State ex rel. Eveland v. Erickson
| Decision Date | 25 March 1921 |
| Docket Number | 4863 |
| Parties | STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA ex rel. H. L. EVELAND, H. C. Preston, and Hugh Smith, as the State Tax Commission, Plaintiffs, v. JOHN P. ERICKSON, County Auditor of Hughes County, Defendant, FIRST CONGREGATIONAL CHURCH OF PIERRE, Intervenor. |
| Court | South Dakota Supreme Court |
Original Proceedings
#4863--Writ denied.
Byron S. Payne, Attorney General
E. D. Roberts
Attorneys for Plaintiff.
Harry Horner, State's Attorney
Attorney for defendant County Auditor.
Howard G. Fuller
Attorney for Intervenor.
John Sutherland
Attorney for Amicus
Opinion filed March 25, 1921
Relators seek, by mandamus, to compel defendant, as county auditor, to place upon the tax lists two certain tracts of land situate in his county. The following are the facts which we deem material. Each tract of land is owned by a church society, and situate thereon is a dwelling owned by such society and occupied as a parsonage by its minister; each tract is a portion of a larger tract, which entire tract would be exempt from taxation—because of a church situate thereon—if no part thereof were occupied by such parsonage; each minister receives the use of his parsonage free of rent charge, but in part consideration for the services which he performs as the minister in charge of the religious work of his particular church society.
Section 6 of article II of our state Constitution provides that:
"The Legislature shall, by general law, exempt from taxation, property used exclusively for ... school, religious, cemetery and charitable purposes. ... "
Chapter 106, Session Laws of 1919, specifically exempts from taxation:
"all property belonging to any ... religious society, or used exclusively for ... religious purposes."
Relators contend that the property in question is not used exclusively for religious purposes, and that such portion of chapter 1o6, supra, as purports to exempt property merely because it belongs to a religious society, is unconstitutional. The only question that we find necessary to consider is whether or not a tract of land upon which is situate a parsonage, owned and used as above described, is property "used exclusively for religious purposes."
Relators contend that laws relating to the exemption of property from taxation should be strictly construed. They argue that it is the duty of all property owners to share in the support of the government; that exemption from taxation is the exception and not the rule; and that, before any one can claim the benefit of an exemption, it is incumbent upon him to bring himself or his property clearly within the exception.
Massachusetts, the mother of our great public school system, also led in religious life. Nearly a century and a half ago she announced in her fundamental law that:
"It is the right as well as the duty of all men in society, ... to worship the Supreme Being, the great Creator and Preserver of the Universe."
Const. Mass. pt. 1, art. 2.
The framers of our Constitution, recognizing the importance of religion and education, declared in section 1 of article 21 that the motto of this state shall be "Under God the People Rule." In section 1 of article 8 they declared that the stability of our form of government depends "on the morality and intelligence of the people;" that it is the duty of "the Legislature to establish and maintain a general and uniform system of public schools;" and that it is its duty "to adopt all suitable means to secure to the people the advantages and opportunities of education." Thus we see how, during the whole history of our nation, religion and education have been recognized as the foundation pillars of American civilization. We question whether the rule of strict construction should have any place in determining the intention of those who framed and who adopted those provisions of our Constitution relating to exemptions of property used for religious or educational purposes; it would almost seem to us that, in the light of the other provisions to which we have referred, it might well be held that a liberal rather than a strict construction should be applied to our constitutional and statutory provisions in relation to exemption from taxation of property used for school and religious purposes. But, even if the rule of strict construction is to be adhered to, yet, as was said by the court in State ex rel. v. Johnston, 214 Mo. 656, 21 LRA (NS) 171:
What is meant by the word "purposes" as used in the tax exemption provisions of our Constitution and statute? Webster defines purpose as:
"That which one sets before himself as an object to be attained; the end or aim to be kept in view in any plan, measure, exertion, or operation; design; intention."
This definition has been recognized as correct by the courts. Loftin v. Watson, 32 Ark. 414; Ex parte McCoy, 10 Cal. App. 116, 101 Pac. 419. In Sawter v. Shoenthal, 81 NJ Law, 197, 80 Atl. 102, "purpose" is defined as: "Something placed before the mind as an aim or desideratum."
It seems to us that some courts, in placing constructions upon tax exemption statutes, have fallen into error through a consideration of the mere use as distinguished and disconnected from the purpose of the use of property. They speak of "primary use," and lose sight of "primary purpose," and this especially when they are construing statutes relating to the exemption of property used for religious purposes. The word "primary" has many meanings and shades of meanings, varying in accordance with the subject word to which it is applied. Thus the primary uses of two buildings when considered without reference to the purposes with which such uses may be connected may be the same; yet the primary purposes lying back of such uses may be entirely different. Webster defines "primary" as: "First in order of time or development or in intention; primitive; fundamental; original."
When we couple the above definitions of "purpose" and "primary," it is clear that "primary purpose" is that which is first in intention; which is fundamental. It follows that, in determining whether the "use" to which certain property is put is for a religious "purpose" we must, in each case, determine what is first, or fundamentally, in the intention of the owners of such property when putting same into use.
We have situate near Pierre a large tract of land owned by the federal government. On this tract are several dwelling houses, barns, a heating plant, an office building, a dining room, a storehouse, a dormitory, an auditorium, a building wherein are classrooms. Among the personal property kept thereon are horses, cattle, and hogs. There are lands used for pasture, and other lands for raising grain and vegetables. Each particular item of property has a use peculiar to itself, and yet the primary purpose for which all was provided and for which all is used—the purpose that was first in the intention of the government, the fundamental purpose—was the establishment of an. educational institution for the education of the wards of the government. Who is there to question but that all this property is being made use of exclusively for "school purposes?"
A study of the decisions of the various courts will disclose that the courts have almost uniformly looked to find and been controlled by that purpose which was first in the mind or intention of those who owned and used the property when such courts have been called upon to construe statutes providing for the exemption of property "used exclusively for school purposes," or statutes having some similar provision. Thus in Minnesota, where it was provided that grounds attached to educational institutions, and which were necessary for their proper occupancy, use, and enjoyment should be exempt, the court held, in Ramsey County v. Macalester College, 51 Minn. 437, 18 LRA 278, that land, upon which were situate the residences of professors, was exempt. Under constitutional provisions worded identically as ours, it was held, in Monticello Seminary v., People, 106 Ill. 398, 46 Am). Rep. 702, that, where the seminary in question was originally located upon an eight-acre tract of land, and since three other tracts aggregating some 75 acres in all had been acquired, those tracts were all being used exclusively for school purposes. In that case it appeared that one part of this land was used for gardening, to supply vegetables for the institution, one for orchard purposes, one for raising grain and hay to feed the stock that was used in connection with the institution, one for pasture and woodland. Of the three tracts above mentioned, one 40-acre and one 20-acre tract were used for no other purposes than those just above Mentioned. Upon the other tract there was a building occupied by the superintendent of the grounds this tract was laid out in walks, avenues, etc., and used for the exercise and benefit of the scholars. It was shown that the produce of all kinds, taken from the land, was used for supplying the scholars and teachers, all of whom resided and lived within and upon the grounds of the institution. Under these facts the court said:
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