State ex rel. Evans v. Kozer

• Decision Date: 05 January 1926
• Parties: STATE EX REL. EVANS ET AL. v. KOZER, SECRETARY OF STATE.
• Court: Oregon Supreme Court

242 P. 621

116 Or. 581

STATE EX REL. EVANS ET AL. v. KOZER, SECRETARY OF STATE.

Supreme Court of Oregon

January 5, 1926

Department 2.

Original mandamus by the State, on the relation of Clyde Evans and others, against Sam. A. Kozer, Secretary of State. Demurrer to alternative writ sustained, and cause dismissed.

Robert R. Rankin, of Portland (Chas. R. Spackman Jr., of Portland, on the brief), for plaintiffs.

Willis S. Moore, Asst. Atty. Gen. ( I H. Van Winkle, Atty. Gen., on the brief), for defendant.

BELT, J.

This is an original proceeding in mandamus to compel the secretary of state to issue licenses for the operation of certain commercial motor vehicles for the year 1926. The single question involved is the constitutionality of that part of section 1, c. 363, General Laws of Oregon for 1925, which provides as follows:

"Motor vehicles, not common carriers under the laws of this state, and used for commercial purposes in the business of selling and/or delivering goods, wares, merchandise materials, or any article of commerce not exclusively within the boundaries of incorporated cities or towns of the state of Oregon or within five miles beyond the boundaries of such cities or towns, and if the principal place of business of the owner or operator of such vehicle is not within the boundaries of an incorporated city or town, then within five miles of such principal place of business, shall pay, in addition to the fees now provided by law, an annual license fee equal to 50 per cent. of the license fee hereinabove provided according to the light weight of such motor vehicle provided, that motor vehicles used for commercial purposes shall not be deemed to include vehicles used exclusively in delivery to market of the products of husbandry by the grower and owner thereof."

Relators made application in due form for registration of their respective automobiles, but failed to include in the tender of license fees the additional amount as required by the above statutory provision. The right of the secretary of state to refuse to issue the licenses depends upon the validity of the act in question.

It is contended that this legislative enactment is unconstitutional, because: (1) It abridges the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States; (2) it grants to a class of citizens privileges and immunities which upon the same terms do not equally belong to all citizens; and (3) it is not uniform in its application to all owners of commercially used cars, and is discriminatory as to that class of owners of commercially used cars to which these relators belong, and that no reasonable ground exists for such classification and discrimination.

Petitioners do not challenge the right of the state to require the payment of license fees for the privilege of operating motor vehicles upon the highways, as such question is definitely and affirmatively settled in this jurisdiction by Camas Stage Co., Inc., v. Kozer, 104 Or. 600, 209 P. 95, 25 A L. R. 27, and numerous authorities therein cited, nor is it contended that the state may not classify the objects of its legislation; but it is ably urged that the classifications under consideration are arbitrary and unreasonable, and therefore violative of both the state and federal Constitutions (Const. Or. art. 1, § 20; Const. U.S. Amend. 14, § 1), prohibiting special "privileges or immunities" and guaranteeing "equal protection of the laws." It appears in the applications for licenses that relators reside in the city of Portland, and use their automobiles "for commercial purposes in the business of selling and/or delivering goods, wares, and merchandise" more than five miles beyond the boundaries of such city. They claim unfair and illegal discrimination in requiring them to pay this additional license fee, for the reason the law exempts: (1) Common carriers; (2) motor vehicles used exclusively for the purposes above stated not beyond five miles from the boundaries of the city in which the owners have their places of business; (3) "motor vehicles used exclusively in delivery to market of the products of husbandry by the grower and owner thereof."

The precise question is whether there is a reasonable basis for the classifications made in the above act. If there is, the cause of petitioners fails; if there is not, the act violates well-established constitutional principles and the writ must issue. Tichner v. Portland, 101 Or. 294, 200 P. 466; Chan Sing v. Astoria, 79 Or. 411, 155 P. 378; Sterett & Oberle Packing Co. v. Portland, 79 Or. 260, 154 P. 410, 415; Ideal Tea Co. v. Salem, 77 Or. 182, 150 P. 852, Ann. Cas. 1917D, 684; Kellaher v. Portland, 57 Or. 575, 110 P. 492, 112 P. 1076; State v. Wright, 53 Or. 344, 100 P. 296, 21 L. R. A. (N. S.) 349. In the consideration of this statute, we are mindful of the well-recognized rule that every reasonable intendment is in favor of its validity, and that it should not be declared unconstitutional, unless satisfied that such is true beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Bailey (Or.) 236 P. 1053; State v. McFall, 112 Or. 183, 229 P. 79; Tichner v. Portland, supra.

There is much discretion vested in the Legislature as to classification of the objects of taxation. 6 R. C. L. 384. In classifying property for taxation, the state is declaring a public policy, and efficient government demands that it be not tied down by narrow or technical rules when undertaking to accomplish such purpose. Classification is primarily a question for the Legislature, and courts will not interfere, unless such is clearly arbitrary and unreasonable. Keeney v. New York, 222 U.S. 525, 32 S.Ct. 105, 56 L.Ed. 299, 38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1139. As stated in Baldwin v. State, 194 Ind. 303, 141 N.E. 343:

"It is primarily for the Legislature to determine the classification, and is never a judicial question unless the classification under no circumstances can be viewed as reasonable. When the classification in a law is questioned, if any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it, the existence of that state of facts must be presumed."

In Mutual Loan Co. v. Martell, 222 U.S. 225, 32 S.Ct. 74, 56 L.Ed. 175, Ann. Cas. 1913B, 529, Mr. Justice McKenna said:

"We have declared so often the wide range of discretion which the Legislature possesses in classifying the objects of its legislation that we may be excused from a citation of the cases. We shall only repeat that the classification need not be scientific nor logically appropriate, and if not palpably arbitrary and is uniform within the class, it is within such discretion."

Also see 6 R. C. L. 380, and numerous cases there cited.

Many times this court has cited with approval the clear and accurate statement of the rule as announced by Mr. Justice Wolverton in Ladd v. Holmes, 40 Or. 167, 66 P. 714, 91 Am. St. Rep. 457, who, speaking for the court, said:

"The greater difficulty centers about the classification. It may not be arbitrary, and requires something more than a mere designation by such characteristics as will serve to classify. The mark of distinction must be something of substance, some attendant or inherent peculiarity calling for legislation suggested by natural reason of different character to subserve the rightful demands of governmental needs. So that, when objects and places become the subject of legislative action, and it is sought to include some and exclude others, the inquiry should be whether the distinctive characteristics upon which it is proposed to found different treatment are such as in the nature of things will denote in some reasonable degree a practical and real basis for discrimination."

In determining whether the classifications in question are reasonable, it is important to give due consideration to the general purpose and spirit of the Oregon motor vehicle laws. It is apparent, even from a casual reading of the same, that the Legislature intended to impose upon those who most use the public highways of this state the greatest part of the burden of repairing and maintaining them. This policy, as a matter of abstract justice, is unquestionably sound. It requires the person who causes the most wear and tear on our highways, which are maintained at great expense, to assume a just part of this public burden.

In keeping with this policy, the Legislature, with good reason might well classify commercial vehicles. Is it not reasonable that certain kinds of commercial vehicles will...