them constitutional rights. They have at one point or another sought to declare the statute unconstitutional or in the alternative to have the charges against them dismissed.

D. All the defendants, by rulings or motions, have taken a position adverse to that of the State. There is a real, substantial and actual controversary [sic] between the parties.

E. The issues raised by the allegations herein are continually raised in the superior and district court divisions of the General Court of Justice. Upon information and belief, the State alleges that these issues will continue to arise and will impede the orderly and efficient administration of justice absent a prompt and definitive ruling.

F. The defendants and judges named herein all have an interest in the resolution of these questions.

G. The State of North Carolina has an interest in swift and orderly administration of justice and in the uniform application of the law throughout the State. The State has a compelling interest and a constitutionally mandated duty to enforce the criminal laws of the State that are designed to protect citizens of the State from the operation of vehicles by persons impaired by an impairing substance. The resolution of these questions is necessary for the State to fulfill its obligations.

The complaint contains a section of "SPECIFIC ALLEGATIONS" which details the various challenges to the Safe Roads Act and judicial rulings entered thereon in the individual cases in the district and superior courts. The statutory provisions, criminal defendant (or civil plaintiff), presiding judge and judicial ruling in the cases ³ alleged in this section of the complaint may be summarized as follows:

"1. N.C.G.S. § 15A-534.2. Detention of impaired drivers. (Persons who are arrested for DWI, who are intoxicated, and pose a danger to themselves may be held for up to 24 hours).

"Held: Unconstitutional as it affects the defendant's right of access to counsel.

"Cases: A. State v. Willie A. Johnson, (Wake County, 84CR5312). B. State v. Stephen J. Hartwig, (Wake County, 83CR83444). C. State v. Dannie Lin Tew, (Wake County, 84CR15166).

"Judge: Narley L. Cashwell.

"2. N.C.G.S. § 20-16.2(a)(6). Implied consent to chemical analysis; mandatory revocation of license in event of refusal; right of driver to request analysis. (Thirty-minute time limit in which to call an attorney or witness prior to chemical testing procedure).

"Held: Unconstitutional as it fails to afford the defendant effective assistance of counsel, and denies the defendant his right of access to counsel.

"Case: State v. John Bernard Howren, Jr., (Gaston County, 83CR23635).

"Judge: Lewis Bulwinkle.

"3. N.C.G.S. § 20-16.5. Immediate civil license revocation for certain persons charged with implied-consent offenses. (Immediate ten-day pretrial license revocation authorized when an individual charged with DWI has an alcohol concentration of 0.10 or more or where he refuses to submit to chemical analysis).

"Held: Constitutional in three revocation proceedings. Statutory revocation provision then challenged by either direct appeal and/or filing of separate civil action by affected defendants.

"Defendants: A. Ernest Bradley Williams, (Davie County, 83CVR4048 and 83CVS295). (Challenge subsequently withdrawn by defendant). B. Gary Raymond Henry, (Wake County, 83CVRS88527 and 84CVS2347). C. Lawrence Wilson Crow, (Mecklenburg County, 83CVR67347) and ( Crow v. State of North Carolina, C-C-83-0809-P) (W.D.N.C.).

"4. N.C.G.S. § 20-138.1(a). Impaired driving. Proof of offense either under a theory of impairment as found in subsection (a)(1), driving "while under the influence of an impairing substance," or the theory of the 0.10 per se offense as found in subsection (a)(2), driving ("after having consumed sufficient alcohol that he has, at any relevant time after the driving, an...