State ex rel. Flynn v. Rigg

• Decision Date: 24 July 1959
• Docket Number: No. 37700,37700
• Parties: STATE of Minnesota ex rel. Nicholas J. FLYNN, Appellant, v. Douglas C. RIGG, Warden, Minnesota State Prison, Respondent.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Page 79

98 N.W.2d 79

256 Minn. 304

STATE of Minnesota ex rel. Nicholas J. FLYNN, Appellant, v. Douglas C. RIGG, Warden, Minnesota State Prison Respondent.

No. 37700.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

July 24, 1959.

Syllabus by the Court

1. The only questions open to review on habeas corpus after conviction are whether the court had jurisdiction over the person charged with the crime and the subject matter of the cause; whether the sentence was authorized by law; or whether the petitioner has been denied due process or other fundamental constitutional rights. The writ may not be used as a substitute for an appeal or for a motion to correct, amend, or vacate a judgment of conviction validly entered.

2. Where there is no challenge to the jurisdiction of the court over the person or subject matter, our inquiry is limited to a determination of whether petitioner has been denied due process or other fundamental constitutional rights.

3. Before a petitioner is entitled to a hearing on a petition for a writ of habeas corpus it must appear from the petition and the commitment record that the facts, if established, would entitle him to a discharge.

4. Petitioner's claim that he was inadequately represented by counsel is untenable where it appears that more than 20 days elapsed between his arrest and arraignment, during substantially all of which time he was represented by counsel of his own choosing and was freely granted opportunity for consultation with such attorney.

5. Where it appears that the court correctly informed petitioner as to the maximum sentence for the crime of which he was charged and thereafter informations were filed charging petitioner with conviction of prior felonies which increased the permissible maximum sentence, petitioner was not denied due process where, as here, he understood that he would be charged with such prior convictions before he entered a plea of guilty.

6. Where petitioner was sentenced to an indeterminate term for the crime of larceny in the second degree and three prior felonies, his application for a discharge under a writ of habeas corpus on the ground that one of such prior convictions was for a crime that was not a felony in this state is premature where he has not served the maximum time to which there is no objection.

Feinberg, Mirviss, Meyers & Schumacher, Minneapolis, for appellant.

Miles Lord, Atty. Gen., Charles E. Houston, Sol. Gen., St. Paul, for respondent.

KNUTSON, Justice.

This is an appeal from a judgment of the District Court of Washington County, dated September 26, 1958, denying a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

From the record before us it appears that petitioner was arrested on July 28, 1954, and charged with the crime of grand larceny in the second degree. It appears that petitioner and one Edward K. Huisinga, while driving their car on the highway, picked up a hitchhiking sailor, one Russell C. Pasonault. Petitioner and Huisinga had a supply of liquor and as they and Pasonault drove along they stopped and purchased more. Apparently they consumed quite a large quantity of liquor, as the result of which they all became intoxicated. Somewhere along the way petitioner and Huisinga carried Pasonault from the car into a field, where they removed his watch, ring, and some travelers checks, some of which were later found in their car. The value of the stolen property was $95. Shortly after being arrested, petitioner, on the advice of the sheriff, retained counsel of his own choosing. Before appearing in court for arraignment, there were three, or possibly four, conferences between petitioner and his attorney. Petitioner entered a plea of guilty to the offense of grand larceny in the second degree, after which he was charged with the commission of three prior felonies, to which he entered a plea of guilty. He was thereupon sentenced to an indeterminate them in the state penitentiary.

Petitioner asserts that the sentence is invalid for the following reasons: (1) That, although he was represented by counsel in the district court at the time of and prior to his arraignment, his plea of guilty was conditional and qualified and that it should not have been accepted by the court; (2) that he was misled by a statement of the court that the maximum penalty for the offense of which he was charged was 5 years, whereas the maximum penalty for the offense, after a plea of guilty to three prior felony convictions, was for a much longer term; and (3) that the information charging him with three prior felony convictions was invalid in that one of the convictions was not a felony under Minnesota law.

1. The rules pertaining to the right to a writ of habeas corpus in a criminal matter have been stated so frequently by this court that it seems superfluous to repeat them. It is well recognized that ordinarily the only questions open to review on habeas corpus after a conviction are whether the court had jurisdiction over the person charged with the crime and over the subject matter of the cause; whether the sentence was authorized by law; or whether petitioner has been denied due process or other fundamental constitutional rights. ¹ The writ may not be used as a substitute for an appeal or for a motion to correct, amend, or vacate a judgment of conviction validly entered.

2. Where there is no challenge to the jurisdiction of the court over the person or the subject matter involved, our inquiry is limited to a determination of whether petitioner has been denied due process or other fundamental constitutional rights. In this case there is no challenge to the jurisdiction of the court, either over the person of petitioner or the subject matter involved. We therefore confine our examination of the petition and record to the questions involving a denial of due process or other fundamental constitutional rights.

3. Petitioner appeared pro se in the district court but appears in this court represented by counsel. It has been the practice of this court, where a petitioner imprisoned in the state penitentiary appears pro se, to carefully examine the petition and commitment record, including the judgment roll, to ascertain if there has been any denial of fundamental constitutional rights even though, technically, the petitions so presented sometimes lack the requsite draftsmanship that would be expected if the petitioner had appeared by counsel. We have so proceeded in this case, but, whether a petitioner appears pro se or by counsel, it must appear from the petition and the commitment record that facts alleged, if established, would entitle the petitioner to a discharge under a writ of habeas corpus before he is entitled to a hearing on the petition. With these rules in mind, we proceed to a determination of the questions raised by petitioner.

4. Petitioner's first contention is that he was inadequately represented by counsel; that his plea of guilty was conditional; and that the state failed to establish intent to appropriate the property taken, which was an essential element of the crime of which he was charged. The record fails to bear him out. He was arrested on July 28 and brought before the municipal court on July 30, 1954. He was then represented by counsel, as he was throughout the proceeding. He waived a preliminary hearing. On August 20, some 20 days after appearing in municipal court, he appeared before the district court upon his application to plead guilty. He admits that he had conferred with his counsel two or three times and does not now claim that he had inadequate time in which to confer with counsel. He and his attorney both admitted at the time of his arraignment that he understood the nature of the crime of which he was charged. The record shows that the court was more than usually careful in ascertaining that he did understand the nature of the crime. During the arraignment and prior to the imposition of sentence, the record shows the following proceedings, including questions by the court and the prosecuting attorney:

'THE COURT: * * * May I next ask, Mr. Klemme, ² how often you have consulted with these gentlemen? Have you talked to them on several occasions?

'MR. KLEMME: That's right, Your Honor, My best guess would be three and possibly four times.

'THE COURT: You are satisfied it is proper that they make this application to plead guilty at this time?

'MR. KLEMME: Yes, Your Honor.

'THE COURT: Now, I want to inquire, Mr. Klemme, whether or not you are satisfied that both of these defendants understand the nature of the charge made against them.

'MR. KLEMME: They understand the nature of the charge, Your Honor.'

After the clerk of court had read the information, the court again inquired:

'THE COURT: Now, you are satisfied, Mr. Klemme, that defendants and each of them understand the nature of this charge made against them?

'MR. KLEMME: That's correct.

'THE COURT: You are satisfied, also, that each of them possesses the mental capacity and competency to understand this charge and to present any defense which they have to it?

'MR. KLEMME: That's correct.'

Thereafter the court asked petitioner personally what his plea was, and he personally stated 'Guilty * * *.'

Before the imposition of sentence, petitioner was questioned by the prosecuting attorney, and the following questions were put to petitioner and answers obtained:

By Mr. Felix:

'Q As I understand, you told your counsel that you were under the influence of intoxicating liquor when this offense occurred to which you pleaded guilty?

'A Yes, I was, sir.

'Q But you don't claim that you were stupefied drunk?

'A Well, I was almost, I guess you might call it.

'Q Let me ask you, Mr. Flynn, if you claim that your intoxication was to such a degree that you did not have any intent whatsoever?

'A If it was any intent, it would be on the spur of the moment.

'Q You don't deny that you committed this crime, one of the essential elements of which is the intent to appropriate that money?

'A No,...