State ex rel. Electric Household Stores v. Hostetter

• Decision Date: 18 December 1935
• Docket Number: 34144
• Parties: State of Missouri at the Relation of Electric Household Stores, Inc., Doing Business as Thor Electric Shops, Relator, v. Jefferson D. Hostetter, William Dee Becker and Edward J. McCullen, Judges of the St. Louis Court of Appeals
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

89 S.W.2d 28

338 Mo. 79

State of Missouri at the Relation of Electric Household Stores, Inc., Doing Business as Thor Electric Shops, Relator, v. Jefferson D. Hostetter, William Dee Becker and Edward J. McCullen, Judges of the St. Louis Court of Appeals

No. 34144

Supreme Court of Missouri

December 18, 1935

Writ quashed.

Louis Lowell Hicks and Vogel & Field for relator.

(1) The statement filed in the justice court is fatally defective in that it contains no allegation of facts showing circumstances creating an obligation on the part of relator to furnish medical services to Richard R. Callahan, and fails to allege a promise to pay on the part of relator. It is a general rule that a person requesting a physician or surgeon to render services to another is not liable for the payment of services in the absence of a showing that the person requesting the professional services is bound to furnish such services to the third person and the opinion of the St. Louis Court of Appeals that the statement filed was sufficient, is in conflict with the last controlling decisions of this court in the following cases: Hill v. St. Louis Ore & Steel Co., 90 Mo. 103; Hunicke v. Meramec Quarry Co., 262 Mo. 560. (2) The statement filed in the justice court was not itemized and did not state the nature of the professional services rendered and was not sufficiently definite to advise relator of the nature and details of the cause of action or to bar another suit on the same transaction and the opinion of the St. Louis Court of Appeals that the statement was sufficient is in conflict with Sections 2185, 2186, Revised Statutes 1929, and the last controlling decisions of this court in the following cases: Hill v. St. Louis Ore & Steel Co., 90 Mo. 103; Butts v. Phelps, 79 Mo 302. (3) An ordinary commercial corporation, unless expressly authorized to do so by its charter, has no power to use its funds or to incur obligations for the treatment of employees for sickness or injury not incurred in the line of duty of the employee or under circumstances creating no liability on the part of the corporation and the ruling of the St. Louis Court of Appeals that an ordinary commercial corporation has such implied power is contrary to the last controlling decisions of this court in the following cases: Natl City Bank v. Carleton Dry Goods Co., 67 S.W.2d 69; Millinery Co. v. Trust Co., 251 Mo. 570; Fidelity Natl. Bank v. Dry Goods Co., 293 Mo. 194. (4) The general managing officers of an ordinary commercial corporation have no implied power to employ a physician to treat an employee for sickness or injury not incurred in the line of duty of the employee and under circumstances creating no liability on the part of the corporation and the ruling of the St. Louis Court of Appeals to the effect that the general managing officers of an ordinary commercial corporation have such implied power is in conflict with the last controlling decisions of the Supreme Court. Tucker v. Ry. Co., 54 Mo. 177; Mayberry v. Railroad Co., 75 Mo. 492; Brown v. Ry. Co., 67 Mo. 122.

Foristel Mudd, Blair & Habenicht for respondents.

(1) The statement filed in the justice court was sufficient to give the court jurisdiction and is sufficient as against the attack as here made upon it. Quinn v. Stout, 31 Mo 160; Lustig v. Cohen, 44 Mo.App. 271; Meyers v. Realty Co., 96 Mo.App. 625; Shortridge v. Raifferson, 204 Mo.App. 166; Norton v. Allen, 4 S.W.2d 841; Witting v. Ry. Co., 101 Mo. 631; Rundelman v. Boiler Wks. Co., 178 Mo.App. 642; Elwood v. Construction Co., 183 Mo.App. 289. (2) Dorband, as general manager, under the circumstances shown in the opinion, had authority by virtue of his office, to employ plaintiff and bind the defendant to pay for his services. 3 Thompson on Corporations (3 Ed.), secs. 1691-2; Monsanto Chemical Works v. Lead & Smelter Co., 253 S.W. 1011; Robinson v. Mining Co., 178 Mo.App. 539; Crossley v. Lumber Co., 187 S.W. 113; Hasler v. Land & Lumber Co., 101 Mo.App. 136; Reynolds v. Railroad Co., 114 Mo.App. 670; Newberry v. Construction Co., 180 Mo.App. 672; Weinsberg v. Cordage Co., 135 Mo.App. 553; Osmer v. Brokerage Co., 155 Mo.App. 211; Freeman v. Baking Co., 126 Mo.App. 124; Ghio v. Mercantile Co., 180 Mo.App. 686; Greensfelder v. Hardware Co., 189 Mo.App. 516. (3) If respondent furnished medical service at the request and promise to pay of Dorband, as general manager of defendant, relying upon the authority implied from his office as general manager, he was not bound by any limitation of Dorband's authority, if any, contained in the charter or resolution of the board of directors of the company. 2 Thompson on Corporations, sec. 1156; Ten Broek v. Boiler Co., 20 Mo.App. 19; Rosenbaum v. Gillian, 101 Mo.App. 126; Crossley v. Lumber Co., 187 S.W. 113; Reynolds v. Ry. Co., 114 Mo.App. 675.

OPINION

Hays, J.

Certiorari to the St. Louis Court of Appeals, bringing up the record in the case of Cameron v. Electric Household Stores, Inc., doing business as Thor Electric Shops. In due course that case reached the circuit court on appeal, where upon a trial plaintiff recovered a verdict and judgment for $ 300. This judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

Dr. Solomon Cameron, a physician, sued the defendant corporation for professional services. The statement filed with the justice of the peace alleged that "the defendant is indebted to the plaintiff for professional services rendered Richard B. Callahan at the special request of defendant between the dates of February 3 and April 5, 1930," in the sum of $ 450; alleged also plaintiff's demand made for payment and defendant's refusal and failure to pay, and prayed judgment.

In the trial in the circuit court the defendant's instruction in the nature of a demurrer to the evidence, offered at the close of the case, was refused. The Court of Appeals in its review of the record below affirmed the judgment, and such decision is claimed by the defendant to be in conflict with the latest controlling decisions of our court.

The first claimed conflict is in respect of the Court of Appeals' holding that said statement contained sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action. Our cases of Hill v. St. Louis Ore & Steel Co., 90 Mo. 103, 2 S.W. 289; Butts v. Phelps, 79 Mo. 302, and Hunicke v. Meramec Quarry Co., 262 Mo. l. c. 576, 172 S.W. 43, are cited in support of this claim. These cases applied the fundamental rule that "statements before justices of the peace must advise the opposite party of the nature of the claim and be sufficiently specific to bar another action." In the Butts case the statement was as follows:

"Plaintiff states that defendant is indebted to him in the sum of $ 50.00 lawful currency, for which he asks judgment."

In the Hill case the statement was in the form of an account, alleging that the defendant was indebted to plaintiff for boarding certain designated persons, in varying sums. The disparity between those statements and the one at hand is too obvious to require comment. The essential difference is that the one in this case contains an allegation that the services were rendered "at the special request of the defendant," whereas the others did not. The necessity of an allegation that the services were rendered at defendant's request may be illustrated by the petition which was under consideration in Wells v. Pacific Railroad, 35 Mo. 164, and which alleged, "that one William Miller, and two other persons who were then employed as agents and servants of defendant, were injured by collision on the road of defendant, and plaintiffs were called upon as physicians by the agent of said company to attend to said employees so injured; that, at the instance and request of the agent of defendant, plaintiffs rendered their services as physicians to said persons injured and for which plaintiffs say that defendant owes them." In reversing and remanding the case our court said: "The petition is defective in that it does not allege any promise by the defendant, or any fact from which the law would imply a promise. The allegation that the services were rendered at the instance and request of the agent of the defendant, is not an averment that they were rendered at the instance and request of the defendant itself. The defendant was not liable for the personal expenses of its servants or employees, unless such liability was assumed by contract; and if such contract shall have been made by a supposed agent of the defendant, the authority (special or general) of the agent must be proved as in any other case." Both the petition in that case and the one in the present case were substantially in the form of a common-law declaration on quantum meruit, one of the common counts in assumpsit; and in such an action the promise of the defendant is by the law implied from the request. In the case at bar there was an express contract -- and express contracts are admissible in evidence in quantum meruit actions -- shown to have been made by the relator's general manager and vice-president. That case originated in the circuit court, wherein pleadings are more strictly construed than in justices' courts. As is stated in Iba v. Railroad, 45 Mo. 469, the latter "are popular tribunals, before which ordinary disputes can be adjusted without the aid of attorneys; and it would defeat the end of their organization if the rules of practice and pleading found necessary in courts of record were applied to their proceedings." [See, also, Walton v. Carlisle, 313 Mo. l. c. 279, 281 S.W. 402.] We are of the opinion that the allegations contained in the statement now under review would ordinarily be sufficient as between individuals in a quantum meruit action.

However it is said in Hunicke v. Meramec Quarry Co., supra, that "When a person requests a...